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SUMMARY 
 
This  project  details  the  development  of  a  new  framework  known  as  the  Coordinated 
Knowledge Management method to enable complete task integration of all low and mid-
level  tasks  for  process  industries.    The  framework  overcomes  past  problems  of  task 
integration, which made it impossible to have a fully integrated system and with integration 
being limited to data acquisition, regulatory control and occasionally supervisory control.  
The main component of the project includes the use of hierarchically structured timed place 
Petri nets, which have not previously been used for integrating tasks in intelligent process 
operations management.  Tasks which have been integrated include all low-level tasks such 
as  data  acquisition,  regulatory  control  and  data  reconciliation,  and  all  mid-level  tasks 
including supervisory control and most significantly the integration of process monitoring / 
fault detection and diagnosis. 
 
The Coordinated Knowledge Management method makes use of hierarchical timed place 
Petri  nets  to  (i)  coordinate  tasks,  (ii)  monitor  the  system,  (iii)  activate  tasks,  (iv)  send 
requests for data updates and (iv) receive notice when tasks are complete.  Visualization of 
the  state  of  the  system  is  achieved  through  the  moving  tokens  in  the  Petri  net.    The 
integration Petri nets are generic enough to be applied to any plant for integration using 
existing  modules  thus  allowing  the  integration  of  different  tasks,  which  use  different 
problem solving methodologies. 
 
Integrating tasks into an intelligent architecture has been difficult to achieve in the past 
since the developed framework must be able to take into account information flow and 
timing in a continuously changing environment.  In this thesis Petri nets have been applied 
to  continuous  process  operations  rather  than  to  batch  processes  as  in  the  past.    In  a 
continuous process, raw materials are fed and products are delivered continuously at known 
flow-rates  and  the  plant  is  generally  operated  at  steady  state  (Gu  and  Bahri,  2002).    iv 
However, even in a continuous process, data is received from the distributed control system 
(DCS) at discrete time intervals.  By transforming this data into process events, a Petri net 
can be used for overseeing process operations.  
 
The  use  of  hierarchical  Petri  nets  as  the  coordination  mechanism  introduces  inherent 
hierarchy  without  the  rigidity  of  previous  methods.    Petri  nets  are  used  to  model  the 
conditions  and  events  occurring  within  the  system  and  modules.    This  enables  the 
development of a self-monitoring system, which takes into account information flow and 
timing in a continuously changing environment.  Another major obstacle to integration of 
tasks in the past has been the presence of faults in the process.  The project included the 
integration of fault detection and diagnosis a component not integrated into current systems 
but which is necessary to prevent abnormal plant operation.  A novel two-step supervisory 
fault detection and diagnosis framework was developed and tested for the detection and 
diagnosis of faults in large-scale systems, using condition-event nets for fault detection and 
Radial  Basis  Function  neural  networks  for  fault  diagnosis.    This  fault  detection  and 
diagnosis methodology detects and diagnoses faults in the early stages of fault occurrence, 
before fault symptoms propagate throughout the plant. 
 
The Coordinated Knowledge Management method and the newly developed fault diagnosis 
module  were  developed  in  G2
1  and  applied  and  tested  on  the  Separation  and  Heating 
sections of the Pilot plant for the Bayer process at the School of Engineering Science, 
Murdoch University.  Testing indicated that the use of an intelligent system comprising of 
Petri nets for integration of tasks results in improved plant performance and makes the 
plant easier to monitor increasing profits.  The fault detection and diagnosis module was 
found to be useful in detecting faults very early on and diagnosing the exact location of 
faults, which would otherwise prove to be difficult to detect.  This would also increase 
plant safety, reduce wastage and improve environmental considerations of the plant. 
                                                 
1 G2 is a commercial programming environment for creating and deploying intelligent real-time applications 
(Gensym, 1999).   v 
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  Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
Current data acquisition systems provide the user with hundreds and even thousands of 
variables,  which  need  to  be  monitored  and  processed.    These  variables  need  to  be 
organized within an intelligent control architecture encompassing tasks such as data 
acquisition,  regulatory  control,  data  reconciliation,  supervisory  control,  process 
monitoring / fault  detection and  diagnosis,  planning and  scheduling.  An  integrated 
intelligent system uses this data in order to monitor and control tasks within the plant 
resulting in: 
 
￿￿ Increased production. 
￿￿ Increased plant lifetime. 
￿￿ Increased plant safety. 
￿￿ Improved plant performance. 
￿￿ Improved environmental aspects of the plant and decreased emissions. 
￿￿ Reduced plant running costs. 
￿￿ Reduced plant variability. 
￿￿ Reduced human error. 
￿￿ Minimization of labor-intensive tasks. 
￿￿ More frequent and better-informed decisions by the operator. 
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Tasks are categorized as low, mid and high-level tasks.  Low-level tasks include data 
acquisition,  data reconciliation and regulatory  control.  The most basic task is data 
acquisition where the process data is acquired from the plant through sensors attached 
to the plant.  These on-line process measurements are often corrupted by errors during 
measurement and transmission of data.  These errors are unavoidable and so before the 
plant data can be usefully used, it is necessary to reconcile this data into meaningful 
values.  Regulatory control occurs when the control system functions to counteract the 
effect of disturbances in order to maintain the output at its desired set pint.  The most 
common regulatory controller used in industry is the Proportional Integral Derivative 
(PID) controller (Ogunnaike and Ray, 1994).  Regulatory control cannot cope with large 
disturbances or process faults.  Mid-level tasks encompass process monitoring or fault 
detection  and  supervisory  control.    Process  monitoring  or  fault  detection  involves 
monitoring the process and detecting departures from normal operation.  Once a fault is 
detected, fault diagnosis involves identification of the cause of the fault (Reklaitis and 
Koppel, 1996).  A good fault detection and diagnosis module is thus useful to prevent 
abnormal plant operation.  Supervisory control involves the on-line calculation of set 
points to achieve maximum profit while satisfying operational constraints (Seborg et al., 
1989).  High-level tasks include planning and scheduling.  Planning is the forecasting of 
the average performance of a plant (a collection of interconnected processes) over some 
specified period, such as a month or a year.  Scheduling is the specification of the inputs 
to and outputs from each process and inventory, plus the timing and sequencing of each 
production operation, whether batch or continuous, over some short scheduling period, 
such as a week, or ten days (Boddington, 1995).  Planning and Scheduling have not 
been integrated into this application since they are application specific but can be easily 
integrated using the same technique. 
 
Past research has focussed on individual tasks with many different techniques being 
developed for each task.  Focussing on individual tasks in isolation with limited task 
integration  does  not  allow  for  maximum  plant  efficiency.    Individual  task 
implementation needs to include techniques that are capable of effectively dealing with 
incomplete information concerning the plant and its environment within unexpected or 
unfamiliar conditions.  In addition to conventional control techniques using numeric 
algorithms and process models, task implementation should include methods capable of 
self-learning (eg. neural networks), methods of organizing knowledge (eg. Petri nets), Introduction                                                                                                        Chapter 1 
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techniques dealing with incomplete or inexact information (eg. fuzzy logic strategies) 
and  non-numeric  techniques  such  as  knowledge  based  methods.    By  using  these 
techniques in various modules and integrating all modules, overall process improvement 
can be achieved.  With the aim of improving plant performance, increasing production 
and reducing plant variability, research is now leading towards the integration of these 
tasks.  By integrating these tasks into a framework encompassing intelligent process 
operation, a powerful intelligent system for overseeing process operation can then be 
developed.  Application of this framework would require a high-level programming 
environment and powerful knowledge representation tools including objects, methods, 
if-then rules, procedures, inheritance, hierarchies, relations, even triggering and multi-
tasking (Kramer and Fjellheim, 1996). 
 
Until recently the concept of an integrated framework for coordinating operational tasks 
in industrial plants has not been possible due to technological limitations.  As a result of 
increased computing power and powerful memory systems, a fully computer integrated 
system is now possible.  However, developing an integrated framework for operational 
tasks  is  difficult  to  achieve  for  the  approach  needs  to  accommodate  the  changing 
dynamics of a plant’s operation.  Previously proposed frameworks have outlined the 
order  that  tasks  should  occur  without  specifying  how  the  system  is  to  be  realized.  
Those frameworks include the functional hierarchy, which is limited by its inability to 
allow the transfer of information between all modules and the blackboard structure, 
which creates problems relating to data transfer rates and data consistency.  Problems of 
task  integration  include  not  only  information  flow  and  timing  for  a  continuously 
changing environment, but the integration of overlapping events, which result from the 
integration  of  different  tasks  using  different  problem  solving  methodologies  whilst 
operating towards the same global objective. 
 
Due to the problem of integrating all tasks, current distributed control systems (DCS’s) 
have limited their task integration to data acquisition, regulatory control and in some 
cases, supervisory control.  These systems are sufficient to keep the process at necessary 
operating  states  but  cannot  cope  with  large  disturbances  or  process  faults  (Becraft, 
1991).  If the dynamics of the process are changed, for example, due to a fault occurring 
in  the  process,  the  system  is  unable  to  account  for  this  situation.    Tasks  such  as 
supervisory  control can no longer be  directly  applied to this  faulty process and the Introduction                                                                                                        Chapter 1 
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process would no longer be operating at its optimal “steady state”.  Fault detection and 
diagnosis therefor plays an integral part in the operation of any processing plant as 
faults have the potential to disrupt any structure that is present in any sort of hierarchy.  
Similarly, data reconciliation, which is responsible for detecting sensor drift, cannot 
simply  be  added  to  this  “layered”  structure  as  results  from  the  data  reconciliation 
module affect all other modules. 
 
1.2  Coordinated Knowledge Management Method 
In this thesis a new method of task integration known as the Coordinated Knowledge 
Management  Method  has  been  developed.    In  this  method  hierarchically  structured 
timed  place  Petri  nets  enable  the  coordination  of  tasks  in  a  continuously  changing 
environment.    The  tokens  moving  throughout  the  Petri  net  monitor  conditions  and 
events occurring in both the plant and modules to allow for the coordination of tasks.  
The moving tokens in the Petri net provide a convenient visualization of the current 
state of the system.  Petri nets are used to: 
 
￿￿ Coordinate tasks. 
￿￿ Monitor the system. 
￿￿ Activate the knowledge sources (tasks). 
￿￿ Request for data to be updated in the data structures. 
￿￿ Receive notice when the task is completed. 
 
In the Coordinated Knowledge Management method as long as the correct data is made 
available to the Petri nets and data structures, it doesn’t matter which problem solving 
method is used in the individual modules.  This way, the most suitable technique or a 
combination of techniques can be used when implementing individual tasks.  Also, by 
coordinating tasks, computer processing power and memory requirements are decreased 
compared to continuously running individual tasks.   
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1.3  Project Aim  
The major novel contributions of this thesis (in descending order or importance) are as 
follows: 
 
￿￿ The  development  of  an  intelligent  system  and  integration  framework  for 
coordinating  operational  tasks  using  Petri  nets  as  the  coordination 
mechanism. 
￿￿ The development of a supervisory fault detection and diagnosis module for 
detecting dynamic faults in  large-scale system  using a  Petri net for  fault 
detection and neural networks for fault diagnosis. 
 
Although  individual  modules  for  integration  including  data  acquisition,  regulatory 
control, data reconciliation, supervisory control and process monitoring were developed 
it was not the aim of the thesis to develop new methods for these modules, but to 
integrate low and mid-level tasks.   
 
The developed intelligent system has been tested on a Pilot plant of the Bayer process at 
the School of Engineering Science, Murdoch University. 
 
1.4  Thesis Overview 
The following paragraphs provide an overview of the thesis: 
 
Chapter  2  presents  a  review  of  integration  techniques  in  intelligent  operational 
management.  The reader is provided with a review of different frameworks, which 
have  been  used  in  the  past  for  Artificial  intelligence  applications.    This  includes  a 
review  of  expert  systems  and  their  subset,  knowledge  based  systems  and  their 
limitations.  Previously proposed structures for task integration such as the functional 
hierarchy and blackboard model are then presented.  Due to limitations in these models, 
the reader is introduced to the newly developed Coordinated Knowledge Management 
method for task integration, the main component of this project. 
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Because the Coordinated Knowledge Management method makes use of hierarchically 
structured timed place Petri nets in order to coordinate tasks, Chapter 3 provides the 
reader with an introduction into the theory of Petri nets and their operation.  This allows 
the  reader  to  understand  the  operation  of  Petri  nets,  which  are  presented  in  later 
chapters.  
 
Before tasks could be integrated, each module needed  to be developed.  Chapter  4 
presents the modules encompassing intelligent operational management.  This chapter 
includes a literature review into methods used for each of these tasks and the theories 
involved.    The  implementation  of  the  data  reconciliation,  supervisory  control  and 
process monitoring modules in then discussed in detail as applied to the Pilot plant case 
study. 
 
Because  fault  detection  and  diagnosis  is  a  major  component  of  task  integration, 
emphasis was placed on developing a fault detection and diagnosis module for large-
scale processes.  Chapter 5 therefore is dedicated to the development of a supervisory 
fault  detection  and  diagnosis  system  to  detect  faults  as  they  occur  in  large-scale 
systems. 
 
Chapter  6  describes  the  Coordinated  Knowledge  Management  method  in  complete 
detail with specific details on individual integration Petri nets. 
 
Chapter 7 presents the results of testing the application through an integrated run on the 
Pilot  plant  at  the  School  of  Engineering  Science.    In  this  chapter  conclusions  and 
recommendations of future work are also discussed. 
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1.5  List of Publications 
Major components of the work in this thesis are presented in the following conference 
presentations and journal articles: 
 
￿￿ Power,  Y.  and  Bahri,  P.A.  (2002).  The  Use  of  G2  and  NOL  for  Early 
Detection  and  Diagnosis  of  Faults  in  the  Mineral  Processing  Industry, 
Gensym  User  Society  Worldwide  Meeting  2002  (GUS2002),  Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 3-5 April. 
 
￿￿ Power,  Y.  (2002).  “Supervisory  Fault  Diagnosis  Using  Petri  Nets”, 
proceedings  of  the  Third  Inter  University  Postgraduate  Electrical 
Engineering  Symposium,  Murdoch  University,  Rockingham,  Western 
Australia.   
 
￿￿ Power, Y. and Bahri, P.A. (2003). “Intelligent Operational Management and 
the Concept of Integration”, in Chung, P.W.H., Hinde, C. and Ali, M. (eds.), 
Developments in Applied Artificial Intelligence, LNAI 2718, Springer, pp. 1-
10. 
 
￿￿ Power,  Y.  (2003).  “The  Development  of  a  Framework  for  an  Integrated 
Process Operation Management System”, proceedings of the Fourth Inter 
University Postgraduate Electrical Engineering and Computing Symposium, 
Curtin University, Bentley, Western Australia. 
 
￿￿ Ghaeli, M., Power, Y., Bahri, P.A. and Nikraz, M. (2004). “The Application 
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Systems, December 2002. 
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  Chapter 2 
Review of Integration Techniques in 
Intelligent Operational Management 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
In order to integrate tasks into an intelligent system, a framework must be used to allow 
modules to communicate with each other in a coordinated fashion.  In the past, several 
types of frameworks have been developed for Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications 
two  of  which include expert  systems  (ES)  and  its  subset  knowledge  based  systems 
(KBS).  Frameworks that have been developed include the functional hierarchy and the 
blackboard model, which was designed to eliminate the weaknesses of expert systems.  
To date no known application of integration of low (data acquisition, regulatory control, 
data reconciliation), mid (supervisory control, process monitoring / fault detection and 
diagnosis)  and  high-level  tasks  (planning  and  scheduling)  has  been  developed  for 
processing plants. 
 
The integration of operational tasks through an intelligent architecture would lead to 
improved plant performance and an increase in production by reducing plant variability 
through  the  interaction  and  coordination  of  information  flow  between  tasks.    Past 
research has focussed on individual task implementation at each level of the hierarchy, 
using many different techniques.  However, with the advancement of computing power 
research is now emphasizing the integration of tasks. 
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Individual tasks have usually been treated in isolation, however this should not be the 
case  since  lower-level  tasks  have  an  impact  on  higher-level  tasks.    For  example, 
traditionally  fault  diagnosis,  data  reconciliation  and  control  have  been  developed 
independently without any interaction, however is preferable that they be treated under 
one single central objective (Rengasamy, 1995).  Low-level events such as sensor drift 
detected  by  the  data  reconciliation  module  will  affect  mid-level  tasks such  as  fault 
detection and diagnosis.  Process faults (a mid-level task) will also have an effect on 
high-level  tasks  such  as  scheduling.    If a  fault  is  detected and  diagnosed,  previous 
schedules may have to be revised.  Similarly, high-level tasks impact on lower-level 
tasks  (Rengasamy,  1995).    Changes  to  schedules  may  result  in  process  set  point 
changes,  which  are  calculated  by  the  supervisory  control  module  and  affect  the 
regulatory control module.  So although each module is responsible for its own specific 
task, for optimal plant operation, they cannot operate in isolation. 
 
Rengasamy (1995) lists seven desirable characteristics an integrated process operation 
framework should possess.  These (characterized by the integrated system developed in 
this thesis) are as follows (Rengasamy, 1995): 
 
(i)  Ability to reason with partial and uncertain information.  Uncertainty 
arises from incorrect sensor readings and often only certain streams can 
be measured. 
(ii)  Ability to reason with models of different degrees of accuracy.  Low-
level models use cause / effect relationships between different variables.  
High-level  models  can  numerically  predict  the  relationship  between 
various  process  variables.    Middle-models  use  both  qualitative  and 
quantitative information.  These models should be able to work together. 
(iii)  Ability to understand and reason about the process at different levels of 
details.  At the highest-level, the process should reason about the process 
in  its  entirety.    For  example,  this  may  involve  monitoring  individual 
control loops of the process over a longer time frame.  This dictates the 
need for a hierarchical representation of process subsystems. 
(iv)  Ability to ensure the validity and consistency of assumptions made at 
different  levels.    Model  assumptions  may  change  during  the  process 
operation.    So  assumptions  must  be  verified  and  changes  must  be Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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incorporated during the reasoning process.  This is also necessary when 
considering the interaction between different modules. 
(v)  Ability  to  achieve  seamless  integration  between  various  solution 
approaches.  This involves the use of different solution methodologies 
for the same problem.  One solution methodology may not be sufficient. 
(vi)  Ability  to  operate  as  an  automated  decision  support  system  for  the 
operators.  Operators must be actively involved during decision-making.  
This would involve the development of simple, operator friendly user 
interfaces, visual and graphic display information, structured and guided 
access to data and knowledge about the process status and behavior and 
explanation capabilities offering insight into the systems reasoning and 
recommendations. 
(vii)  Ability  to  adapt  to  changes  in  the  process.    These  include  changes 
stemming  from  disturbances  or  environmental  conditions  such  as 
changes  in  production  quantities  with  changing  demands,  changes  in 
quality  of  raw  material  etc.    Also,  each  module  integrated  in  the 
framework should be easily updateable. 
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of expert systems outlining their limitations and 
weaknesses.  Different integration frameworks are reviewed drawing from the areas of 
process industries and management.  The Coordinated Knowledge Management method 
of  task integration is  then  presented  which eliminates  some  of  the  shortcomings  of 
previous methods.  The final section describes the Pilot plant case study where the 
developed modules and Coordinated Knowledge Management method are tested. 
 
2.2  Expert Systems 
An  expert  system  is  an  intelligent  computer  program  that  can  perform  special  and 
difficult task(s) in some field(s) at the level of human experts.  Expert systems are 
comprised of three components (Rodd and Verbruggen, 1991): Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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(i)  A  control  mechanism  that  determines  strategies  to  control  the 
inference process. 
(ii)  An inference engine, which provides interpretation of the knowledge, 
together with logical deductions and modifications to the knowledge 
base. 
(iii)  The  knowledge  base,  which  can  include  facts,  judgements,  rules, 
intuition and experience. 
 
An  important  characteristic  of  this  model  is  the  separation  of  the  inference  engine 
(program  using  the  knowledge)  from  the  control  mechanism  and  knowledge  base 
enabling the knowledge to be controlled and expanded as new information is obtained 
(Rodd and Verbruggen, 1991).  After the expert system is built, the reasoner can select 
various relative knowledge from the knowledge base and construct various problem-
solving sequences according to the particulars of the specific solved problems (Cai, 
1997). 
 
Three  different  types  of  expert  systems  can  be  distinguished:  (i)  rule-based  expert 
systems,  (ii)  model-based  expert  systems and  (iii)  knowledge-based expert  systems.  
Rule-based  expert  systems  contain  only  “shallow  knowledge”  obtained  from  the 
designer.  Model-based expert systems attempt to supplement the empirical rule based 
knowledge with information about the domain being handled (Rodd and Verbruggen, 
1991).    The  model-based  expert  system  can  then  inference  through  two  reasoning 
modes: (i) using heuristic knowledge as it does in a rule-based expert system and (ii) by 
generating and testing the searching space of the deep model (Cai, 1997).  Knowledge 
based systems, where the majority of research is focussed today is described in more 
detail. 
 
2.2.1  Knowledge-based expert systems 
Knowledge-based expert systems (KBS) are computer programs that capture and retain 
expertise that has been gained over many years of engineering experience.  They also 
employ  knowledge  gained  from  other  (than  human)  knowledge  sources.    KBS  can 
reason intelligently about necessary actions to take in real time, thus freeing operational Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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staff (Tzafestas and Verbruggen, 1995).  A typical architecture for KBS is presented in 
Fig. 2.1. 
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Fig. 2.1. Expert system architecture (Tzafestas and Verbruggen, 1995) 
 
The principle components of the KBS include (Tzafestas and Verbruggen, 1995): 
 
(i)  The knowledge base to represent the facts, rules and events. 
(ii)  The database, which contains information about the current problem. 
(iii)  The inference engine, which draws conclusions from the knowledge 
base. 
(iv)  A system interface in order to pass conclusions to the system. 
(v)  The  explanation  component,  which  informs  the  user  on  how 
conclusions are obtained. 
(vi)  The workspace, which is an area or memory for storing the problem 
description. 
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KBS are  designed  to be modular in  that the knowledge base  is  separated from the 
inference  engine  and  algorithms  so  that  new  situations  can  be  accommodated 
(Tzafestas, 1997).  Rules can easily be added, deleted or changed without affecting 
other rules.  Also separation of the knowledge base from the algorithms means that 
algorithms can be separated from heuristic knowledge thus allowing for higher level 
reasoning, making the intelligent system more robust and flexible (Wang and Linkens, 
1996).  Moreover, separation of the knowledge base from the inference engine allows 
the inference engine and algorithms to be generic so they can be applied to a variety of 
processes.  This means that it is possible to begin operating a process with an empty 
knowledge base and to create a new knowledge base for a particular process (Wang and 
Linkens, 1996). 
 
2.2.2  Limitations of expert systems 
The ‘classical’ expert system structure has two main weaknesses (Engelmore et al., 
1988): 
 
(i)  The  control  of  the  application  of  the  knowledge  is  implicit  in  the 
structure of the knowledge base.  For example, in the ordering of rules 
for a rule-based system. 
(ii)  The representation of the knowledge is dependent on the nature of the 
inference engine (a rule interpreter, for example can only work with 
knowledge expressed as rules). 
 
The blackboard model, covered in a later section, serves to eliminate the weaknesses of 
the classical expert system structure.  By separating the problem solving knowledge into 
separate knowledge sources, separate solution methodologies can be applied each using 
their own inference engine.  Hence, the representation of knowledge would no longer be 
dependent on the nature of the inference engine. 
 
Another weakness of the classical expert system is that for increasingly large problems, 
as the size of the knowledge base increases, the inference engine must cope with the 
focus-of-attention-problem; specifically “how should limit resources be allocated at a 
given time when many plausible ways of making progress exist?” (Terry, 1988). Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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In general, classical expert systems are application specific where each expert system 
must be developed for each individual application.  The aim of this project, however, 
was the development of a method for task integration, which once developed, could be 
applied to many different processing plants, integrating existing solution methodologies 
for each individual task. 
 
2.3  Integration of Tasks 
2.3.1  Hierarchical structure 
Sardis functional hierarchy is the most common method used to describe integration of 
tasks and is based on management models.  It is organized according to the “Principle 
of  Increasing  Precision  with  Decreasing  Intelligence”  (IPDI  principle)  (Tzafestas, 
1997).  The functional hierarchy applied to a process plant is presented in Fig. 2.2.  
Note that this diagram does not include data reconciliation, which forms part of the low-
level tasks.  Three levels were proposed: (i) the execution level (lower level), (ii) the 
coordination level (intermediate level) and (iii) the organization level (higher level).  
The motivation behind this structure is that tasks and operations are ordered from a 
more abstract, less time crucial levels to more specific, data intensive and time crucial 
levels  (Tzafestas,  1997).    Low-level  tasks  such  as  regulatory  control  require  large 
amounts of sensor data and data is usually received at rate ranging from seconds to 
minutes.    However,  high-level  tasks  such  as  planning  and  scheduling  are  often 
performed on a longer time scale, ranging from daily to half yearly. Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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Fig. 2.2. Functional hierarchy applied to processing plants (Reklaitis and Koppel, 1996) 
 
The functional hierarchy is the most commonly used structure in current distributed 
control systems (DCS’s).  Layers are added using different control technologies at each 
level.  Once a layer has been implemented, tested and accepted a more complex layer 
can be introduced on top of it.  The new layer then acts on the lower layer, which 
modifies the status of the objects associated with them (Alarcon et al., 1994). 
 
The main components  of a  commercial  DCS network are  shown in Fig. 2.3.  This 
consists of a large number of local data acquisition computers responsible for certain 
process measurements and part of the local control action.  These computers transfer 
their measurement results and control actions to other computers via the data highway 
usually made up of several levels used for raw or processed data.  At a higher level, the 
supervisory (or host) computer is responsible for performing higher-level functions such 
as  optimization,  plant  startup  and  shutdown  and  providing  feedback  on  economic 
performance (Ogunnaike and Ray, 1994). Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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Fig. 2.3. The elements of a commercial DCS network (Ogunnaike and Ray, 1994) 
 
Current  DCS’s  are  usually  only  limited  to  data  acquisition,  regulatory  control  and 
sometimes, supervisory control.  This type of system is sufficient to keep the process at 
necessary operating states but cannot cope with large disturbances of process faults 
(Becraft, 1991).  If the dynamics of the process are changed, for example, due to a fault 
occurring  in  the  process,  the  system  is  inadequate  to  account  for  this  situation.  
Configurating such a system to account for these types of situations would be difficult 
to achieve. 
 
2.3.1.1  Limitations of functional hierarchy 
This functional hierarchy is equivalent to traditional pyramid organizational structures.  
Management theorists have discovered that a very rigidly structured organization with 
many  levels,  function  best  when  environmental  conditions  are  relatively  stable.  
Unstable surroundings dictate a more flexible organization, which can adapt quickly for 
change (Kreitner, 1998).  Hence this rigid structure is no longer considered appropriate.  
The same can be said about the framework as applied to the process industry.  Tasks are 
isolated  from  each  other  and  executed  in  a  hierarchical  manner  where  upper-level Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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decisions are imposed on lower-levels with limited feedback up the chain.  This can 
result in the plant not running at maximum capability (Reklaitis and Koppel, 1996).  
Plant complexity and uncertainty can upset this hierarchy.  There is also no relation to 
timing of tasks in the functional hierarchy.  The structure does not take into account 
situations in which the flow of information may be upset and information flow may be 
changed.  It is therefore necessary to find a more adaptive framework (Kreitner, 1998).  
This framework should not be as rigidly structured as the functional hierarchy. 
 
2.3.2  Blackboard architecture (data management) 
A general knowledge-based model, suitable for implementing intelligent systems, is the 
blackboard model (Tzafestas, 1997).  The blackboard metaphor involves a group of 
generic  problem  solvers  (experts),  which  look  at  the  same  blackboard  recording 
individual states of the ongoing problem solving process.  Each expert takes appropriate 
actions based on the information presented on the blackboard.  A key feature of this 
structure is that the problem solving states are made available in the form of global data 
structures  while  maintaining  the  isolation  of  each  of  the  modules  (Albayrak  and 
Krallmann, 1995).  The blackboard architecture is flexible and able to integrate different 
kinds of knowledge representation and inferencing techniques (Cai, 1997). 
 
The blackboard model seeks to eliminate the inherent weaknesses in the classical expert 
system.  The self-contained modules contain knowledge that provides separate solution 
methodologies and so each knowledge base no longer needs use the same knowledge 
representation.  Each individual module does not need to operate in the same way and 
contains  its  own  individual  inference  engine.    Communication  between  modules 
consists only of reading and writing to the working memory and so each module must 
read/write in a format understandable by every other module (Engelmore et al., 1988). 
 
The  fundamental  blackboard  architecture  is  presented  in  Fig.  2.4.    The  blackboard 
architecture consists of three major components (Engelmore et al., 1988): Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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(i)  The knowledge sources (KS), which are independent but complementary 
subsets  of  the  knowledge  about  the  process.    Each  KS  is  able  to 
contribute  to  the  ongoing  solution  of  the  problem  by  modifying  the 
blackboard or control data structure.  The KS must know the conditions 
under  which  it  contributes  to  the  blackboard.    KS  are  generally 
represented as procedures, sets of rules or logic assertions. 
(ii)  The blackboard data structure where all the knowledge sources have 
exclusive access for retrieval and storage modification of information.  
This  represents  a  global  database.    Interaction among  the  KS’s  takes 
place solely through changes on the blackboard.  Data is often organized 
in hierarchically represented objects of attribute-value pairs.  Objects can 
contain input data, partial solutions, alternatives and final solutions (and, 
possibly control data). 
(iii)  The  control  mechanism  which  consists  of  the  KS  responding  to  the 
changes on the blackboard and determines the focus of attention either 
on KS’s, blackboard objects, or a combination of both. 
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Fig. 2.4. Fundamental blackboard architecture (Tzafestas, 1997) Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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The solution methodology used in the blackboard can be data, goal or model driven.  
The operation of the blackboard framework can be described as follows (Engelmore et 
al., 1988): 
 
1.  Each KS makes change(s) to the blackboard.  As changes are made, a record 
is kept in a data structure that holds the control information. 
2.  Each KS then indicates the contribution it can make to the new solution state 
(a priori or dynamically determined). 
3.  Using the information from steps 1 and 2, the control mechanism selects the 
focus of attention. 
4.  The control mechanism then executes as follows: 
a.  Knowledge-scheduling approach – if the focus of attention is a KS, a 
blackboard object (or a collection of these) is used as the context of 
its invocation. 
b.  Event-scheduling approach – if the focus of attention is a blackboard 
object, a KS is chosen to process the object. 
c.  If the focus of attention is both a KS and an object, the KS is ready 
for execution.  The KS is executed together with the object. 
 
The solution process is terminated when a KS indicates that the problem solving process 
is  complete  either  due  to  an  acceptable  solution  being  found  or  due  to  lack  of 
knowledge (Engelmore et al., 1988). 
 
Fjellheim et al. (1994), present an advanced tool for real time artificial intelligence (AI) 
applications, for the integration of process monitoring and diagnosis using knowledge-
based systems, real-time specifications and object-orientation.  Its main features include 
a blackboard architecture, multiple cooperating agents and predictable execution times 
for critical tasks (Kramer and Fjellheim, 1996).  The tool has been used to develop an 
application for diagnostic/alarm handling at an oil refinery.  The general aims of the 
MORSAF  (Monitor  Operations  to  Render  Sound  Advice  Fast)  application  are  to 
(Fjellheim et al., 1994): 
 
(i)  Manage alarm situations as far as possible by anticipation. 
(ii)  Base diagnosis of a fault (alarm) situation on causal knowledge. Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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Managing alarms consists of (i) monitoring the plant status, (ii) analyzing the actual 
alarm and (iii) restoring the plant status using on-line suggestions, which the operator 
must follow (Fjellheim et al., 1994).  The overall architecture is represented by the flow 
diagram in Fig. 2.5.  Data is presented and updated on the blackboard periodically.  If 
the knowledge sources have not updated in this time period, an optimal solution may 
not  be  reached.    This  in-optimal  solution  would  then  filter  down  into  other  tasks, 
achieving overall poorer plant performance.  Supervisory control set point selection had 
not been integrated into this application and is performed manually by  the operator 
(Pessi and Bullo, 1994).  Further information on this architecture can be found in Barber 
et al. (1994), Fjellheim et al. (1994), Kersual and Mensch (1994), Kramer and Fjellheim 
(1996), Pessi and Bullo (1994) and Vega and Gonzalez-Quel (1994). 
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Fig. 2.5. MORSAF architecture (Kramer and Fjellheim, 1996) 
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2.3.2.1  Limitations of the blackboard model 
The blackboard model only outlines the organization principle and does not specify how 
the system is to be realized as a computational entity.  Application of the blackboard 
framework often requires extensions to the framework (Engelmore et al., 1988). 
 
When applying the blackboard framework one must address the problem of maintaining 
data consistency in the blackboard by controlling asynchronous references to shared 
data (Engelmore and Morgan, 1988).  The development of a blackboard framework 
necessitates the use of multiprocessor computers or distributed computer systems.  A 
multiprocessor system derives its high performance by performing many computations 
in parallel (Hamacher et al., 1996).  A multiprocessor environment introduces several 
other problems as the exchange of data, code and results among these processors can 
often  make  the  overall system  slow  (Ensor  and  Gabbe,  1988;  Nii  et  al.  1988).    A 
bottleneck  of  distributed  computer  systems  includes  issues  relating  to  speed  of 
communication or data transfer rates (Hamacher et al., 1996).  Although distributed 
control  systems  are  currently  used  for  data  acquisition  and  regulatory  control, 
introducing  increased  functionality  such  as  data  reconciliation,  supervisory  control, 
process monitoring / fault detection and diagnosis would lead to increased volumes of 
data with computationally intensive processing and real-time execution constraints.  It is 
therefore better to coordinate tasks based on events occurring within the process. 
 
Past applications of the blackboard framework have been to find a specific solution to a 
problem at hand, for example speech understanding systems in the 1970’s (Hearsay-II), 
signal  interpretation,  image  understanding  and  mission  planning  (Engelmore  et  al., 
1988).  However, integration of tasks for a processing plant does not involve one single 
solution, but continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current state of the system by 
the coordination of individual tasks.  Also, KS’s should not only contain procedures, 
sets of rules or logic assertions as in the traditional blackboard framework, but should 
include other solution methodologies such as optimization and neural networks. 
 
The Coordinated Knowledge Management method proposed in section 2.3.6 uses a Petri 
net  coordination  structure  to  integrate  all  low  and  mid-level  tasks.    Absolute 
independence  of  KS’s  has  not  been  implemented,  as  presented  in  the  blackboard Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
Page 2.15 
framework  because  each  module  is  affected  by  the  current  state  of  the  process.  
Modules  rely  on  data  from  other  modules  to  perform  their  task,  for  example  the 
supervisory  control  module  relies  on  data  from  the  data  reconciliation  module  to 
calculate set point values.  Each module is independent in that it is responsible for a 
particular task.  The Petri net coordination structure monitors the modules and process 
events in order to drive the system providing ongoing evaluation of the current state of 
the system.  For the case of a large processing plant, multiprocessing as used in the 
blackboard framework would result in very slow system evaluation.  The coordination 
of tasks would therefore also reduce this processor power. 
 
2.3.3  Knowledge management 
The knowledge management viewpoint focuses on the common knowledge required for 
multiple applications and a methodology for representing this information in a useful 
way.  This avoids duplication of process knowledge as the same knowledge can then be 
used in multiple applications.  This type of approach lends itself towards object-oriented 
programming (Rengasamy, 1995). 
 
Lu et al. (1997) present a test bed, based on object-oriented programming, which serves 
to provide a framework for coordinated activities, interaction between performers and 
sharing  of  information.    This  multi-dimensional  object-oriented  model  (MDOOM) 
contains three sub-models: 
 
(i)  The information model, which defines domain system classes and their 
hierarchies that capture the entireties of relevant unit operations, pieces 
of equipment etc. 
(ii)  The  activity  model,  which  identifies  engineering  activities  and 
relationships  between  these  activities  and  their  associated  classes 
(objects)  and  performers.    Activities  are  represented  by  rules  and 
procedures. 
(iii)  The  performers  consisting  of  humans  and  computer  programs  which 
have the knowledge and skills on how to perform the activities. 
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Qian et al. (2000) outlines an object/agent based system model, which encompasses 
problem integration, task integration and personnel involvement.  The paper describes 
the  class  hierarchy  that  has  been  developed  in  order  to  promote  effective 
communication between modules.  This class hierarchy includes: 
 
(i)  The  base  and  process  object  classes  used  to  represent  the  basic 
characteristics of the chemical process and provide data processing and 
mathematical model computation for the decision activities of process 
operation. 
(ii)  The  decision  object  and  decision-maker  class  used  to  implement  the 
decisions and support operator involvement. 
 
Module details have not been provided in this paper. 
 
2.3.4  A framework for integrated process supervision 
Rengasamy (1995) proposed a framework to integrate low and mid-level tasks shown in 
Fig.  2.6.    This  framework  is  a  combination  of  the  functional  blocks  view  and 
information management view.  In the functional blocks view, modules are assigned 
individual  boxes  and  arrows  between  boxes  represent  data  flow.    This  viewpoint 
emphasizes maintainability of software modules.  Data flow is represented abstractly 
and  may  contain  slight  hierarchy  (Rengasamy,  1995).    The  proposed  framework  is 
useful  for  considering  the  information  flow,  however,  data  exchanging  and 
communication  are  not  addressed  (Quia  et  al.,  2000).    Further  information  on  this 
framework including module details is presented in Rengasamy (1995), Reklaitis and 
Koppel (1996), Venkatasubramanian (1994) and Venkatasubramanian (2003). Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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Fig. 2.6. Process integration framework (Rengasamy, 1995) 
 
2.3.5  Other integration methodologies 
Other areas of engineering have also studied the problem of task integration.  Valavanis 
et  al.  (1997)  provide  a  review  of  various  control  architectures  used  in  unmanned 
vehicles.    These  vehicles  face  similar  problems  to  those  in  the  processing  industry 
including high-dimensional sensory data,  computation-intensive processing and  real-
time execution constraints.  Architectures reviewed include hierarchical, heterarchical 
(parallel structure where all system modules communicate amongst themselves without 
supervision or intermediate levels), subsumption (behaviors working in parallel without 
a higher level supervisor where one layer can subsume another layer, although both still 
run in parallel) and hybrid (combination of the three other architectures).   
 Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
Page 2.18 
Each of these four architectures are limited.  Limitations of the hierarchical architecture 
have already been discussed.  The lack of supervision in heterarchical architecture can 
lead to uncontrollable intensive communication amongst modules.  Disadvantages of 
the subsumption architecture includes difficulty synchronizing timing between modules, 
increasing complexity of the system with increasing number of modules and a lack of 
high level control.  Formal verification of the hybrid architecture is difficult to achieve 
(Valavanis et al., 1997). 
 
2.3.6  Coordinated  Knowledge  Management  method:  a  new  approach  to 
task integration 
The Coordinated Knowledge Management method allows tasks to communicate directly 
with the coordination mechanism dispensing with the requirement of an external control 
mechanism.  Hierarchy is present but it is not as rigidly structured as in the functional 
hierarchy.   As in the case of the blackboard framework, tasks  represent knowledge 
sources and act autonomously.  A Petri net is used to (i) coordinate tasks, (ii) monitor 
the system, (iii) activate the knowledge sources (tasks), (iv) request data to be updated 
in the data structures and (v) receive notice when the task is completed.  Visualization 
of the state of the system is achieved through the moving tokens in the Petri net. 
 
A  diagram  outlining  the  interfacing  in  the  Coordinated  Knowledge  Management 
method is shown in Fig. 2.7.  The blackboard in the traditional blackboard model has 
been  replaced  by  hierarchical  timed  place  Petri  nets  that are timed  place  Petri  nets 
organized in a tree structure (Dittrich, 1995).  Each individual module (data acquisition, 
data  reconciliation,  regulatory  control,  process  monitoring  /  fault  detection  and 
diagnosis and supervisory control) contains information (including rules, procedures, 
Petri nets, optimization and neural networks), which enables each module to operate 
autonomously.    The  hierarchical  timed  place  integration  Petri  nets  co-ordinate  the 
information flow and timing between modules. 
 
Sensor  information  is  stored  in  global  data  structures  for  each  sensor.    These  data 
structures contain the raw sensor reading, sensor limits, nominal values, information 
about presence or sensor errors, mode of operation and current steady state status of the 
sensor.    These  data  structures  also  contain  information  coming  from  each  of  the Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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modules such as the reconciled readings, and where appropriate, set points.  When the 
integration Petri nets activates a knowledge source (task), appropriate data is read from 
the  data  structure  into  the  module  and  once  the  task  has  been  performed,  the 
corresponding  data  structure  is  updated  accordingly.    Tasks  do  not  communicate 
directly  with  each  other,  but  through  the  coordination  mechanism  and  global  data 
structures.    The  organization  of  the  sub  Petri  nets  is  covered  in  complete  detail  in 
Chapter 6. 
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Fig. 2.7. Coordinated Knowledge Management method interfacing 
 
Each module (apart from regulatory control) has been developed in G2 (a commercial 
programming environment for creating and deploying intelligent real-time applications) 
(Gensym, 1999).  Data is transferred between G2 and the DCS via a bridge (donated by 
Process Control Technology Engineers Pty. Ltd.).  Communication with the operator is 
achieved  through  the  operator  interface.    The  use  of  object-oriented  approach  for 
programming  each  individual  module  including  schematics,  equipment  and  data 
structures promotes abstraction and reusability (Fjellheim et al., 1994). 
 
The aim of the Coordinated Knowledge Management method is that each module must 
be responsible for its own individual task.  There is, however, some overlap in tasks Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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performed and so the information present in each individual module must be in a format 
understandable by other modules (through the global data structures) and each module 
must also be able to interface to a global coordination mechanism.  The user / operator 
interface  represents  the  gateway  between  the  developed  intelligent  system  and  the 
operators of this system. 
 
The techniques used in each individual module are not important, as long as the correct 
information is made available to the global data structures and the integration Petri nets.  
The integration Petri nets are generic enough to be applied to any plant for integration 
using existing modules already in use.  The only attributes, which form part of the 
integration Petri nets,  which may need to  be changed, are some timing  parameters, 
which relate to operator input and the duration of procedures.  The rules and procedures 
will need to be modified so that existing modules can interface to the integration Petri 
nets. 
 
Task integration takes into account information flow and timing of the modules through 
the coordination mechanism.  Running the modules involves monitoring events, which 
characterizes significant changes in state.  Similarly, operator input and data flow can 
translate  to  conditions.    These  suitably  map  into  a  Petri  net  description  for  the 
coordination mechanism, where events are represented by transitions and conditions by 
places (Peterson, 1981; Reisig, 1982; Reisig, 1992; Reisig, 1998).  Moving tokens in the 
Petri  nets  represent  the  current  state  of  the  process  as  monitored  by  the  modules; 
however, data from each module is stored in global data structures representing each 
piece of process equipment.  Each module is able to access this data when requested, 
depending on the current state of the process as monitored by the modules.  Timing can 
be  incorporated  into  the  Petri  net  by  considering  timed  Petri  nets  (Coolahan  and 
Roussopoulos, 1983; Wang, 1998). 
 
2.4  Case Study 
2.4.1  Process description 
The integration framework and modules have been developed and tested on the Pilot 
plant at the School of Engineering Science, Murdoch University.  This represents a pilot Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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scale model of the Bayer process, the process of producing alumina from bauxite.  The 
plant is used to illustrate control principles and is therefore run using only alumina 
hydrate and water.  The Pilot plant is shown in Fig. 2.8. 
 
 
Fig. 2.8. Pilot plant at School of Engineering Science 
 
The Pilot plant can be divided into four stages each representing a different part of the 
Bayer process.  These include: 
 
(i)  The Supply tanks, which represent the feed to the plant. 
(ii)  The Ball mill section, which represents crushing and grinding of the ore. 
(iii)  The Separation section consisting of a series of tanks, hydro cyclone and 
lamella, which separate solids from liquids. 
(iv)  The Precipitation (Heating) section
1, which consists of a series of heated 
tanks, where tank levels and temperatures can be controlled. 
                                                
1 Note that in this thesis, the Precipitation section of the Pilot plant may also be referred to as the Heating 
section.  This is because the primary function of the Precipitation section of the Pilot plant is heating of 
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The Honeywell Scan3000 overview of these four sections is shown in Fig. 2.9.  
 
 
Fig. 2.9. Honeywell Scan3000 overview for Pilot plant 
 
The plant is a good representation of a large-scale industrial process.  It is equipped 
with flow, level, pressure and temperature transmitters connected to an Allen-Bradley 
PLC cabinet, allowing the command of control valves and variable speed drives within 
the plant.  A Honeywell Scan3000 system performs data acquisition and primary control 
functions. 
 
A  sample  screen  shot  of  the  Honeywell  Scan3000  system  Precipitation  (Heating) 
section is shown in Fig. 2.10.  Each sensor has the attributes PV (process variable – 
current value), SP (set point), OP (operating point – eg. pump speed) and MD (mode – 
manual or auto).  When in automatic operation, the operator / intelligent system is able 
to change the SP of the sensor and in manual operation, the operator / intelligent system 
is able to alter the OP of the sensor.  
 Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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Each sensor reading has a range of 0 – 100%, where 0% corresponds to fully closed or 
‘off’ and 100% corresponds to fully open or ‘on’.  The maximum flow rates through 
small sized pumps are 5L/min, medium sized pumps are 10L/min and larger pumps are 
15L/min. 
 
 
Fig. 2.10. Honeywell Scan3000 screen of Precipitation (Heating) section of Pilot plant 
 
2.4.2  Control loop configuration 
Each module has been implemented on the Separation and Heating sections of the Pilot 
plant.  A schematic for these sections is shown in Fig. 2.11.   Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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Fig. 2.11. Separation and Heating sections of Pilot plant 
 
Water enters the Separation section through FCV-541, which controls the level in the 
non-linear tank through a proportional-integral (PI) controller.  The level in the needle 
tank is controlled with a PI controller attached to the FDP-521 (a variable speed pump).  
Liquid then flows through the needle underflow pump, which controls the flow in FT-
569 through a PI controller. The liquid finally flows to the Heating section. 
 
The Heating section consists of three heated tanks in series. The water from the first two 
tanks overflows to the third tank whose level is controlled by the product pump (PP-
681) through a PI controller.  The temperature in each heated tank is controlled by 
adjusting the steam flow rate through a flow control valve located at the entrance of the 
steam coil in each tank.  The process set points are listed in Table 2.1.  The process 
settling times are approximately 5 minutes for levels and 15 minutes for temperature 
changes. Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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Table 2.1. Process set points 
Sensor  Set point 
LT-542  60% 
LT-501  60% 
LT-667  90% 
TT-623  50°C 
TT-643  60°C 
TT-663  75°C 
FT-569  50% 
 
 
In each control loop, Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controllers were used.  The 
mathematical form or a PID controller is as follows:  
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ + + = ￿ ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
0 t e
dt
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D d e I t Pe t u
t
t t         (2.1) 
 
Where:   P, I and D  are the tuning parameters of the controller 
) (t u     is the output of the controller 
    ) (t e      is the error, ie.  ) ( ) ( t y t ysp -  
    ) (t ysp     is the set point 
    ) (t y      is the output of the process (measurement) 
 
In  PID  control,  the  proportional  action  increases  the  control  action  when  the  error 
increases.  The integral action increases the error action if the error is in the system for a 
long time.  It also removes the offset that the proportional action cannot always remove, 
but may cause oscillation around the set point.  The derivative action increases the 
control  action  if  the  error  increases.    This  also  dampens  oscillation  caused  by  the 
integral action (Maillet and Zawadski, 2001; Ogunnaike and Ray, 1994). 
 
Another  equivalent  form  of  the  PID  controller  is  used  in  the  Honeywell  Scan3000 
system.  The time constants in the Honeywell Scan3000 are expressed in minutes rather 
than the usual seconds.  This is shown in Equation 2.2 (Maillet and Zawadski, 2001; 
Ogunnaike and Ray, 1994). Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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Where the equivalence between parameters is as follows: 
 
c K P =  
I
c K
I
t 60
=   D c K D t 60 =         (2.3) 
 
PI controllers ( ) 0 = D t  were used when operating the Pilot plant.  The controller tuning 
parameters used in the Honeywell Scan3000 system are presented in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2. PI controller settings 
Control Loop 
c K   I t  
FCV-541 / LT642  5  6 
FDP-523 / LT-501  4  1.2 
NUFP-561 / FT-569  2  3 
PP-681 / LT667  3  3 
FCV-622 / TT-623  26  10 
FCV-642 / TT-643  26  10 
FCV-662 / TT-663  26  10 
 
 
2.5  Expert System Shell 
G2 real-time expert system was chosen in order to implement various modules and the 
Coordinated Knowledge Management method.  This choice was based on the fact that 
G2 had the following features (Moore, 1991): 
 
¨  Ability to represent temporal knowledge over periods of time. 
¨  Ability to reason in real-time. 
¨  Ability to incorporate dynamic models including mass and energy balances. 
¨  Object  oriented  knowledge  representation  promoting  reusability  and 
extendibility. 
¨  Connectivity of objects via graphical connections on the schematics. Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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¨  Generic knowledge allowing one rule to be applied to many classes. 
¨  Procedural knowledge for rapid reasoning. 
¨  Transient objects where objects can be created and modified using rules and 
procedures. 
¨  Dynamic relations  where relations are created, modified and  deleted  using 
rules and procedures. 
¨  A neural network toolbox for use when mathematical models cannot easily be 
created. 
¨  Ability to interface on-line to the DCS. 
 
G2 is typically applied to (Gensym, 1999): 
 
¨  Monitoring, diagnosis and alarm handling. 
¨  Scheduling and logistics. 
¨  Supervisory and advanced control. 
¨  Process design, simulation and re-engineering. 
¨  Intelligent network management. 
¨  Decision support for enterprise wide operations. 
 
2.6  Conclusion 
This  chapter  discussed  the  need  for  task  integration  in  the  processing  industry  and 
provided a review of intelligent systems including expert systems.  Several integrated 
frameworks  were  presented  including  a  discussion  of  their  advantages  and 
disadvantages. 
 
The Coordinated Knowledge Management method was proposed as an alternative for 
task integration.  This approach incorporates a form of hierarchy, but is not as rigidly 
structured  as  the  functional  hierarchy.    Independent  modules  communicate  via  a 
coordination Petri net rather than an external control mechanism as in the blackboard 
architecture.  The integration Petri nets are used to coordinate tasks, monitor the system, 
activate the knowledge sources (tasks), request data to be updated in the data structures 
and  receive  notice  when  the  task  is  completed.    Object  oriented  programming  and Review of Integration Techniques in Intelligent Operational Management   Chapter 2 
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global  data  structures  are  used  to  store  data  in  this  framework.    The  Coordinated 
Knowledge  Management  method  is  generic  enough  to  be  applied  to  any  plant  for 
integration using existing modules already in use.  
 
Finally, a Pilot plant case study was presented outlining the DCS and PID control loop 
parameters for which the developed modules and integration Petri nets are developed 
and tested. 
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  Chapter 3 
Petri Net Basics 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter covers the fundamentals of the Petri nets used in this thesis including place 
transition, timed place and hierarchical Petri nets.  This chapter is not used as an in-
depth coverage of Petri net theory and application, but rather serves to provide the 
reader with a general background on Petri nets and how they function.  Several simple 
examples are provided in order to illustrate Petri net dynamics.  Further information on 
Petri nets can be found in the references listed at the end of this chapter. 
 
Petri nets were initially used as a general-purpose mathematical tool to describe the 
causal  relationship  in  computer  systems.    In  the  80’s  they  were  applied  to 
manufacturing  systems  and  since  the  90’s  they  have  been  used  for  batch  process 
modeling, supervisory  control, planning  and scheduling  applications (Gu and  Bahri, 
2002).    Petri  nets  cover  a  range  of  diverse  applications,  including  communication 
protocols, computer networks, manufacturing systems, industrial process control and 
data flow computing.  They have also been widely used for the study of behavioral 
properties  in  areas  such  as  simulations,  performance  evaluation  and  fault  tolerance 
(Nissanke, 1997).  In this thesis Petri nets have been applied to continuous process 
operations.  In a continuous process, raw materials are fed and products are delivered 
continuously at known flow-rates and the plant is generally operated at steady state (Gu 
and Bahri, 2002).  However, even in a continuous mode, process data is received from Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
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the distributed control system (DCS) at discrete time intervals.  By transforming this 
data into process events, a Petri net can be used for overseeing process operations. 
 
Petri nets can represent a dynamic model of the system.  This cannot be achieved with 
Boolean  relationships  as  in  fault  trees  or  causal  graphs,  which  are  known  as  static 
models.    Dynamic  models  are  able  to  continuously  take  into  account  data,  which 
changes with time.  It is possible to incorporate timing information into a Petri net 
model and thus it is easy to model the evolution of system behavior. 
 
3.2  Definitions 
3.2.1  Place transition Petri nets 
A Petri net is a bipartite graph consisting of two sets of nodes (places and transitions) 
and  a set  of  arcs  between  pairs  of  nodes  (Nissanke,  1997).    Pictorially,  places are 
depicted as circles and transitions as bars or boxes.  Each place may potentially hold 
either none or a positive number of tokens, pictorially represented by small solid circles.  
The number and distribution of tokens amongst the places is called the marking of the 
net and represents the state of the net.  The arcs on the other hand, dictate how the 
tokens move throughout the net (Moody and Antsaklis, 1998). 
 
Mathematically,  a  Petri  net  graph  is  a  weighted  bipartite  graph  (Cassandras  and 
Lafortune, 1999): 
 
( ) w A T P PN , , , =                 (3.1) 
 
Where:   P is a finite set of places. 
    T is a finite set of transitions. 
( ) ( ) P T T P A ´ È ´ Í  is the set of arcs from places  to transitions  and 
from transitions to places in the graph. 
{ } ￿ , 3 , 2 , 1 : ® A w  is the weight function on the arcs. 
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A  set  of  places  is  represented  as  { } n p p p P , , , 2 1 ￿ = ,  and  a  set  of  transitions  by 
{ } n t t t T , , , 2 1 ￿ = .  Arcs are in the form of ( ) j i t p ,  or ( ) i j p t , , and the weight relating to 
an arc  is a  positive  integer  k  (Cassandras  and Lafortune,  1999).   If  no  weights  are 
indicated on the arcs, assume the weighting is one.   When there is only one-input and 
output  arc  connecting  places  to  transitions  and transitions  to  places  the  Petri  net  is 
known as an ordinary Petri net. 
 
When describing a Petri net, it is often useful to refer to input and output places to 
transitions, where  ( ) j t I  is the set if input places to transitions  j t  and  ( ) j t O  is the set of 
output places from transition  j t . 
 
  ( ) ( ) { } A t p P p t I j i i j Î Î = , :               (3.2) 
( ) ( ) { } A p t P p t O i j i j Î Î = , :               (3.3) 
 
Similar notation can be used to describe input and output transitions for a given place 
( ) i i p I p :  and  ( ) j p O .  Finally (Cassandras and Lafortune, 1999): 
 
( ) 0 , = j i t p w  when  ( ) j i t I p Ï   and   ( ) 0 , = i j p t w  when  ( ) j i t O p Ï    (3.4) 
 
The interpretation of transitions and places would depend on the problem at hand.  For 
example, in a flexible manufacturing system: (i) places could represent resource status 
or operations, (ii) transitions could represent start and/or end of operations, processes, 
activities and events and (iii) arcs could represent material, resource, information and/or 
control flow direction (Zhou and DiCesare, 1993; Zhou and Venkatesh, 1999).  Some 
typical interpretations of transitions and places are presented in Table 3.1 (Wang, 1998). Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
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Table 3.1. Some typical interpretations of transitions and places (Wang, 1998) 
Input Places  Transitions  Output Places 
Preconditions  Event  Postconditions 
Input data  Computation step  Output data 
Input signals  Signal processor  Output signals 
Resource needed  Task or job  Resources released 
Conditions  Clause in logic  Conclusion(s) 
Buffers  Processor  Buffer 
 
 
 
Example 3.1: The Petri net graph shown in Fig. 3.1 can be defined as follows: 
 
{ } 4 3 2 1 , , , p p p p P =     { } 3 2 1 , , t t t T =  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } 1 3 4 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 1 , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , p t p t p t p t p t t p t p t p A =  
 
( ) 1 , 1 1 = t p w     ( ) 2 , 2 2 = t p w     ( ) 1 , 3 3 = t p w  
( ) 1 , 1 1 = p t w     ( ) 1 , 2 1 = p t w     ( ) 1 , 3 2 = p t w  
    ( ) 1 , 4 2 = p t w       ( ) 1 , 1 3 = p t w  
 
 
p1 p2
p3
p4
t1 t2
t3
 
Fig. 3.1. Petri net for example 3.1 Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
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3.2.1.1  Marked Petri net 
If a Petri net is used to model conditions and events, a mechanism is needed to indicate 
if the conditions have been met.  This is achieved by assigning tokens to places.  A 
token is something that is put on a place, in order to indicate that a condition is met.  
The number and distribution of tokens is referred to as the marking of the net. 
 
A marked Petri net graph is a five-tuple  ( ) x w A T P , , , ,  where  ( ) w A T P , , ,  is the Petri 
net graph and x is a marking of the set of places P;  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
n
n p x p x p x x N Î = ￿ , , 2 1  is 
the row vector associated with x, where n is a non-negative integer (Cassandras and 
Lafortune, 1999). 
 
Example 3.2: The marking for the Petri net shown in Fig. 3.2 can be defined as follows: 
 
[ ] 1 , 0 , 2 , 1 0 = x  
 
p1 p2
p3
p4
t1 t2
t3
 
Fig. 3.2. Marked Petri net for example 3.2 
 
3.2.1.2  Enabling and firing rules 
In a marked Petri net (referred to simply as a Petri net), transitions may be enabled and 
fired.  The transitions firing renders tokens being redistributed, and results in a new 
marking.  The flow of tokens throughout the net is governed by the enabling and firing 
rules.  A transition  j t  is said to be enabled if the number of tokens in  i p  is at least Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
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equal to the weight of the arc connecting  i p  to  j t , for all places  i p  that are input to 
transition  j t .  That is (Cassandras and Lafortune, 1999): 
 
( ) ( ) j i i t p w p x , ³   for all  ( ) j i t I p Î           (3.5) 
 
When an enabled transition  j t , fires, the number of tokens equal to the weight of the 
directed arc connecting  i p  to  j t  are removed from  i p .  The firing of  j t  also deposits 
on each output place  i p , the number of tokens equal to the weight of the directed arc 
connecting  j t  to  i p .  This yields a new marking of the Petri Net as follows (Cassandras 
and Lafortune, 1999): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) i j j i i i p t w t p w p x p x , , ) ( ' + - = ,   n i , , 1 ￿ =       (3.6) 
 
Note that the number of tokens in a Petri net needs not be conserved (Cassandras and 
Lafortune, 1999). 
 
Example 3.3: For the case shown in Fig. 3.2, the initial state is  [ ] 1 , 0 , 2 , 1 0 = x .  We see 
only transitions  1 t  and  2 t  are enabled, since  1 t  requires a single token from place  1 p  
and  2 t  requires two tokens from  2 p  to fire.  In other words,  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 0 ,t p w p x ³  and 
( ) ( ) 2 2 2 0 ,t p w p x ³ , and condition (3.5) is satisfied for both  1 t  and  2 t .  When transition 
1 t  fires, a token is removed from  1 p  and is placed on  1 p  and  2 p .  When transition  2 t  
fires, two tokens are removed from  2 p  and placed on  3 p  and  4 p . Equation 3.6 can also 
directly be applied to find the new state  [ ] 2 , 1 , 1 , 1 1 = x  shown in Fig. 3.3.  This process 
continues.   Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
Page 3.7 
 
p1 p2
p3
p4
t1 t2
t3
 
Fig. 3.3. Marked Petri net for example 3.3 
 
Note  that  unless  specific  probability  weightings  are  given  to  transitions,  the  firing 
sequence of a Petri net is not pre-specified.   
 
3.2.1.3  Properties 
Petri nets exhibit two different properties: (i) behavioral and (ii) structural properties.  
Behavioral properties depend on the initial state or marking of the Petri net.  Structural 
properties  depend  on  the  topology  or  structure  of  the  Petri  net.    Other  Petri  net 
properties  include  reachability,  boundedness,  conservativeness,  safety  and  liveness.  
Further details can be found in Wang (1998) and Cassandras and Lafortune (1999). 
 
3.2.1.4  Modeling using Petri nets 
As  part  of  the  Coordinated  Knowledge  Management  method  for  task  integration, 
several Petri net structures recur.  These structures are outlined in the sections below 
(Wang, 1998).  Further information on using Petri nets for modeling can be found in 
Peterson (1981), Reisig (1992) and Reisig (1998). 
 
Sequential execution 
Sequential execution achieves a precedence relationship.  In the example shown in Fig. 
3.4, transition t2 can only fire after t1.  This imposes the precedence constraint “t1 before 
t2” and also models the causal relationship among activities (Wang, 1998). Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
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p1 p2 p3 t1 t2
 
Fig. 3.4. Sequential (Wang, 1998) 
 
Conflict 
Fig. 3.5 shows conflicting transitions t1 and t2.  If transition t1 fires, transition t2 is 
disabled and if transition t2 fires, transition t1 is disabled.  Conflict can be resolved 
either in a purely deterministic way by assigning probabilities to arcs or by using priory 
arcs (covered in a later section). 
 
In some cases, in the developed integration Petri nets (Chapter 6) for the Coordinated 
Knowledge Management method conflict occurs.  This conflict, however, is resolved 
either by using priorities or from specific properties of the modules themselves, where 
two conflicting events will never occur at the same time. 
 
p1
t1 t2  
Fig. 3.5. Conflict (Wang, 1998) 
 
Concurrent 
Transitions t1 and t2 in Fig. 3.6 are concurrent.  For concurrency to exist, a forking 
transition deposits a token on two or more output places.   
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Concurrency  frequently  arises  in  the  integration  Petri  nets  developed  for  the 
Coordinated  Knowledge  Management  method,  where  two  or  more  states  result 
following the occurrence of an event. 
 
p1 t1
p2
t2
 
Fig. 3.6. Concurrency (Wang, 1998) 
 
Synchronization 
In Fig. 3.7, t1 is enabled only when each of p1 and p2 receives a token.  Transition t1 
models the joining of information.  This is often used when there is a “waiting” state for 
resources or messages. 
 
In the Coordinated Knowledge Management method, this type of structure is used for 
module interaction with the integration Petri nets.  For example, when the integration 
Petri net must wait for a signal from a module in order to go into its next state. 
 
p1
t1
p2  
Fig. 3.7. Synchronization (Wang, 1998) Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
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Merging 
When tokens from several places arrive at the same place this is known as merging, as 
shown in Fig. 3.8. 
 
In the Coordinated Knowledge Management method, this structure is used, in particular 
in the “Starting” section of each integration Petri net for each module.  Merging can 
result in several tokens being deposited on the output place.  This represented a problem 
when developing the “Starting” section of each integration Petri net, as several tokens 
arriving on an output place would activate several requests to start a module, when only 
a single request is needed.  Using a “resource allocation” place, which is analogous to 
“mutual  exclusion”,  as described  in  the  next few  pages,  solved  the  problem.    This 
resulted in only one request to run the module being sent to the module.  Further details 
can also be found in Chapter 6. 
 
It was also considered to use a capacity restriction
1 on places to solve the problem, 
however,  in  this  type  of  Petri  net,  tokens  would  be  stored  on  the  input  place  until 
conditions are satisfied and further request would then be sent to the module, which is 
not wanted. 
 
p1
p3
t1
p2 t2
 
Fig. 3.8. Merging (Wang, 1998) 
 
                                                
1 In Petri nets with capacity restrictions, firing is only possible if the token content per place after firing 
does not surpass the token capacity restriction indicated on the place (Prock, 1991). Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
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Confusion 
Confusion occurs when conflict and concurrency co-exist.  In Fig. 3.9, both t1 and t3 are 
concurrent while t1 and t2 are in conflict, and t2 and t3 are also in conflict. 
 
This  type  of  structure  often  occurred  in  the  Coordinated  Knowledge  Management 
method integration Petri nets.  However, confusion was eliminated, by using different 
time  delays  on  conditions  and  through  the  use  of  priority  arcs.    Also,  because  of 
interactions  between  various  modules,  conditions  /  events  were  often  inherently 
mutually exclusive eliminating any confusion. 
 
p1
t1
t2
p2 t3
 
Fig. 3.9. Confusion (Wang, 1998) 
 
Mutual exclusion 
Two processes are mutually exclusive if they cannot be performed at the same time due 
to constraints on the usage of shared resources.  Mutual exclusion is modeled as shown 
in Fig. 3.10 where a token can only arrive on either p2 or p3, but not on both p2 and p3 at 
the same time. 
 
This is analogous to the “resource allocation” problem in the Coordinated Knowledge 
Management  method.  Multiple  requests to  run  a  module  should  not  occur, as  this Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
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would result in multiple signals to start each module.  By introducing an extra place (the 
resource allocation place indicated by p1 in Fig. 3.10), only one request is sent to the 
module until the “resource allocation” had been reset. 
 
p2
t1
t2
p1
p3
t3
t4  
Fig. 3.10. Mutual exclusion (Wang, 1998) 
 
Priorities 
The inhibitor arc does not form part of classical Petri net theory, however, they are 
useful to represent priorities.  Inhibitor arcs connect input places to transitions and are 
represented  by  an  arc  terminated  by  a  small  circle.    This  changes  the  transitions 
enabling condition.  When an inhibitor arc is present, a transition becomes enabled if 
each input place, connected to the transition by a normal arc (an arc terminated with an 
arrow), contains at least the number of tokens equal to the weight of the arc, and when 
no tokens are present on each input place connected to the transition by the inhibitor 
arc.  The transition-firing rule is the same for normally connected places.  The firing, 
however, does not change the marking in the inhibitor arc connected places.   
 
A Petri net with an inhibitor arc is shown in Fig. 3.11.  Transition t1 is enabled if p1 
contains a token, while transition t2 is enabled if p2 contains a token and p1 has no 
token.  This gives priority to transition t1 over t2. 
 
The inhibitor arc has been used frequently in the development of the Petri nets for the 
Coordinated  Knowledge  Management  method  to  assign  priorities  to  events  and  to 
eliminate conflicts and confusion. Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
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p1 t1
p2
t2
 
Fig. 3.11. Priorities (Wang, 1998) 
 
Sink transitions 
A sink transition has no output place attached to them and so, once a token activates a 
sink transition, and the sink transition fires, the token cannot be recovered (Desrochers 
and Ai-Jaar, 1995).  An example of a sink transition is shown in Fig. 3.12. 
 
p1
t1
p2  
Fig. 3.12. Sink transition 
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3.2.2  Timed place Petri nets 
Timed Petri nets can be divided into two classes: (i) Deterministic Timed Petri Nets 
(DTPN’s), and (ii) Stochastic Timed Petri Nets (STPN’s).  
Timing  can  be  incorporated  into  a  DTPN  by  associating  a  firing  time  to  a  place, 
transition, arc or token.  In a Deterministic Timed Place Petri Net (DTPPN), a token 
deposited in a place becomes available only after a certain period of time (time delay).  
Only available tokens can enable transitions.  This is a similar case to the Deterministic 
Timed  Transition  Petri  net  (DTTPN)  or  the  Deterministic  Timed  Arc  Petri  net 
(DTAPN).  In a timed token Petri net, tokens carry a time stamp that indicates when 
tokens are available to fire a transition.  This time stamp can be incremented at each 
transition firing (Balbo, 2002).  In Time Petri nets (TPN’s), each transition is associated 
with a deterministic firing time interval (Wang, 1998). 
 
Stochastic timed Petri nets have various time details modeled as random variables or 
probability distributions.  These time delays are associated with the transition only (Gu 
and Bahri, 2002). 
 
DTPPN  have  been  used  in  the  Coordinated  Knowledge  Management  method,  and 
hence, further details of this type of Petri net are presented.  Further information on 
DTTPN’s, DTAPN’s, TPN’s and STPN’s can be found in Balbo (2002) and Wang 
(1998). 
 
A DTPPN is six-tuples (Wang, 1998): 
 
( ) t , , , , , x w A T P TPN =               (3.7) 
 
Where:   w A T P , , ,  and x have the same meaning as mentioned earlier. 
( )
+ ® R T or P : t  is the place delay function (
+ R  is a set of non-negative 
real numbers). 
 
In  a  DTPPN,  a  token  in  a  place,  with  an  associated  time  delay,  can  only  become 
available after the period of the time delay on the place.  This is illustrated in Fig. 3.13 Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
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where only the tokens in black are available to enable transition t2.  The white tokens 
have not satisfied the timing requirements and thus are not able to enable t2. 
 
P1,t t1 t2
 
Fig. 3.13. Illustration of a DTPPN (Balbo, 2002) 
 
In order to obtain a conflict free DTPPN, the Petri net model must be decision-free: 
each place must have at most one incoming arc and at most one outgoing arc (Wang, 
1998).  If there is more than one incoming arc then the first token arriving on a place 
activates the transition after the place time delay.  Subsequent arrivals of tokens wait for 
the  time  delay  on  the  place  and  then  enable  the  transition.    In  the  case  of  the 
Coordinated Knowledge Management method, when there exists multiple outputs from 
a place, this conflict is resolved by only activating one of the output transitions by using 
priorities or by exploiting the fact that certain conditions/events are mutually exclusive. 
 
Synchronous timing mechanism 
One Petri net structure which is used as part of the starting Petri nets in the Coordinated 
Knowledge  Management  method  integration  Petri  nets  is  the  “master  timing 
mechanism” which achieves repetitive performance for time driven systems.  Examples 
of time driven systems include patient monitoring systems, process monitoring systems 
and scientific data acquisition systems, amongst others (Coolahan and Roussopoulos, 
1983).   
 
The synchronous timing mechanism structure is presented in Fig. 3.14.  The master 
timing mechanism is modeled by a net construction that includes a cycle, called the 
“driving cycle” because its execution time drives the remainder of the Petri net model.  
The  master  timing  mechanism  consists  of  a  place  p1  (the  master  timing  process) 
connected by an elementary loop to transition t1 such that the initial marking of p1 (one 
token  on  p1)  reproduces  itself  within  a  fixed  execution  time  t1  (Coolahan  and Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
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Roussopoulos, 1983).  In the Coordinated Knowledge Management method, this time 
interval t1 is chosen by the operator or designer. 
 
p1,t1 t1
 
Fig. 3.14. A driving cycle of a time-driven system (Coolahan and Roussopoulos, 1983) 
 
Example 3.4: Consider the DTPPN shown in Fig. 3.15 with the following time delays 
associated to places: 
 
1 1 = t ,  5 2 = t ,  1 3 = t ,  3 4 = t  
 
Assume  that  the  tokens  on  4 p   has  just  arrived  giving  the  initial  marking  as 
[ ] 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 0 = x .  The token on  4 p  can only become enabled after a period of 3 seconds, 
yielding the new marking  [ ] 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 1 = x . 
 
Now, place  1 p  has a time delay of 1 second.  After this time has elapsed, the new 
marking is  [ ] 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 1 = x .  Although, after this delay place  3 p  contains a token, transition 
2 t  is not yet enabled, as the enabling condition is not satisfied and the token on  2 p  is 
not yet available for firing.   
 
Five seconds after a token arriving on  2 p , the token becomes available for  2 t  to fire, 
resulting in original marking  [ ] 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 3 = x .  This process continues. Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
Page 3.17 
 
p3
p1 p2
p4
t1
t2
t3
 
Fig. 3.15. DTPPN for example 3.4 
 
3.2.3  Hierarchical Petri nets 
Hierarchically structured Petri nets are useful when splitting the whole description of a 
system  using  a  well-structured  set  of comprehensive  descriptions  with  nets  that are 
organized in a tree (Dittrich, 1995).  This is particularly useful in the case of large-scale 
systems where a large net can be split into sub-nets rather than using one large Petri net. 
 
Hierarchical modeling does not increase any “theoretical modeling power”, the concept 
of distributing a large system model over multiple layers of hierarchies is necessary to 
reduce the graphical complexity of large system models in practice (Fehling, 1993). 
 
Further information on hierarchical Petri nets can be found in Buchholz (1994), Dittrich 
(1995), Fehling (1993), Heiner et al. (1995) and Ang (1998). 
 
3.2.4  Colored Petri nets 
Coloured Petri nets are classified as higher-level nets.  The step from low-level Petri 
nets to high-level nets can be compared to the step from assembly languages to modern 
programming languages (Jensen, 1992).  In a low-level net there is only one kind of 
token and this means that the state of a place is described by an integer (in many cases a 
Boolean value).  In high-level nets, each token can carry complex information of data 
(which may describe the entire state of the process) (Jensen, 1992). Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
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In a coloured Petri net, each token is equipped with an attached data value known as a 
token colour.  The data value can be of an arbitrary complex type (eg. a record where 
the first field is real, the second is a text string, while the third is a list of integer pairs).  
For a given place, all tokens must have token colours that belong to a specified type.  
This type is called the colour set of the place.  More elaborate arc expressions are also 
needed (Jensen, 1992).   
 
Attaching a colour to each token and a colour set to each place allows us to use fewer 
places  than  would  be  needed  for  a  place  transition  net  (Jensen,  1992).    Further 
information on coloured Petri nets can be found in Jensen (1992) and Jensen (2002).  
The use of coloured Petri nets for integration of tasks is discussed in Chapter 7 under 
“Future work”. 
 
3.3  Notation Used in Coordinated Knowledge Management Method 
In  the  Coordinated  Knowledge  Management  method,  place  names  are  written  in 
capitals, for example DR1 or SC1.  When developing the rules, they are described by 
listing the place names.  For example, in Fig. 3.16 the following rule describes the 
conditions under which transition t1 fires: 
 
  Rule 1:   If P1 and P2 then P3. 
 
That is, if places P1 and P2 contain tokens, then transition t1 will fire, removing tokens 
from places P1 and P2 and depositing a token on place P3. 
 
Placing a bar across the place name indicates the case of a token not existing on a place 
for a transition to fire.  For example, in Fig. 3.16, transition t2 only fires if a token does 
not exist on P1 (indicated by  1 P ), and a token exists on P2.  In this case, the token is 
removed from P2 and created on P3.  This is written as follows: 
 
  Rule 2:   If  1 P  and P2 then P4. Petri Net Basics                                                                                                  Chapter 3 
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P1
t1
P2
t2
P3
P4
 
Fig. 3.16. Petri net example for the Coordinated Knowledge Management method 
notation 
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  Chapter 4 
Modules Encompassing 
Intelligent Operational Management 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Previous chapters have outlined the benefits of implementing an integrated framework 
encompassing  intelligent  process  operation,  however,  details  were  not  provided 
regarding individual task definitions and implementation.  This chapter will provide a 
review  into  individual  task  implementation  focusing  on  data  acquisition,  regulatory 
control, data reconciliation (DR), supervisory control (SC), process monitoring (PM) / 
fault detection, fault diagnosis, planning and scheduling.   
 
Low-level tasks including data acquisition and regulatory control have already been 
touched on in Chapter 2, section 2.4.2 “Control loop configuration”.  In this chapter, 
detailed  model  equations  are  provided  for  the  data  reconciliation  and  supervisory 
control modules.  It is important to note that new techniques were not developed for 
these two modules, as the research in this project mainly focused on integration of tasks 
rather than individual module techniques.  The fault detection and diagnosis module is 
only briefly mentioned in this chapter and is covered in more detail in Chapter 5 as it 
represents a methodology for detection and diagnosis of “dynamic faults” in large scale 
systems developed in order to overcome shortcomings of previous fault detection and 
diagnosis techniques.   The chapter ends with some snapshots of G2 screens of each 
module, which have been developed as part of the intelligent system. Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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4.2  Low-level Tasks 
4.2.1  Data acquisition 
The most basic component is data acquisition module where process data is acquired 
from the plant through sensors attached to the plant.  Transducers convert the data to a 
form recognizable by a computer.  This data is then used as a foundation either directly 
or  indirectly  for  every  other  task.    Typical  process  variable  measurements  include 
temperature,  pressure,  flow,  density,  liquid  level,  viscosity,  composition,  electrical 
heating, flow adjustment and alarms (Ogunnaike and Ray, 1994). 
 
As part of this project, sensors and transmitters on the plant perform data acquisition 
and  sensor  values  are  viewed  through  the  Honeywell  Scan3000  system.    A  list  of 
process sensors is provided in Table 4.1.  Raw sensor values are then read into G2 for 
further processing through a G2/Scan3000 bridge programmed in C, donated by Process 
Control Technology Engineers Pty. Ltd. 
 
 
Table 4.1. Process sensors 
Sensor  Parameters 
LT-542  PV 
LT-501  PV 
LT-667  PV 
FT-523  PV 
FT-569  PV 
FT-687  PV 
TT-568  PV 
TT-623  PV 
TT-643  PV 
TT-663  PV 
FDP-521  PV, SP, OP 
NUFP-561  PV, SP, OP 
PP-681  PV, SP, OP 
FCV-541  PV, SP, OP 
FCV-622  PV, SP, OP 
FCV-642  PV, SP, OP 
FCV-662  PV, SP, OP 
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4.2.2  Regulatory control 
Regulatory control occurs when the control system functions to counteract the effect of 
disturbances in order to maintain the output at its desired set point (Ogunnaike and Ray, 
1994).  Output variables may deviate from their set points due to disturbance effects or 
set point changes.  These deviations can result in instability and poor plant performance.  
The most common regulatory controller used in industry is the Proportional Integral 
Derivative (PID) controller. 
 
In this thesis, regulatory control is performed by an Allen Bradley Programmable Logic 
Controller  (PLC)
1,  which  is  monitored  by  a  Honeywell  Scan3000
2  system  through 
which control loop configurations and parameters can be changed.  The control loop 
configurations, default process set points and controller settings can be found in Chapter 
2: Fig. 2.11, Tables 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. 
 
4.2.3  Data reconciliation 
Process  data  is  the  foundation  upon  which  all  control  and  evaluation  of  process 
performance are based (Mah, 1990).  This includes production planning, scheduling, 
supervisory  control,  optimization  and  process  control.    However,  on-line  process 
measurements  may  be  corrupted  by  errors  during  measurement and  transmission  of 
data.  These errors are unavoidable and so before plant data can be usefully used, it is 
necessary  to  reconcile  this  data  into  meaningful  values.    Data  reconciliation  is  the 
adjustment of a set of data so that the quantities derived from the data obey natural laws 
such  as  material  and  energy  balances.    The  benefits  of  data  reconciliation  include 
(Boddington, 1995): 
                                                
1  A  Programmable  Logic  Controller  (PLC)  is  a  device  used  to  automate  monitoring  and  control  of 
industrial plants. It can be used stand-alone or in conjunction with a SCADA or other system (Imperial 
College Department of Computing, 1997). 
2  The  Honeywell  Scan3000  system  provides  a  real-time  database  for  monitoring  and  control  of  the 
process. Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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(i)  Better  monitoring  of  performance  and  higher  accuracy  of  process 
measurements. 
(ii)  Aid in detecting faulty instrumentation and prioritization of instrument 
maintenance. 
(iii)  More  accurate  operating  data  for  technical  analysis  and  process 
improvement. 
(iv)  More accurate data for use in supervisory control and plant optimization 
routines. 
 
The main difference between data reconciliation and other filtering techniques is that 
data reconciliation makes use of the process models constraints and obtains estimates of 
process variables by adjusting process measurements so that the estimates satisfy the 
constraints (Narasimhan and Jordache, 2000).  The reconciled values are the solution of 
a constrained least square optimization problem.  In the simplest case, constraints are 
linear, however, they are generally non-linear (Nooraii, 1995).  The type of constraints 
affects the solution methodology.  For the case of a nonlinear objective function subject 
to linear and non-linear constraints, techniques such as the LaGrange Multiplier method, 
Quadratic  programming,  Generalized  Reduced  Gradient  method  and  Successive 
(Sequential, Recursive) Quadratic programming can be used to solve the optimization 
problem.  Further information on these techniques can be found in Edgar et al. (2001). 
 
Two types of errors are usually present: (i) random and (ii) gross errors.  Random errors 
are small and are due to normal process fluctuations.  Neither the magnitude nor the 
sign of a random error can be predicted.  Some sources of random errors include power 
supply  fluctuations,  network  transmission  and signal  conversion  noise,  analog  input 
filtering and changes in ambient conditions (Narasimhan and Jordache, 2000).  Gross 
errors  on  the  other  hand  are  caused  by  non-random  events  such  as  instrument 
malfunction, sensor drift, mis-calibration, bias and process leaks (Boddington, 1995). 
 
Data reconciliation therefore serves to eliminate random errors, but cannot eliminate 
gross  errors.    A  gross  error  detection  strategy  should  be  in  place  before  data 
reconciliation is performed (Boddington, 1995).  Alternatively, a gross error detection 
strategy  could  be  incorporated  into  the  data  reconciliation  procedure.    Failure  to Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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eliminate  or compensate  for  gross  errors  leads  to  a  “smearing  effect”  in  reconciled 
values (Narasimhan and Jordache, 2000). 
 
Data reconciliation can only be performed if there is redundancy in measurements.  In a 
typical process, process variables are related to each other through mass and energy 
balances.    Given  these  system  constraints,  a  minimum  number  of  error  free 
measurements are needed in order to calculate all system variables and parameters.  If 
there are more measurements than this minimum, then spatial redundancy exists and can 
be  used  for  the  purpose  of  data  reconciliation  (Narasimhan  and  Jordache,  2000).  
Unmeasured variables are usually eliminated from the constraints before reconciliation 
is performed.  After data reconciliation is completed, the unmeasured variables can be 
calculated  by  using  the  reconciled  variables  and  mass  and  energy  balances  for  the 
process (Nooraii, 1995). 
 
Much  research  has  been  conducted  into  data  reconciliation  of  steady  state  plant 
measurements  in  both  linear  and  non-linear  systems  (Boddington,  1995;  Campbell, 
1997; Chen, 1998; Crowe, 1986; Crowe et al., 1986; Johnston and Kramer, 1995; Mah, 
1990; Simpson et al., 1991).  However, current research is tending towards dynamic 
data  reconciliation  of  non-linear  systems.    This  requires  the  use  of  nonlinear  state 
estimation techniques such as Kalman filtering.  Several references can be cited on the 
treatment  of  the  non-linear  and  dynamic  data  reconciliation  problem  including: 
Albuquerque and Lorenz (1996), Bagajewicz and Jiang (1997), Chen (1998), Darouach 
and  Zasadzinski  (1991),  Kim  et  al.  (1991),  Narasimhan  and  Jordache  (2000), 
Ramamurthi et al. (1993) and Romagnoli and Sanchez (2000). 
 
A  newer  technique,  which  is  increasingly  being  used  for  data  reconciliation,  is  the 
neural  network.    Aldrich  and  Deventer  (1995)  outline  a  technique  for  variance 
estimation, gross  error detection and the reconciliation of  process data using  neural 
networks.  One of the advantages of using neural networks for on-line reconciliation of 
process measurements is that they can be used as fast parallel processors, which can 
deal with large problems, or with on-line systems requiring rapid calculations (Aldrich 
and Deventer, 1995). 
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Companies such as Invensys Simsci-Esscor and OSIsoft have developed packages such 
as Sigmafine and DATACON respectively for industrial data reconciliation applications 
(Invensys Simsci-Esscor, 2002; OSI Software, Inc., 2003).  Industrial applications of 
data reconciliation are also discussed in Campbell (1997), Chiari et al. (1997), Dempf 
and List (1998) and Placido and Loureiro (1998). 
 
4.2.3.1  Problem formulation 
The  relationship  between  the  measured  value,  true  value  and  random  error  in  the 
measurement of variable, in the absence of gross errors, can be expressed as follows 
(Narasimhan & Jordache, 2000):  
 
  e + = x y                 (4.1) 
 
Where:   y   is the measured value 
    x   is the true value 
    e    is the random error 
 
It is assumed that the random error oscillates around zero, with mean or expected value: 
 
  ( ) 0 = e E                 (4.2) 
 
And variance: 
 
  ( ) [ ]
2 2 var s e e = = E               (4.3) 
 
Where:  s  is the standard deviation of the measurement error.  A small value of 
s   indicates  a  more  precise  measurement  (Narasimhan  &  Jordache, 
2000). 
 
One assumption that is made to simplify data reconciliation calculations is that random 
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independent, in which case they would have zero correlation (Narasimhan & Jordache, 
2000). 
 
  ( ) ( ) 0 , cov = = j i j i E e e e e             (4.4) 
 
The data reconciliation problem is then formulated by a constrained weighted least-
squares optimization problem as follows (Narasimhan & Jordache, 2000): 
 
  ( ) ￿
=
-
n
i
i i i
u x x y w Min
j i 1
2
,
              (4.5) 
Subject to:  ( ) 0 , = j i k u x g ,  m k ,..., 1 =           (4.6) 
 
The objective function in Equation 4.5 defines the total weighted sum of squares of 
adjustments made to measurements, where  i w  are the weights,  i y  are the measurements 
and  i x  are the reconciled estimates for variables  i, and  j u  are the estimates of the 
unmeasured variables.  Equation 4.6 defines the set of model constraints.  The weights 
i w  are chosen based on the accuracy of the different measurements.  More accurate 
measurements are given larger weights to force their adjustments  to be as small as 
possible.    In  this  problem  formulation  one  assumes  that  the  variances  of  the 
measurements are known and the weights are the inverse of the variances. 
 
4.2.3.2  Gross error detection 
The above problem formulation assumes the absence of gross errors.  In practice, raw 
process data may also contain gross errors.  In comparison with random errors, there 
should normally be a small number of gross errors present in any given set of data.  
However, their presence invalidates the statistical basis of the reconciliation procedure.  
For this reason, they must be identified and removed (Mah, 1990).  In the presence of 
gross errors, the measurement model of Equation 4.1 becomes: 
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Where:   d are the elements of the gross error vector 
 
The most common technique for detecting gross errors is based on statistical hypothesis 
testing.  This is achieved by testing the observed or measured data against alternative 
hypothesis.    The  null  hypothesis,  H0  states  that  no  gross  error  is  present,  and  the 
alternative hypothesis, H1 assumes that  one or  more gross errors  are present in the 
measurement (Mah, 1990).  The basic principle involves assuming that the random error 
follows a normal distribution with zero mean and known covariance.  Computing the 
normalized error of a measurement and checking if it lies outside a certain confidence 
region will provide an  indication of the presence  of a  gross error (Narasimhan and 
Jordache, 2000).  
 
A simple gross error detection strategy can be implemented as follows (Narasimhan and 
Jordache, 2000): 
 
(i)  Reconcile the measurements assuming no gross errors in data. 
(ii)  Compute the difference between the measurements and reconciled values 
for all measurements (known as the measurement for adjustment). 
(iii)  For  a  linear  constraint  problem  derive  the  expected  variance  of 
measurement adjustments. 
(iv)  Check if the computed measurement adjustment falls within a confidence 
interval (eg. ±2s). 
(v)  If  not,  there  is  a  gross  error.    Eliminate  the  largest  measurement 
adjustment measurement and re-evaluate. 
 
Techniques such as the Measurement Test and Generalized Likelihood Ratio can be 
used  in  conjunction  with  data  reconciliation  in  order  to  identify  the  presence  and 
location of gross errors such as sensor drift or bias (Narasimhan and Jordache, 2000; 
Narasimhan and Mah, 1987; Narasimhan and Mah, 1988). 
 
4.2.3.3  Estimation of the covariance matrix 
In  the  data  reconciliation  problem  formulation  (Equation  4.5)  it  is  necessary  to 
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squares  optimization  function  are  found.    The  covariance  matrix  varies  when  the 
process is operating at different operating conditions.  If the process is truly at steady 
state, then the direct method using the sample variance and covariance can be used 
(Romagnoli and Sanchez, 2000). 
 
Let yi be the i
th element in a vector of measured variables, then the sample variance of 
the r repeated measurements of yi is given by (Romagnoli and Sanchez, 2000): 
 
  ( )
2
1 1
1
) var( ￿
=
-
-
=
r
k
i ik i y y
r
y             (4.8) 
 
And the covariance of yi is given by: 
 
  ( )( ) ￿
=
- -
-
=
r
k
j jk i ik j i y y y y
r
y y
1 1
1
) , cov(           (4.9) 
Where:   ￿
=
=
r
k
ik i y
r
y
1
1                (4.10) 
 
r is the size of the window, which is a function of time during which the process is truly 
at steady state.  
 
4.2.3.4  Detection of steady state 
The above sections assumed that the process is operating at steady state and so before 
the DR optimization can take place it is necessary to implement a steady state detection 
algorithm.  One of the simplest approaches is to track the important variables and wait 
until their values have not moved significantly over a period of time.  The movement 
allowed and time interval is process dependent, however, some arbitrary percentage 
change over some time interval is typical (Boddington, 1995).   
 
More rigorous statistical based methods of detecting if a process is operating at steady 
state are presented in Narasimhan et al. (1986, 1987).  A change in state is considered to 
take place if one or more of the true values of the measured process variables undergo a Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
Page 4.10 
change.  A combination of multivariate statistical tests is used to detect changes in the 
state of the variables using measurements on these variables.  The variables are grouped 
together based on the knowledge that they are physically related together.  Only when 
the combined change of the true value of the variables exceeds a pre-specified threshold 
amount, should a change in steady state be assumed to take place.  This method is 
advocated  for  quasi  steady  state  process  variables,  which  remain  steady  for  long 
intervals of time and which change relatively quickly from one steady state to another 
(Narasimhan et al., 1986). 
 
4.2.3.5  Solution methodology 
There  is  a  great  range  of  optimization  techniques  available  in  order  to  solve  the 
minimization problem.  The solution methodology used depends on (i) the number of 
variables, (ii) the nature of the inequality constraints and (iii) the nature of the objective 
function (Edgar et al., 2001; Seborg et al., 1989).  Several pre-written software codes 
are available which can be used to solve the optimization problem (Lawrence et al., 
1997; Press et al., 2002). 
 
4.2.3.6  Implementation of the data reconciliation module 
The data reconciliation module has been applied to the Separation and Heating sections 
of the Pilot plant.  One can perform data reconciliation on either: 
 
1.  The Separation section, reconciling FT-523.PV and FT-569.PV. 
2.  The Heating section, reconciling FT-569.PV, FT-687.PV, TT-568.PV, TT-
623.PV,  TT-643.PV,  TT-663.PV,  FCV-622.OP,  FCV-642.OP  and  FCV-
662.OP. 
3.  Both sections, reconciling all sensors listed above. 
 
A diagram of the sections to be reconciled is provided in Fig. 4.1 and the corresponding 
sensors are listed in Table 4.2. Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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Fig. 4.1. Block diagram of Separation and Heating sections of the Pilot plant 
for data reconciliation 
 
 
Table 4.2. Definitions 
Sensor  Raw Value  Weight  Reconciled 
Value 
FT-523.PV  x0  W0  y0 
FT-569.PV  x1  W1  y1 
FT-687.PV  x2  W2  y2 
TT-568.PV  T0  w3  y3 
TT-623.PV  T1  w4  y4 
TT-643.PV  T2  w5  y5 
TT-663.PV  T3  w6  y6 
FCV-622.OP  m1  w7  y7 
FCV-642.OP  m2  w8  y8 
FCV-662.OP  m3  w9  y9 
 
 
For the Pilot plant, the problem formulation is as follows: 
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Subject to… 
1.  Inequality constraints: 
  % 0 , , , , , 3 2 1 2 1 0 ³ m m m x x x             (4.12) 
   C T T T T
￿ 0 , , , 3 2 1 0 ³               (4. 13) 
   % 100 , , , , , 3 2 1 2 1 0 £ m m m x x x            (4.14) 
   C T T T T
￿ 100 , , , 3 2 1 0 £              (4.15) 
 
2.  Equality constraints: 
(i)  Normalized steady state mass balance around Separation section. 
     [ ] 11 00
1
0 x x
xs
- =             (4.16) 
(ii)  Normalized steady state mass balance around Heating section. 
     [ ] 22 11
1
0 x x
xs
- =             (4.17) 
(iii)  Normalized steady state energy balance around Heating tank 1. 
     ( ) ( )
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p p s s
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(iv)  Normalized steady state energy balance around Heating tank 2. 
     ( ) ( )
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(v)  Normalized steady state energy balance around Heating tank 3 
     ( ) ( )
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C
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  (4.20) 
 
Equations (4.16) to (4.20) require several transformations in order to convert the raw 
sensor  readings  (%)  so  they  are  dimensionally  consistent  with  the  mass  /  energy 
balances.  Transformation Equations (4.21) to (4.23) can be substituted into Equations 
(4.16) to (4.20) to convert the percentage flow rate readings ( 2 1 0, x and x x ) to have Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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units of  min
3 m  ( 22 11 00, x and x x ) to be used for optimization.  Note that the maximum 
flow rate through  2 1 0, x and x x  is 15  min
L  and so each percentage flow rate reading 
is multiplied by 0.15 to covert to  min
L  and then divided by 1000 to covert to  min
3 m . 
 
   0 00
0
00 00015 . 0
1000
15 *
100
x x
x
x = ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
=          (4.21) 
   1 11
1
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￿
￿
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￿
￿
=           (4.22) 
   2 22
2
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￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
=          (4.23) 
 
Variables  1 s ,  2 s  and  3 s  represent the steam flow rates of FCV-622, FCV-642 and 
FCV-662 and are related to valve openings ( 1 m ,  2 m  and  3 m ) as follows (Maillet and 
Zawadski, 2001): 
 
   1
2
1
3
1 1 cm bm am s + + =              (4.24) 
   2
2
2
3
2 2 cm bm am s + + =             (4.25) 
   3
2
3
3
3 3 cm bm am s + + =             (4.26) 
 
In the above equations: 
 
3 2 1 3 2 1 0 2 1 0 , , , , , , , , , m m m T T T T x x x  are the measured sensor readings (% and °C) 
9 0,...,w w  are the weightings associated with each sensor, and are the inverse of 
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     ( )
2 tan
1
i
i deviation dard s
w =        (4.27) 
 
9 0,..., y y  are the reconciled values of the sensor readings (% and °C) 
TA is the air temperature (°C) 
 
A list of raw and reconciled variables and the corresponding sensor is provided in Table 
4.2.  The remaining coefficient descriptions and values are provided in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3. Parameters and physical properties 
Constant  Description  Value  Units 
s x   Normalising 
coefficient for 
flow rates 
0.0066 
min
3 m
 
S T   Normalising 
coefficients for 
temperature 
20  °C 
U  Heat transfer 
coefficient 
720 
K m
kW
2  
A  Tank area  0.126  2 m  
r  Density of 
water 
1000 
3 m
kg
 
l  Latent heat of 
vaporisation 
2200 
kg
kJ
 
Cp  Specific heat of 
water 
4.184 
kgK
J
 
a  Steam flow rate 
coefficient 
7 10 5356 . 8
- ´ -   - 
b   Steam flow rate 
coefficient 
4 10 14594 . 1
- ´   - 
c  Steam flow rate 
coefficient 
3 10 68836 . 2
- ´   - 
 
 
Equations (4.11) to (4.27) have been implemented as part of a Sequential Quadratic 
Programming program developed by Lawrence et al. (1997).  The solution is generated 
on line.  Current data is read from appropriate variables in G2 into a comma separated 
variable (csv) text file, which is then read into the C-program.  The C-program performs Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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the minimization and finds the solution for the reconciled variables.  The C-program 
then  forms  a  csv  text  file  of  the  reconciled  values,  which  is  read  back  into  the 
appropriate variables in G2. 
 
There is not a clear-cut classification of gross error detection and in which module it 
belongs.  For example, fault diagnosis includes sensor failures in its scope and hence 
data validation and rectification is a specific case of a more general fault diagnosis 
problem (Kramer and Mah, 1993 cited in Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003).  In the 
Coordinated Knowledge Management method, gross error detection is divided amongst 
three modules.  
 
(i)  Process leaks and sudden sensor errors are detected by the fault detection 
and diagnosis module and are further discussed in Chapter 5. 
(ii)  Sensor values being out of range is classified by the process monitoring 
module and is covered in section 4.3.1.1. 
(iii)  Sensor  drift  or  sensor  mis-calibration  is  classified  by  the  data 
reconciliation module, which is further discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
In  the  event  of  a  gross  error,  case  (i)  or  (ii),  classified  by  the  fault  detection  and 
diagnosis module or process monitoring module respectively, the data reconciliation 
module should not be run until the error is eliminated.  If the data reconciliation module 
is  run  assuming  no  errors,  as  in  case  (iii)  and  the  difference  between  the  raw  and 
reconciled sensor value lies outside a confidence interval, which is specified by the 
operator, then it is assumed that a gross error is present.  In this case, the operator is 
given two options: (a) to repair the sensor and re-run the data reconciliation module or 
(b) to re-run the data reconciliation module using a nominal value for the sensor in 
error.  In case (b), if the sensor in error (PV) forms part of a control loop, then the set 
point (SP) of the sensor is used as the nominal value.  If this is not the case then a back 
calculation using Equations (4.16) to (4.26), depending on the variable of interest is 
used to find  the  nominal value  of the  sensor  in error.   These  operator choices and 
interaction  of  the  data  reconciliation  module  with  the  process  monitoring  and  fault 
detection and diagnosis modules are further outlined in Chapter 6, section 6.4.1 and 
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The simplest approaches to steady state detection, as outlined in section 4.2.3.4, is used 
before  the  data  reconciliation  module  can  be  run.    This  technique  of  steady  state 
detection applied to the Pilot plant is further discussed under point (ii) in section 4.3.1.1 
as part of the process monitoring module. 
 
4.3  Mid-level Tasks 
4.3.1  Process monitoring 
Current distributed control systems (DCS’s) are able to collect large quantities of data 
that contain descriptions of the operation of a processing plant at every instant in time.  
However, the correct type of information must be extracted and interpreted in real time 
for such large amounts of data to be useful.  Any action taken on a process relies on a 
description of the state of operations or events that are occurring in the process.  A 
typical process contains hundreds of variable measurements, however, very few events 
actually occur.  Data must therefore be mapped into meaningful descriptions of the 
events occurring (Davis et al., 1996).  This is the task of the process monitoring (PM) 
module. 
 
Process monitoring is composed of two  steps, data analysis  and data  interpretation.  
Data analysis is the manipulation and processing of data to produce features of interest.  
Data interpretation refers to the mechanism, which assigns labels to this data.  Process 
monitoring, therefore, refers to a machine-based system capable of mapping process 
data to labels of practical use (Davis et al., 1996; Davis and Wang, 1995). 
 
In  practice,  process  monitoring  refers  to  the  detection  of  abnormal  situations  and 
isolation  of  faults  and  is  often  considered  part  of  the  fault  detection  and  diagnosis 
module.  Thus a lot of the literature concerning process monitoring overlaps with that of 
fault detection and diagnosis.  Vedam and Venkatasubramanian (1998) present a dyadic 
B-Splines based data compression algorithm in order to perform data compression by 
removing noise in the data belonging to each sensor.  As well as being archived in a 
historical data based, this compressed data is used for trend based process monitoring 
and  diagnosis.    The  process  monitoring  algorithm  is  used  to  detect  abnormal Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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frequencies, identify changes in correlation among sensor variables and perform root 
cause analysis (Vedam and Venkatasubramanian, 1998). 
 
Rengaswamy and Venkatasubramanian (1995), present a syntactic pattern-recognition 
approach for process monitoring composed of two main parts that consist of a set of 
fundamental units, and a set of grammatical rules specifying different ways in which the 
fundamental units can combine.  The paper addresses two main issues: (i) identification 
of the primitives in noisy data using pattern-recognition abilities of a back-propagation 
neural network and (ii) development of an error correcting code which prunes errors 
made at the pattern-classification stage, generating higher level trend explanation.  This 
approach can be used to summarize the important features of trends, their potential 
consequences and provide cause-and-effect explanation about the process behavior at 
various levels of detail to the operator (Rengaswamy and Venkatasubramanian, 1995). 
Simula and Kangas (1995), present a self-organizing map algorithm in order to create 
systems  to  monitor  complicated,  dynamical  processes  and  to  visualize  the  process 
development.  The nonlinear mapping from a high dimensional input space to a usually 
two-dimensional grid efficiently characterizes complex systems.  Process behavior is 
visualized by extracting the feature vector of the parameter of interest and displaying its 
value as a gray level on the map.  By following the trajectory of the operating point, the 
parameter is monitored.  The map can also be used for fault detection and identification 
(Simula and Kangas, 1995). 
 
4.3.1.1  Implementation of the process monitoring module 
In the Coordinated Knowledge Management method, process monitoring can be broken 
up into three sections, each of which has been implemented in the process monitoring 
module developed in G2 for the Pilot plant application. 
 
(i)  One of the earliest implemented methods of process monitoring is the 
limit checking approach, used to identify normal, high and low states 
depending  on  the  value  of  the  sensor  (Rengaswamy  and 
Venkatasubramanian, 1995).  This approach has been implemented by a 
“Low  Level  Control  /  Limit  Checking”  component  of  the  process 
monitoring module in G2.  Each sensor has its own specific upper and Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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lower limits.  If the raw sensor reading goes above or below its specified 
sensor limit, an indicator forming part of the sensor indicates this event.  
The start and end time of this event and the duration is also recorded on 
the sensor.  A message is also created on a sensor-error operator list 
informing the operator of this event. 
 
A second basic task of the process monitoring module is exponential 
filtering of the raw process sensor value.  This filtering is according to 
Equation (4.28) (Ogunnaike and Ray, 1994). 
 
       ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( 1 1 k y k y k y b b - + - =
L L
      (4.28) 
 
Where:   ( ) k y
L
 is the filtered value of the signal at the sampling 
instant k (when  k t t = ) 
( ) k y  is the measured signal value at sampling instant k 
b  is the filter constant  1 0 < < b  
 
Each  individual  sensor  has  its  own  filter  constant.    For  increased 
filtering, the operator can increase b  of the associated process variable. 
 
Other  basic  process  monitoring  calculations  involve  calculating  the 
standard deviation and mean of each sensor.  These values are then used 
as part of the data reconciliation module in order to calculate weightings 
for sensors in the optimization problem. 
 
(ii)  A  major  component  of  the  process  monitoring  module  consists  of 
monitoring the current state of the process to see if the process is at 
steady state.  This is achieved by monitoring each sensor over a time 
interval specified by the operator.  If the sensor value goes above or 
below a certain range from its initial value during that time interval, the Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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sensor is considered to no longer be at steady state.  Each sensor has an 
object attached to it with the attributes: 
 
·  Ss-status indicating if the sensor is at steady state. 
·  SS-allowed-variability,  which  is  entered  by  the  operator 
indicating  how  much  the  sensor  value  is  allowed  to  vary 
before it is considered to be at unsteady state. 
·  Process-monitoring-time-interval  is  the  time-interval  in 
which the sensor must have its value within the ss-allowed-
variability in order for the process to be indicated at steady 
state. 
·  SS-start-time, ss-stop-time and ss-duration indicating the start 
time, stop time and the duration of the sensor at steady state. 
·  NSS-start-time and Nss-stop-time and Nss-duration indicating 
the  start  time,  stop  time  and  the  duration  of  the  sensor  at 
unsteady state. 
 
Monitoring a collection of these sensor variables for each plant section 
forms process monitoring.  The relevant sensors that are monitored to 
indicate the status of the Separation and Heating sections of the Pilot 
plant are shown in Table 4.4.  Total plant process monitoring consists of 
a combination of the Separation and Heating sections.  Note that the 
steady state detection component of the process monitoring module is 
also used as the steady state detector for data reconciliation. 
 
Table 4.4. Process monitoring sensors for plant sections 
Plant Section  Sensors 
Separation  LT-542, FT-523, LT-501 & 
FT-569. 
Heating  FT-687, LT-667, TT-568, 
TT-623, TT-543 & TT-663. 
Total Plant  LT-542, FT-523, LT-501, 
FT-569, FT-687, LT-667, 
TT-568, TT-623, TT-543 & 
TT-663. Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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(iii)  The “fault detection and diagnosis module” has been implemented as a 
separate module to process monitoring.  However, theoretically detecting 
departures from normal operation also forms part of process monitoring.  
The fault detection and diagnosis module is briefly outlined in the next 
section. 
 
4.3.2  Fault detection and diagnosis 
Fault detection and diagnosis involves the tracking of process execution, detection of 
departures from normal operation and identification of cause (Reklaitis and Koppel, 
1996).  Fault detection uses data in order to detect abnormal situations and isolate faults 
and is often considered to be part of process monitoring.  Faults include gross parameter 
changes in a model, structural changes, malfunctioning sensors and actuators, external 
obstacles  such  as  clogging  or  outflows  and  defects  in  construction  such  as  cracks 
(Venkatasubramanian, 1994). 
 
The development of the fault detection and diagnosis module is presented in Chapter 5 
where a thorough review of fault detection and diagnosis is presented including the 
development of a technique for early detection and diagnosis of faults in large-scale 
systems. 
 
4.3.3  Supervisory control 
Supervisory control involves the on-line calculation of set points (SP’s) allowing the 
unit or plant to achieve best performance while satisfying operation constraints (Seborg 
et al., 1989).  The type of application of a supervisory computer, which adjusts the SP’s 
of analog or digital controllers is illustrated in Fig. 4.2. Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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Digital
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Controller Process +
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Digital or Analog Controller
Digital or Analog Controller
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Fig. 4.2. A supervisory digital computer system (Seborg et al., 1989) 
 
Process  and  economic  models  of  the  plant  are  used  to  optimize  plant  operation  by 
maximizing daily profit,  yields  or production rate.  Steady state system models are 
typically  used  in  supervisory  control.    The  operating  or  economic  model  typically 
include  constraints  on  operating  conditions,  feed  and  production  rates,  storage  and 
warehouse  capacities  and  product  impurities  (Seborg  et  al.,  1989).    Before  the 
development of advanced distributed control systems, supervisory control calculations 
were done by hand using very simple process models.  Now, with the advent of modern 
distributed  control  systems  and  the  availability  of  on-line  computing  capability, 
supervisory control is becoming increasingly automated.  More realistic plant models 
can be used and supervisory control can be performed more regularly (Radhakrishnan, 
1999). 
 
Several  incentives  make  supervisory  control  set  point  optimization  attractive  in  the 
mineral industries.  These are as follows (Radhakrishnan, 1999):  Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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(i)  The high-energy requirement of mineral processing operations and the 
consequent need to increase the energy efficiency. 
(ii)  The  high  variability  in  the  mineral  raw  material  grades  necessitating 
frequent changes in the process conditions. 
(iii)  A requirement of tight processing controls to minimize pollution. 
(iv)  Frequent changes in the market demand and price requiring adjustment 
of the production rate. 
 
Nooraii (1995) presents a supervisory control application of a pilot-scale distillation 
column  separating  ethanol  and  water,  connected  to  an  industrial  distributed  control 
system.    An  economic  objective  is  set  up  which  meets  process  model  and  process 
operational  constraints  such  as  product  quality  control,  safety  and  environmental 
regulations  without  the  fear  of  constraint  violation  in  the  presence  of  disturbances 
(Nooraii, 1995; Nooraii and Romagnoli, 1997). 
 
Radhakrishnan (1999) investigates the use of a supervisory control system to maximize 
throughput with constraints on product particle size distribution for a ball mill model 
together with a hydrocycone forming part of grinding mill in a copper concentrator 
plant.  The throughput (unit price of the product subtract the unit price of the feed) and 
constraints are used to calculate the optimal set points for the controlled variables (feed 
and water flow rate) (Radhakrishnan, 1999). 
 
Further examples of supervisory control applications can be found in literature by Edgar 
et al. (2001), Lojek and Whitehead (1989), Mee and Watchers (1997), Seborg et al. 
(1989) and Swartz (1995). 
 
4.3.3.1  Problem formulation 
In order to implement supervisory control, the problem statement must be formulated 
and  solved.    The  optimization  of  set  points  requires  the  selection  of  an  objective 
function to be maximized or minimized, incorporating the economic model and the 
operating or process model, which includes constraints on the process variables (Seborg 
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An example of operating profit over some specified time might be expressed as follows 
(Seborg et al., 1989): 
 
   ￿ ￿ - - =
r
r r
s
s s OC C F V F P            (4.29) 
 
Where:   P = profit/time 
    ￿
s
s sV F  = Sum of product flow rates times respective profit values 
    ￿
r
r rV F  = Sum of feed flow rate times respective unit cost 
  OC = Operating costs/time 
 
Both the operating and economic models typically will include constraints on (Seborg et 
al., 1989): 
 
(i)  Operating  conditions,  as  temperatures  and  pressures  must  be  within 
certain limits. 
(ii)  Feed and production rates, as pumps have fixed capacities and sales are 
limited by market projection. 
(iii)  Storage and warehouse capacity, because storage tanks cannot overflow 
during periods of low demand. 
(iv)  Product  impurities,  where  a  product  may  contain  no  more  than  the 
maximum amount of some contaminant or impurity. 
 
When  implementing  a  supervisory  control  application,  two  useful  sources  of  data 
include  the  profit  and  loss  statement  (providing  information  on  sales,  prices, 
manufacturing costs and profits) and the operating records (including information on 
material and energy balances, unit efficiencies, production levels and feedstock usage) 
(Seborg et al., 1989). 
 
With the objective of maximizing operation profits, factors to consider include (Seborg 
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(i)  Sales limited by production where an increase in throughput would lead 
to an increase in sales. 
(ii)  Sales  limited  by  market  where  improved  efficiency  at  the  current 
production rates would increase profits. 
(iii)  With  large  throughputs  even  small  savings  in  unit  production  costs 
would amount to large net profit increases. 
(iv)  The reduction of high raw material and energy consumption offers the 
greatest potential savings. 
(v)  Also, product quality being better than specification can cause excessive 
production cost. 
(vi)  Losses of valuable or hazardous components through waste streams or 
pollutant emissions should be minimized, as there is a cost associated 
with these components. 
 
4.3.3.2  Solution methodology 
Once a supervisory control application has been chosen, six steps are then taken in order 
to solve the supervisory control problem.  These steps are listed below (Seborg et al., 
1989): 
 
(i)  Identify the process variables. 
(ii)  Select the performance criteria and develop a mathematical expression 
for the objective function. 
(iii)  Develop the models for the process and constraints. 
(iv)  Simplify the model and objective function. 
(v)  Compute the optimum. 
(vi)  Perform sensitivity studies. 
 
4.3.3.3  Implementation of the supervisory control module 
The supervisory control module was applied to the Heating section of the Pilot plant.  
The objective function consisted of maximizing the profit by minimizing the (cost of) 
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would be equivalent to a quality constraint, where the product temperature represents 
the quality of the product. 
 
The objective function is as follows: 
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                      (4.30) 
 
Where the steam flow-control valve openings,  2 1,m m  and  3 m  are related to the steam 
flow rates  2 1,s s  and  3 s  through Equations (4.24) to (4.26). 
 
Subject to… 
1.  Inequality constraints: 
   % 85 , , % 15 3 2 1 £ £ m m m             (4.31) 
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Where  L X  and  U X  are the product temperature constraints and are specified by 
the operator. 
 
2.  Equality  constraints  are  the  same  as  Equations  (4.18)  to  (4.20)  in  the  data 
reconciliation section, but are repeated for convenience.  
 
(i)  Normalized steady state energy balance Heating tank 1. 
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(ii)  Normalized steady state energy balance Heating tank 2. 
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(iii)  Normalized steady state energy balance Heating tank 3. 
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The definitions of variables are the same as in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3.  Definitions for 
22 11 00, x and x x  are given in Equations (4.21) to (4.23) respectively and definitions for 
1 s ,  2 s  and  3 s  are given in Equations (4.24) to (4.26) respectively. 
 
Where:   P = Profit / time. 
OC = Operating condition (or how much steam costs in the School of 
Engineering Science). 
µ1 = cost of steam chosen by the user ($/kg with default value 10). 
 
Once the solution variables  1 m ,  2 m  and  3 m  have been found, the temperature set points 
for  1 T ,  2 T  and  3 T  can be found by re-arranging Equations (4.35) to (4.37) as shown in 
the following equations. 
 
From Equation (4.35): 
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Substitute  the  above-calculated  value  of  sp T , 1   into  the  value  1 T   in  the  following 
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Substitute  the  above-calculated  value  of  sp T , 2   into  the  value  2 T   in  the  following 
equation, which is a re-arrangement of Equation (4.37): 
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Similar to the data reconciliation module, these equations have been implemented as 
part of the same Sequential Quadratic Programming program developed by Lawrence et 
al. (1997), with solution generated on line.  After the optimization has completed and 
the output csv file has been read into the appropriate G2 variable, the new SP’s are sent 
to the DCS. 
 
4.4  High-Level Tasks 
4.4.1  Planning and scheduling 
Planning is the allocation of production resources and assignment of production targets 
for the plant averaged over a suitable time scale.  The time scale for planning is long 
term, typically in the range of weeks, months or years.  Scheduling is the determination 
of the timing and sequence in the execution of manufacturing tasks so as to achieve 
production targets in an optimal fashion (Reklaitis and Koppel, 1996).  The time frame 
in this case is usually days to weeks.  Planning and scheduling are not elaborated in this 
chapter, as they are application specific.  For further information refer to Boddington 
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4.5  G2 Implementation of the Intelligent System 
This section provides sample screens, which have been developed in G2, used by the 
operator  to  navigate  throughout  the  developed  intelligent  system.    Firstly  the  main 
operator  interface  screen  and  process  schematic  screens  are  presented,  followed  by 
screens  specifically  related  to  the  data  reconciliation,  process  monitoring  and 
supervisory control modules. 
 
4.5.1  Module overview 
The  main  workspace  with  which  the  operator  interacts  is  the  “Module  Overview”, 
shown in Fig. 4.3.  This workspace provides links to every module in the intelligent 
system, which the operator can access.  The “Module Overview” is grouped according 
to function as described in the following sections. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.3. Module Overview workspace 
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4.5.1.1  Process schematics 
Process Schematics contains the schematic workspaces for the Separation and Heating 
sections of the Pilot plant, shown in Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.5 respectively.  Selecting each 
individual  piece  of  process equipment  on  the  schematics  displays  the  table  for  that 
particular unit.  Schematics for different plant sections are linked through connections 
attached to the end of each flow pipe. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4. Separation section schematic  Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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Fig. 4.5. Heating section schematic 
 
 
4.5.1.2  Data reconciliation 
The Data Reconciliation section has options relating to the DR module.  By pressing the 
button labeled “Request Running DR Module” (Fig. 4.3) or “Request Running Data 
Reconciliation Module” (Fig. 4.6) the operator can manually run the DR module. 
 
The “Operator Input” screen, shown in Fig. 4.6, has options relating to the frequency 
with  which  the  operator  wishes  to  automatically  run  the  DR  module  and  the  plant 
section to be reconciled.  There are also displays indicating the current status of the DR 
module, the time the DR module was last run and the time that DR will be next run. Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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Fig. 4.6. Data reconciliation operator input 
 
The “Raw & Reconciled Values” (Fig. 4.7) screen lists the raw and reconciled values 
for each sensor, which is to be reconciled including temperature and flow readings. 
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The “Sensors in Error” screen, shown in Fig. 4.8, has an associated icon for each sensor 
which is to  be reconciled.   Action buttons placed  next to the icon are used  by the 
operator to either (i) calculate and use the nominal sensor value in the reconciliation or 
(ii) use the raw sensor value in the reconciliation.  These options are only chosen if the 
sensor is in error.  The operator can also go to the sensor displayed on the schematics by 
pressing the button labeled “Go to {sensor name}” for each particular sensor icon.  By 
selecting  these  icons  the  operator  is  provided with  further  details  on the associated 
sensor including: 
 
￿￿ The reconciled sensor value. 
￿￿ The raw sensor value. 
￿￿ The nominal sensor value. 
￿￿ An indicator, displaying if the sensor is in drift. 
￿￿ If the DR module is using the raw or nominal value in the reconciliation. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.8. Sensors in error screen 
 
 
The “Sensor Drift List” (Fig. 4.9) is a list of all sensors in error including the time, 
which this has occurred. Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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Fig. 4.9. Sensor drift list 
 
4.5.1.3  Process monitoring 
The Process Monitoring section has options relating to the process monitoring module.  
The workspace labeled “Process Monitors” (Fig. 4.10) contains icons representing the 
Separation, Precipitation (Heating) and Total Plant indicating if the particular section is 
at steady state.  Selecting these icons displays the collection of sensor indicators making 
up the particular plant section. 
 
 
Fig. 4.10. Process monitors workspace 
 
The  workspaces  labeled  “Separation  Section  Sensor  Monitors”  and  “Precipitation 
(Heating) Section Sensor Monitors” (Fig. 4.11) contain icons representing each sensor 
indicator, which indicates if the sensor is at steady state, unsteady state or in error.  Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
Page 4.34 
Selecting  each  individual  sensor  indicator  provides  further  details  relating  to  the 
particular sensor including: 
 
￿￿ The current sensor value. 
￿￿ The reconciled sensor value. 
￿￿ An indication if the sensor is at steady state. 
￿￿ The steady state start, stop and duration times. 
￿￿ The unsteady state start, stop and duration times. 
￿￿ The error start, stop and duration times. 
 
Each icon also has an action button associated with it, enabling the operator to go to the 
associated sensor on the process schematics. 
 
 
Fig. 4.11. Separation and Precipitation (Heating) process monitors 
 
4.5.1.4  Supervisory control 
The  Supervisory  Control  section  contains  options  relating  to  the  SC  module.    By 
pressing  the  button  labeled  “Request  Running  SC  Module”  (Fig.  4.3)  or  “Request 
Running Supervisory Control Module” (Fig. 4.12) the operator can manually run the SC 
module. 
 
The “Operator Input” workspace (Fig. 4.12)  has options  relating  to running the SC 
module including a type in box for the operator to enter the frequency to automatically 
run the SC module and an indicator displaying the current status of the SC module.  The 
operator also has type in boxes to enter: Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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￿￿ The current air temperature. 
￿￿ Product temperature lower bound. 
￿￿ Product temperature upper bound. 
 
 
Fig. 4.12. Supervisory control operator input workspace 
 
After changing these parameters the operator must then request that the SC module be 
run as all of these parameters affect the current process set points. 
 
The workspace labeled “New SP’s” lists the current set points, which have been sent to 
the DCS. Modules Encompassing Intelligent Operational Management                        Chapter 4 
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4.6  Conclusion 
This chapter has provided detailed descriptions of the tasks encompassing intelligent 
process  operations.    These  include  data  acquisition,  regulatory  control,  data 
reconciliation, supervisory control, process monitoring / fault detection, fault diagnosis, 
planning  and  scheduling.    In  the  past,  research  has  focused  on  individual  task 
implementation.  Different techniques used for implementation of each individual task 
were  discussed.    Particular  attention  was  provided  on  the  process  monitoring,  data 
reconciliation  and  supervisory  control  modules.    Equations  relating  to  the  data 
reconciliation and supervisory control modules are presented as applied to the Pilot 
plant.  Sample screen shots, which have been developed in G2 for operator interaction 
with these modules were also presented in this chapter.  The techniques applied to these 
three modules are not newly developed, but are needed for use in demonstrating task 
integration.    The  next  chapter  will  describe  in  more  detail  the  fault  detection  and 
diagnosis module, which illustrates a new technique for fault detection and diagnosis in 
large-scale systems. 
 
Although  each  task  is  able  to  function  individually  improving  plant  performance, 
integration  of  these  tasks  within  an  intelligent  architecture  would  lead  to  overall 
improved plant operation. 
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  Chapter 5 
Fault Detection and Diagnosis 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Fault  detection  and  diagnosis  (FDD)  is  an  essential  part  of  the  operation  of  any 
processing plant and an integral part of task integration.  The presence of a fault in the 
system  disrupts  plant  operation  and  invalidates  calculations  performed  by  other 
modules.  Data reconciliation calculations involving the use of the mass and energy 
balances would be disrupted, and set point calculations from the supervisory control 
module are no longer valid.  Depending on the fault severity, plant schedules may have 
to be revised.  Small faults, such as small process leaks are sometimes masked by the 
control  system.    Early  detection  and  diagnosis  of  faults  is  important  in  processing 
industry since a lot of damage and loss can result before a fault present in the system is 
detected.  In addition, it becomes harder to distinguish the root cause of the fault once 
the fault propagates through the plant.  It is the presence of faults in the system, which 
disrupts the structure of the functional hierarchy making it unsuitable for the integration 
of tasks.  A good fault detection and diagnosis method is therefore essential to task 
integration. 
 
This chapter emphasizes a technique for early detection and diagnosis of faults based on 
dynamic  fault  data  and  a  two-step  fault  detection  and  diagnosis  framework.    The 
approach shows various advantages over alternative methods including prompt fault 
detection  and  localization,  applicability  to  large-scale  systems  without  the  need  for 
excessive computing resources, and a modular architecture that allows plant sections to Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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be treated individually.  It is referred to as dynamic fault detection and diagnosis since 
the fault detection and diagnosis module detects and diagnoses the faults in their initial 
phase. 
 
The term fault in fault detection refers to the departure from an acceptable range of an 
observed  variable  or  calculated  parameter  associated  with  equipment  (Himmelblau, 
1978).  Fault diagnosis refers to identification of the fact that a fault exists, plus a 
degree of localization of the source.  Past applications of fault detection and diagnosis 
have mainly been  applied  to  small systems and have focussed on  steady state  data 
detecting faults when they have been in the system for a while.  This is clearly an 
inoptimal approach with real plants, where faults impact as soon as they occur.  In 
addition, with larger systems, computer processing time and memory requirements are 
increased to potentially prohibitive levels.  It was therefore desirable to implement a 
fault detection and diagnosis methodology, with the following properties: 
 
(i)  Ability to satisfy real-time requirements. 
(ii)  The  use  of  little  processing  power  and  memory  requirements  when 
running. 
(iii)  Provide adaptability. 
(iv)  Ability to accommodate noisy data. 
(v)  Ability to incorporate different types of input data. 
(vi)  Easy to implement and understand. 
(vii)  Easy to extend to incorporate new faults. 
 
These  characteristics  are  satisfied  by  the  implementation  of  a  Petri  /  neural  net 
technique for fault detection and diagnosis. 
 
This chapter explores the use of neural networks for fault diagnosis trained on dynamic 
fault data and the use of a Petri net for fault detection in large-scale systems.  Until 
recently, Petri nets have commonly been used to model discrete event systems such as 
batch processes, where the material is operated in finite quantities (or batches), rather 
than  for  fault  detection  based  on  continuous  time  data.    However,  even  with  a 
continuous  process,  data  is  collected  from  the  distributed  control  system  (DCS)  at 
discrete time intervals.  This enables the development of a Petri net for continuous Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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processes.    Some  applications  using  Petri  nets  for  fault  detection  can  be  found  for 
automatic  manufacturing  systems  (Srinivasan  and  Jafari,  1993;  Viswanadham  and 
Johnson, 1988), discrete event systems (Wang, 1995), power systems (Hadjicostis and 
Verghese, 2000; Lo et al., 1999) and nuclear power plants (Prock, 1991a; Prock, 2000). 
 
In the proposed method, the large-scale plant is broken up into sections and a Petri net 
based on real time data is used to locate the particular section of the plant in which the 
fault  originates.    This  Petri  net  then  activates  secondary  neural  networks,  which 
diagnose the exact location of the fault in that particular plant section. 
 
Petri nets are easy to implement and understand and require very little processing power 
to run.  They can be run in real time and are easy to extend to incorporate more plant 
sections.  They offer potential for prompt detection and localization of the problem.  In 
the case of the fault detection module, the Petri net represents a convenient visualization 
of  the  detection  of  a  system  departure  from  normal  operation.    Running  Petri  net 
requires less processing power than a neural network and thus  is more  suitable for 
detection of faults in large-scale systems. 
 
The chapter begins with a review of fault detection methods followed by a discussion of 
the use of neural networks.  The proposed two-step supervisory fault detection and 
diagnosis framework using Petri nets for fault detection and neural networks for fault 
diagnosis is then outlined.  Section three presents a description of the simulated faults, 
methodology and results.  The case study includes a comparison between the two-step 
Petri net / neural network detection and diagnosis methodology and a single neural 
network for total plant fault detection and diagnosis. 
 
5.2  Fault Detection and Diagnosis: A Review 
Numerous  techniques  have  been  proposed  for  fault  diagnosis  in  the  past.    These 
techniques can be broadly classified as (Dash and Venkatasubramanian, 2000): 
 
(i)  Process model based methods. 
(ii)  Process history based methods. 
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Process model based methods rely on a fundamental understanding of the process using 
first principle knowledge, which includes qualitative methods (qualitative functions are 
centered  around  different  units  is  a  process)  and  quantitative  methods  (when 
mathematical relations exist to describe the process) (Dash and Venkatasubramanian, 
2000).  Examples of qualitative approached to fault diagnosis include signed directed 
graphs  (SDG),  Fault  Trees,  Qualitative  Simulation  (QSIM)  and  Qualitative  Process 
Theory (QPT).  Quantitative methods include techniques that use analytical redundancy 
to generate residuals through diagnostic observers, parity relations, Kalman filters and 
parameter  estimation  (Venkatasubramanian  et  al.,  2003a).    Limitations  of  process 
model based qualitative techniques include generation of a large number of hypothesis 
and  poor  resolution  which  makes  the  decision  process  more  uncertain  with  high 
computation  efforts  when  used  on-line.    Many  process  model  based  quantitative 
techniques are only applicable to linear systems with limited availability of methods for 
non-linear  chemical  processes  (Dash  and  Venkatasubramanian,  2000).    System 
complexity, high dimensionality, process nonlinearly and lack of good data often make 
it  difficult  to  develop  an  accurate  system  model  limiting  quantitative  model-based 
methods for industrial fault detection and diagnosis.  Other limitations of this approach 
include  the  use  of  a  simplistic  approximation  of  disturbances,  no  support  for  an 
explanation facility, only specifically modeled faults can be detected, applicability of 
the approach to varying process conditions has not been tested, large scale processes 
increase  computational  complexity  (Venkatasubramanian  et  al.,  2003a).    A  major 
disadvantage of qualitative model based methods is the generation of spurious solutions 
(Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003b).  For further information on process model based 
methods such as fault trees and causal graphs refer to Kuo et al. (1997), Montmain and 
Leyval (1994), Rich and Venkatasubramanian (1987), Rich and Venkatasubramanian 
(1989), Vedam and Venkatasubramanian (1997), Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003a), 
Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003b) and Wang and Linkens (1996). 
 
Process history based methods use large amounts of process history data and can also 
be further subdivided into quantitative methods (neural networks, Principle component 
analysis (PCA), partial least squares (PLS) and statistical classifiers) and qualitative 
methods  (qualitative  trend  analysis  (QTA)  and  expert  systems)  (Dash  and 
Venkatasubramanian, 2000).  Process history based (qualitative rule-based) methods are 
good at representing heuristic knowledge, however, they are not good at representing Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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time, causality and intent, they are difficult to verify and their correctness is difficult to 
prove.    They  also  suffer  from  drawbacks  such  as  incompleteness  and  inflexibility 
(Wang and Linkens, 1996).  Further examples of process history based methods can be 
found in Dash et al. (2003), Kramer (1987), Lerner et al. (2000), Leung and Romagnoli 
(1998) and Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003c). 
 
In  order  to  include  the  benefits  of  both  process  model  based  methods  and  process 
history based methods for fault detection and diagnosis, several hybrid frameworks for 
fault detection and diagnosis have been developed.  Becraft (1991) combines the use of 
neural networks with an expert system in order to detect and diagnose faults in large-
scale chemical processes.  The neural networks offer fault detection and localization 
and  the  deep  knowledge expert  system  analyses  the  results  and  either  confirms  the 
diagnosis or offers an alternative solution.   
 
Mylaraswamy and Venkatasubramanian (1997) present a hybrid framework combining 
causal  model-based  diagnosis  with  statistical  classifiers  and  syntactic  pattern 
recognition into a blackboard framework for fault diagnosis.  The weakness of one 
diagnosis method (for example causal model based diagnosis which are good at root 
cause  analysis  rather  than  early  detection)  can be  offset  by  the  strength  of  another 
method (for example, the early detection of faults by pattern recognition approaches). 
 
Ruiz et al. (2001) presented a fault detection and diagnosis scheme that incorporates the 
advantages of neural networks but as a supplement to a fuzzy system in a block oriented 
configuration.  The neural networks require no explicit coding of knowledge and the 
fuzzy system provides insight into the problem-solving process. 
 
Prock  (1991a,  1991b,  1992,  2000)  has  presented  a  four-layered  approach  for  fault 
detection and diagnosis known as LYDIA (earLY sensor and process fault detection and 
DIAgnosis) for nuclear plants.  The layers are as follows: 
 
(i)  Signal layer - This layer consists of the plant or a simulator of the plant 
that is a source of the measurement signals. 
(ii)  Algorithmic layer (residual generation) - This consists of three levels of 
fault detection: Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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(a)  HDFI module: This level of fault detection checks the measurement 
signals  using  hardware  redundancy,  eg.  through  the  Parity  space 
algorithm. 
(b)  NFDI  and  IFDI  (Instrument  Fault  Detection  and  Identification) 
modules:  This  level  of  fault  detection  is  based  on  analytical 
redundancy (both non-temporal and temporal).  Signals belonging to 
the  same  process  or  component  representing  different  physical 
quantities are compared using mathematical models of the process, 
eg.  temporal  Parity  Space  algorithm,  the  Generalized  Likelihood 
Ratio method and a least-squares parameter estimation technique. 
(c)  PNFD  module:  This  module  is  based  on  system  redundancy.  
Conservation quantities of the whole system consisting of different 
processes are monitoring using Petri nets. 
(iii)  Fuzzy logic layer for pattern generation - This layer includes information 
concerning the signal states. 
(iv)  Diagnosis layer or pattern interpretation - Fault diagnosis is performed 
using an expert system and neural network to classify the residuals found 
in step (ii) into faults.  This layer has not yet been developed and has 
been proposed for future work. 
 
Petri nets have been  used as the third  component of the algorithmic  layer for fault 
detection.  Because this is the closest method to the technique of fault detection, which 
was developed as part of this thesis, the similarities and differences of this technique for 
fault detection compared to the technique developed in this chapter will be outlined in 
more detail in section 5.7.3. 
 
Further references on hybrid approaches to fault detection and diagnosis can be found in 
(Dash  and  Venkatasubramanian,  2000;  Pang  et  al.,  1995;  Tang  et  al.,  1994; 
Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003c). 
 
5.2.1  Neural networks for fault detection and diagnosis 
Artificial  neural  networks  (ANN’s)  are  a  type  of  massively  parallel  computer 
architectures based on brain-like information encoding and processing models which Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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exhibit brain like behaviors such as learning, association, categorization, generalization, 
feature  extraction  and  optimization.    An  example  of  a  typical  multi-layered  neural 
network is shown in Fig. 5.1. 
 
Input Layer Hidden Layer Output Layer
 
Fig. 5.1. Typical multi-layered neural network (Tzafestas and Verbruggen, 1995) 
 
For engineering purposes, the neural networks can be thought of as a black box model, 
which accepts inputs, processes them and produces outputs according to some non-
linear transfer function (Zaknich, 2003).  Neural networks learn solutions from supplied 
data.  For example, by exposure to fault signatures for specific equipment, the network 
can learn to recognize faults.  Neural networks are also particularly useful in situations 
with noisy data and where different types of input data are required to be integrated and 
there is difficulty in specifying rules for a knowledge-based system. 
 
Neural network design involves five tasks (Zaknich, 2003): 
 
(i)  Data  collection  –  Neural  networks  are  best  applied  when  there  is  an 
abundance of data. 
(ii)  Raw data pre-processing – In order to reduce the dimensionality of the 
data, filter noise, enhance features etc. 
(iii)  Feature extraction from the pre-processed data - Involving identifying 
features, which have some correlation to the desired output.  Redundant 
or  ineffective  features  can  therefore  be  eliminated  from  the  network 
inputs.  Multivariate data can be visualized in software packages such as Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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XGOBI and can be used for feature extraction purposes (AT&T Labs, 
2003). 
(iv)  Selection of artificial neural network type and topology (architecture) – 
There are many different types of ANN architectures including Multi-
Layer Perceptron (MLP), Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN), Radial 
Basis Function Neural Network (RBFNN) to name a few.  One must also 
choose the number of layers and activation function. 
(v)  Artificial neural network training, testing and validation – The training 
set is used to train the network.  Either during and/or after training, the 
testing  set  is  used  to  check  that  the  network  is  able  to  adequately 
generalize its learning to new data.  The validation set is used as a final 
check on the networks ability to generalize, accuracy and suitability to 
the problem solution. 
 
The design process when using a neural network is shown in Fig. 5.2. 
 
Specify the Problem
Select the ANN model
Collect suitable data
Preprocess the raw
data
Select suitable
features
Prepare vector set Train the ANN model
Test the ANN model
Is the design
adequate?
Validate the ANN
model
Design is complete.
Yes
Good
No Good
No
 
Fig. 5.2. Example of an ANN design procedure (Zaknich, 2003) Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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Most literature concerning fault diagnosis and neural networks has focussed on fault 
detection based on steady state data.  Venkatasubramanian et al. (1990) applied neural 
networks for detection and diagnosis of faults under steady state conditions.  The case 
study encompassed a continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR) and a distillation column.  
Malfunctions were simulated and the new steady state measurement patterns were used 
to train the network.  This approach was advocated for processes with slow dynamics. 
 
Later, they extended the work to represent dynamic process data using neural networks 
(Vaidyanathan and Venkatasubramanian, 1992).  Two approaches were presented.  One 
was  based  on  raw  time-series  values  of  the  measured  process  variables,  while  the 
second used a moving average of the same time-series data.  It was found that the use of 
time series data were quicker than the moving average network in detecting faults early 
in the transient stage, however, the moving average scheme outperformed the raw time-
series scheme in the presence of noisy input data.  This method is suitable for relatively 
small processes, however, when the system becomes large, the neural network training 
time increases and computer memory requirements increase to potentially unacceptable 
levels.  It is therefore necessary to find a way to reduce the resources for fault detection 
and diagnosis of large-scale systems. 
 
Becraft (1991) proposed a method of fault diagnosis for large-scale systems based on 
steady state data by using a series of neural networks integrated with an expert system.  
This method was proposed in order to reduce the computational training time required 
for a single large neural network.  In this approach the large-scale plant was divided into 
three sections or batteries with three neural networks trained on faults in each battery 
unit.    A  main  neural  network  was  then  trained  based  on  the  boundary  flows, 
temperatures and concentration of these battery units, where the boundaries were the 
pipes and equipment joining two battery units.  This main neural network was then used 
as  the  primary  fault  detection  mechanism.    The  fault  detection  in  the  main  neural 
network directed the diagnosis to the particular battery unit or plant section. 
 
Further references of neural networks applied to process fault diagnosis can be found in 
Hoskins et al. (1991), Kavuri and Venkatasubramanian (1994), Kramer and Leonard 
(1990),  Venkatasubramanian  and  Chan  (1989),  Venkatasubramanian  et  al.  (2003c), 
Watanabe et al. (1989) and Watanabe et al. (1994). Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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5.2.2  Supervisory fault diagnosis using Petri nets and neural networks 
The method implemented as part of this thesis utilizes the idea of using dynamic fault 
data in order to diagnose faults as described by Vaidyanathan and Venkatasubramanian, 
(1992).  However in order to eliminate the problem of increased memory requirements 
and to reduce neural network training time for large-scale networks, the large-scale 
system  is  broken  down  into  smaller  plant  sections  as  described  by  Becraft  (1991).  
Additionally, the idea of a large-scale main plant neural network has been replaced with 
a Petri net model to organize the data.  Continual on-line evaluation of a neural network 
can be processor intensive and the more plant sections that are added, the greater the 
network training time.  So, by replacing main plant neural network with a Petri net, 
processing time is decreased.  Other benefits of fault detection using Petri nets include 
early detection of faults and detection of new faults. 
 
The two-step fault detection and diagnosis framework is presented in Fig. 5.3.  A Petri 
net fault detection module detects the fault on-line in real time based on dynamic fault 
data.  This Petri net then directs the diagnosis to the neural network for the particular 
section where the fault originates.  The use of Petri nets for fault detection reduces 
computer-processing power.  This two-step detection and diagnosis methodology allows 
the isolation of the root cause and quick diagnosis of the fault. 
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5.3  Case Study 
The Supervisory fault detection and diagnosis module is implemented on the Separation 
and Heating sections of the Pilot plant.  A schematic and process description for these 
sections are found in Chapter 2, section, 2.4. 
 
5.3.1  Simulated faults 
Faults  are  defined  as  deviations  from  process  operating  specifications  and  are 
categorized  in  terms  of  observations  such  as  pressure,  temperature,  flow,  level  and 
excessive vibration.  Types of faults in the Pilot plant could include: 
 
(i)  Tank leaks, which would be characterized by level, temperature, pump 
speed and flow variations. 
(ii)  Valve failure (such as trim wear or severe gland friction), which would 
be characterized by temperature variations.  
(iii)  Pump  faults  (such  as  a  damaged  impeller,  air  entering  pump  during 
operation, leakage through worn surface), which would be characterized 
by pump speed, tank level and flow deviations. 
 
In this study, the faults simulated in the Pilot plant include three faults in the Separation 
section and three faults in the Heating stage.  These faults are presented in Table 5.1.  
Leaking flow rates for pumps and tanks were between 12 – 28% of the throughput flow 
rate. 
 
Table 5.1. Simulated faults 
Fault No.  Equipment  Description 
Separation section 
1.  NUFP-561  Pump fault (26%) 
2.  LT-542  Sensor error 
3.  LT-501  Sensor error 
Heating section 
4.  Heating tank 3  Tank leaking (12%) 
5.  PP-681  Pump fault (28%) 
6.  LT-667  Sensor error 
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5.4  Fault Diagnosis Module 
The procedure for using neural networks for fault diagnosis is outlined in the following 
sections. 
 
5.4.1  Data collection 
Most fault diagnosis applications in the past have focussed on fault detection based on 
steady state data where the fault may have existed for a long time in the system.  It was 
therefore chosen to capture the fault as it occurred, that is using dynamic fault data.  The 
process faults were simulated by first operating the process under normal steady state 
operation  and  then  introducing  the  faults.    The  dynamic  fault  data  was  collected 
including  the  transition  from  normal  operation  to  faulty  operation.    Collection  of 
dynamic  fault  data  has  also  been  used  by  Gensym  (1998)  and  Vaidyanthan  and 
Venkatasubramanian (1992).  Faulty data was collected for up to 15 minutes after the 
fault occurrence. 
 
5.4.2  Raw data pre-processing 
Different types of raw data pre-processing algorithms were tried including filtering the 
data through an exponential filter, moving average filter and examining derivatives of 
the data.  However, these methods incorporated time delays into the system and this 
diagnosis  was  not  as  rapid  as  in  the  case  of  using  raw  data  (Vaidyanathan  and 
Venkatasubramanian, 1992).  Redundant data points were also removed at this stage.  
The use of raw data provided greater coverage of data points for training the network. 
 
5.4.3  Feature extraction 
For  the  case  of  the  Separation  and  Heating  sections,  the  relevant  sensors  used  for 
feature extraction are listed in Table 5.2. Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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Table 5.2. Sensor choices 
Sensor  Section 
FCV-541.OP  Separation 
FT-523.PV  Separation 
FT-569.PV  Separation & Heating 
LT-542.PV  Separation 
LT-501.PV  Separation 
FDP-521.OP  Separation 
NUFP-561.OP  Separation 
FT-687.PV  Heating 
LT-667.PV  Heating 
PP-681.OP  Heating 
 
 
Each fault listed in Table 5.1 generated changes in flows, pump speeds and tank levels.  
Thus all those variables were included as inputs to the neural network.  For the case of 
level sensors, errors were used as inputs to the network, by subtracting the process 
measurements from the controller set points.  Some faults resulted in the increase or 
decrease in pump speeds and tank levels so past as well as current values of these 
variables were used as inputs to the network.  Raw data was used for flow transmitters.  
 
5.4.4  Selection of ANN topology 
The  networks  used  were  Radial  Basis  Function  Neural  Networks  (RBFNN)  in  G2 
NeurOn-Line (a graphical object oriented software product for building neural network 
applications)  (Gensym,  1996).    A  radial  basis  function  is  a  function  which  is 
symmetrical about a given mean or center point in a multi-dimensional space (Zaknich, 
2003).  In a RBFNN, hidden nodes with radial basis activation functions are connected 
in a feed-forward parallel architecture and are optimized during training.  The radial 
basis function expansion for one hidden layer and an arbitrary radial basis function is 
represented by Equation (5.1) (Zaknich, 2003).  The architecture is shown in Fig. 5.4. 
 
( ) ( ) ￿
=
- =
M
i
i i i ki k x c f w x y
1
,s            (5.1) 
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Where:   ( ) x yk   is the 
th k output 
    x  is an input vector 
    ki w   is the weight from the 
th i  kernel node to the 
th k  output node 
    i c   is the centroid of the 
th i  kernel node 
    i s   is the bandwidth of the 
th i  kernel node 
    M   is the number of kernel nodes 
    () . i f   ( ) ( )
2 2
2 exp i i x c s - - = , Gaussian RBF with bandwidth of  i s  
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Fig. 5.4. RBFNN architecture (Zaknich, 2003) 
 
The radial basis function is suitable for pattern recognition problems and is becoming 
increasingly popular in engineering applications because of its ability to adapt to on-line 
learning without dramatically affecting previous learning (Zaknich, 2003).  This means 
that new faults can be trained into the networks as they occur (refer to Chapter 7, Future 
Work). 
 
Two  separate  RBFNN’s  were  used  for  the  two  plant  sections.    The  inputs  to  the 
networks included the sensor readings as described in the previous section.  The outputs Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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of the neural networks were the fault numbers.  An additional output was included to 
indicate normal operation.  A total list of RBFNN inputs and outputs for the Separation 
and Heating sections are presented in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 respectively. 
 
The G2 RBFNN also has one additional scalar output used to indicate the accuracy of 
the neural network classification. This is a probability between 0.0 and 1.0.  If the value 
is  close  to  zero  (for  example  less  than  0.6),  diagnosis  is  not  very  accurate.    This 
indicates that the hidden layer does not cover the input well, indicating that the network 
possibly predicted inaccurately due to extrapolation (Gensym, 1996). 
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Table 5.3.  Separation RBFNN details 
Separation RBFNN 
Network topology:  Input nodes = 11 
Hidden nodes = 32 
Outputs nodes = 4 
Hidden unit shape:  Spherical 
Network inputs:  1. FCV-541.OP – Ave 
  2. FT-523.PV – Ave 
  3. FT-569.PV – SP 
  4. LT-542.PV – SP 
  5. LT-542.PV – SP (30 sec ago) 
  6. LT-501 – SP 
  7. LT-501 – SP (15 sec ago) 
  8. FDP-521.OP – Ave 
  9. FDP-521.OP – Ave (15 sec ago) 
  10. NUFP-561.OP – Ave 
  11. NUFP-561.OP – Ave (15 sec ago) 
Network outputs:  1. Normal operation 
  2. NUFP-561 leak 
  3. LT-542 sensor error 
  4. LT-501 sensor error 
 
 
Table 5.4.  Heating RBFNN details 
Heating RBFNN 
Network topology:  Input nodes = 11 
Hidden nodes = 40 
Outputs nodes = 4 
Hidden unit shape:  Spherical 
Network inputs:  1. FT-569.PV – SP 
  2. FT-687.PV – Ave 
  3. LT-667.PV – SP 
  4. LT-667.PV – SP (30 sec ago) 
  5. PP-681.OP – Ave 
  6. PP-681.OP – Ave (30 sec ago) 
Network outputs:  1. Normal operation 
  2. Heating tank 3 leaking 
  3. PP-681 pump fault 
  4. LT-667 sensor fault 
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5.4.5  Training and testing of the networks 
The networks were trained in G2.  Several different network topologies were trained 
and tested and the optimum configurations were selected.  The number of hidden nodes 
had to be chosen carefully to ensure that the network was not over-trained thus limiting 
its ability to generalize.  The networks were tested by repeating the faults on the Pilot 
plant.  When applying the neural networks, they were not run in real time but calculated 
based on a sample of historical data and so once the fault is detected, the diagnosis is 
rapid. 
 
5.5  Fault Detection Module 
The procedure for using a Petri net for fault detection in large-scale systems is outlined 
in the following sections. 
 
5.5.1  Plant sections 
First the large-scale plant is partitioned into sections.  These sections may be allocated 
according to plant area or function.  For example, for the Bayer process, an appropriate 
grouping  is  digestion,  precipitation,  clarification  and  calcination.    Alternatively, 
grouping may be by equipment type.  For the case of the Pilot plant, the Separation and 
Heating section were considered in this investigation and therefore was divided into two 
sections as shown in Chapter 2, Fig. 2.11, repeated for convenience in Fig. 5.5. Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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Fig. 5.5. Separation and Heating sections of Pilot plant 
 
5.5.2  Mass and energy balances 
The mass and energy balances can then be formed around the plant sections.  For the 
case of the Pilot plant, a mass balance can be written for each of the Separation and 
Heating sections.  The dashed lines in Fig. 5.5 show the plant boundaries around which 
the mass and energy balances are formed.  For the case of the Separation boundary, the 
boundary  sensors  are  chosen  as  the  flow  of  FCV-541  (refer  to  Appendix  I  for  the 
calculation) and FT-569.  One must use these sensor values in the mass and energy 
balance equations for the Separation section.  For the Heating section, the boundary is 
around the three heated tanks.  FT-569 and FT-687 are chosen as the boundary sensors.  
These  sensors  are  used  in  the  mass  and  energy  balance  equations  for  the  Heating 
section.  The mass balances for the Separation and Heating sections of the plant are 
derived in the following sections. Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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5.5.2.1  Separation section mass balance 
The mass balance around the Separation section of the Pilot plant is as follows: 
569 541 - -
-
- - = + FT FCV
nt
nt
lin non
lin non F F
dt
dh
A
dt
dh
A         (5.2) 
Integrating this expression over the interval of  0 t  to t and re-arranging: 
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                       (5.4) 
Separation_Diff can then be defined as follows: 
 
( ) ￿ - -
- -
- -
- -
- -
+ =
t
t FT FCV
nt nt lin non lin non
nt nt lin non lin non
dt F F
t h A t h A
t h A t h A Diff Separation
0
569 541
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  (5.5) 
 
Where:   Anon-lin  is the surface area of the non-linear tank (m
2) 
Ant is the surface area of the needle tank (m
2) 
lin non h -  is the level of LT-542 (m) 
nt h  is the level of LT-501 (m) 
541 - FCV F   is  the  flow  rate  of  FCV-541  (inflow  rate  of  the  Separation 
section) ( min /
3 m ) (Appendix I) 
569 - FT F  is the flow rate of FT-569 (the outflow rate of the Separation 
section) ( min /
3 m ) 
 
From these calculations, the units for the graphs of Separation_Diff are meters
3 (m
3).  
Since  the  values  were  small,  Separation_Diff  was  multiplied  by  1000  for  the  G2 
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5.5.2.2  Heating section mass balance 
The mass balance around the Heating section of the Pilot plant is as follows: 
687 569
3
3 - - - = FT FT
T
T F F
dt
dh
A             (5.6) 
Integrating this expression over the interval of  0 t  to t and re-arranging: 
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Heating_Diff can then be defined as follows: 
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Where:   AT3 is the surface area of tank 3 (m
2) 
3 T h  is the level of LT-667 (m) 
569 - FT F  is the flow rate of FT-569 (inflow rate of the Heating section) 
( min /
3 m ) 
687 - FT F  is the flow rate of FT-687 (outflow rate of the Heating section) 
( min /
3 m ) 
 
Therefore, the units for the graphs of Heating_Diff are meters (m).  Since the values 
were small, Heating_Diff was multiplied by 1000 for the G2 calculation. 
 
Equations (5.5) and (5.10) are used as the basis for fault detection.  The evaluation of 
the  integrals  in  these  equations  provides  inherent  filtering  of  the  signals.    The 
integration interval ( 0 t  to  t) should be chosen such that small plant disturbances are 
filtered, however faults should still be detectable.  The longer the integration interval Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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the more likely fault detection will not detect a fault present in the system.  For the Pilot 
plant a value of thirty seconds was selected. 
 
5.5.2.3  Boundary sensor 
One sensor lying on the boundary is selected incase a fault occurs on the boundary.  For 
the case of the Pilot plant, the boundary sensor is chosen as FT-569.  This indicates the 
presence of a fault between the Separation and Heating sections.  This boundary sensor 
value is passed through a filter according to Equation (4.28), Chapter 4, section 4.3.1.1. 
 
When performing the boundary sensor calculations it is recommended that a normalized 
boundary sensor value be used.  Where the normalized boundary sensor value is the 
boundary sensor value subtract the average of the sensor value, or for the case when the 
boundary sensor has a set point, the boundary sensor value subtract the set point value 
of the boundary sensor.  This means that the boundary sensor value should fluctuate 
around zero, rather than having an offset. 
 
5.5.3  Boundary conditions 
The  boundary  conditions  for  normal  operation  are  developed and  the values  of  the 
lower  and  upper  bounds are found.  So  for faulty operation,  the difference  will no 
longer lie within the boundary conditions.  The lower and upper bounds were identified 
based on examination of historical data for normal and faulty plant operation.  Lower 
and upper bounds are also formed for a sensor on a boundary between the two sections.  
In  any  fault  detection  and  diagnosis  methodology,  determining  appropriate  decision 
thresholds  requires  balancing  sensitivity  against  false  alarm  rates  (Kramer  and 
Fjellheim, 1996).  The lower and upper bounds should be close to zero, however, the 
smaller the bounds, the greater the chance of false detection of faults.  However, the less 
sensitive the fault detection module, the greater the chance of not detecting faults which 
are present in the system. 
 
The limits for normal operation in the Separation and Heating sections of the Pilot plant 
and  for  569 569 - - - FT average FT   are  shown  in  Equations  (5.11),  (5.12)  and  (5.13) Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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respectively.  The values for these bounds found from historical plant data are given in 
Table 5.5. 
 
m l < < Diff Separation _             (5.11) 
k j < < Diff Heating _               (5.12) 
f e < - - < -569 679 FT average FT            (5.13) 
 
It is important to note that it is not necessary for the lower and upper bounds to be 
symmetric  around  zero  because  there  may  be  variations  due  to  modeling 
simplifications.    The  only  necessary  requirement  is  that  the  modeling  and  on-line 
calculations of mass and energy balances used for fault detection are consistent. 
 
Table 5.5. Lower and upper bound values 
Sensor  Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
569 569 - - - FT average FT  (%)  -0.07  0.08 
Diff Separation _  (
3 3 10 m ´ )  -0.26  0.31 
Diff Heating _  ( m
3 10 ´ )  -1.75  1.91 
 
 
From Equation (5.11), it can be seen that if  Diff Separation _  is less than the lower-
limit l or greater than the upper-limit m there is a fault either in the Separation section 
or in the flow pipe connecting the two sections. 
 
For the case of the Heating section,  Diff Heating _  being less than its lower-limit j or 
greater  than  its  upper-limit  k  (Equation  (5.12))  indicates  a  departure  from  normal 
operation.  It is also necessary to consider the reading of  569 679 - - - FT average FT  as 
the fault may have originated in the Separation section and propagated through to the 
Heating section of the Pilot plant.  This can also be shown by examination of the graphs 
in Fig. 5.6 and Fig. 5.7 for the Heating section of the Pilot plant. Fig. 5.6 indicates 
normal operation.  The normal operating limits are indicated by the horizontal lines 
labeled lower bound (or j) and upper bound (or k).  Faulty operation is shown in Fig. Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
Page 5.23 
5.7.  The fault in this case is LT-667 sensor error.  In this case  Diff Heating _  passes 
below its normal lower bound, indicating the presence of a fault in the Heating section 
of the Pilot plant. 
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Fig. 5.6. Normal operation of Heating section 
 
Fault 6: LT-667 Sensor Error
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Fig. 5.7. Faulty operation of Heating section 
 
All cases relating to bounds have been translated into Petri net input places.  A complete 
list of Petri net input places is provided in Table 5.6. Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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Table 5.6. Petri net input place descriptions 
Place  Description 
B0  e > - - -569 569 FT average FT  
B1  f < - - -569 569 FT average FT  
B2  j < Diff Heating _  
B3  l > Diff Separation _  
B4  m < Diff Separation _  
B5  e > - - -569 569 FT average FT  
B6  j > Diff Heating _  
B7  k < Diff Heating _  
B8  l < Diff Separation_  
B9  f > - - -569 569 FT average FT  
B10  m > Diff Separation _  
 
 
Boundary graphs for all faults can be found in Appendix II. 
 
5.5.4  Fault detection Petri net 
Rules developed following examination of the plant boundary conditions are converted 
into Petri nets as shown in Fig. 5.8.  Following this reasoning, a series of conditions 
were developed and the Petri net was formed.  A list of conditions is given in Table 5.7.  
The topology of the Petri net and the moving tokens represent the developed rules. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.8. Petri net representation of ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ rules Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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Table 5.7. List of conditions for fault detection Petri net 
No.  Condition 
Separation neural network activated 
1.  (B5) and (B6 and B7) and [(B3 and B4) or (B8)] 
2.  (B0 and B1) and (B6 and B7) and (B8) 
3.  (B9) and (B6 and B7) and (B10 or B8) 
Heating neural network activated 
4.  (B0 and B1) and (B2) and (B3 and B4) 
 
 
The Petri net for the Separation and Heating sections of the Pilot plant was developed in 
G2, as shown in Fig. 5.9.  The boundary conditions represent the inputs to the Petri net, 
labeled B0 to B10.  For example, B2 represents  Diff Heating _  being less than its 
lower  bound  (j)  and  B3  represents  Diff Separation_   being  greater  than  its  lower 
bound (l).  When a boundary condition holds true, a token is created on the place 
representing  this  condition.    A  token  located  upon  the  place  labeled  Heating  fault 
represents the presence of a fault in the Heating section and a token located on the place 
labeled Separation fault represents the presence of a fault in the Separation section. 
 
The fault detection Petri net receives input data every 5 seconds.  The two Petri net 
output places are then used to activate the  neural  networks  for that  particular  plant 
section which in turn starts the fault diagnosis module. Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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Fig. 5.9. Fault detection Petri net for Separation and Heating sections 
 
5.6  Total Plant Network 
For comparison purposes a total plant neural network was formed in order to detect and 
diagnose faults using dynamic fault data for the total plant.  The inputs and the data 
used to train the network were the same as described for the neural networks used in the 
two-step approach.  The outputs of the network were the fault numbers (six in total) and 
one extra output to indicate normal operation.  Network details are presented in Table 
5.8.  Fault detection and diagnosis using this network was then compared to the two-
step approach. Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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Table 5.8.  Total plant RBFNN details 
Total Plant RBFNN 
Network topology:  Input nodes = 16 
Hidden nodes = 70 
Outputs nodes = 7 
Hidden unit shape:  Spherical 
Network inputs:  1. FCV-541.OP – Ave 
  2. FT-523.PV – Ave 
  3. FT-569.PV – SP 
  4. LT-542.PV – SP 
  5. LT-542.PV – SP (30 sec ago) 
  6. LT-501 – SP 
  7. LT-501 – SP (15 sec ago) 
  8. FDP-521.OP – Ave 
  9. FDP-521.OP – Ave (15 sec ago) 
  10. NUFP-561.OP – Ave 
  11. NUFP-561.OP – Ave (15 sec 
ago) 
  12. FT-687.PV – Ave 
  13. LT-667.PV – SP 
  14. LT-667.PV – SP (30 sec ago) 
  15. PP-681.OP – Ave 
  16. PP-681.OP – Ave (30 sec ago) 
Network outputs:  1. Normal operation 
  2. NUFP-561 leak 
  3. LT-542 sensor error 
  4. LT-501 sensor error 
  5. Heating tank 3 leaking 
  6. PP-681 leak 
  7. LT-667 sensor error 
 
 
5.7  Results and Discussion 
5.7.1  Supervisory fault diagnosis framework: results 
The Supervisory fault diagnosis module was set to run at the speed of data collection (5 
seconds).    The  Petri  net  fault  detection  module  detected  faults  between  5  and  145 
seconds into the fault occurrence.  These values are significantly smaller in comparison 
to the new fault-induced transient, which took between 7 to 11 minutes to reach a new 
steady  state.    This  is  also  demonstrated  in  a  paper  by  Vaidyanathan  and 
Venkatasubramanian, (1992).  A complete list of times is shown in Table 5.9.  The Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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speed of the Petri net fault detection depends on the choice of the boundary conditions.  
The smaller the region between upper and lower bounds specifying normal operation 
the quicker faults may be detected.  However, narrower bounds may result in false 
detection of faults when in fact there are no faults.  These bounds would also depend on 
sensor noise or drift.  New faults can also be detected as long as there is some deviation 
from mass/energy balance of the process.  If this does not provide enough information 
about the faults, additional places may be added to the Petri net to account for new 
conditions. 
 
The fault diagnosis neural networks diagnosed the faults immediately after the faults 
were detected.  The immediate diagnosis was always accurate with a probability of 
classification of around 0.6 – 0.916.  Further into the fault, the fault diagnosis networks 
were re-run.  In this case diagnosis sometimes fluctuated between similar faults and 
normal operation.  This was because as the fault symptoms propagated through the 
plant, the controllers masked the effects of the faults. 
 
Table 5.9.  Fault detection times for Supervisory fault diagnosis framework 
No.  Fault  Detection 
time (sec) 
Pr.  Correct 
fault 
Separation Faults 
1.  NUFP-561  20  0.61  Yes 
2.  LT-542  5  0.645  Yes 
3.  LT-501  15  0.875  Yes 
Heating Faults 
4.  Heating tank 3  55  0.923  Yes 
5.  PP-681  145  0.953  Yes 
6.  LT-667  5  0.894  Yes 
 
 
5.7.2  Total plant network: results 
The  training  time  when  using  a  total  plant  neural  network  significantly  increased 
compared to the smaller plant section equivalent.  The total plant network was run every 
5 seconds.  Faults were detected and diagnosed on average 15 – 150 seconds after the 
start of the fault occurrence.  A complete list of faults and their detection times is listed 
in Table 5.10.  In some cases diagnosis of faults was more rapid using the total plant Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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network compared to the two-step approach, however diagnosis was not as accurate 
with fault numbers fluctuating between similar faults.  For example, for the case of fault 
4 in Table 5.10 (Heating tank 3 leaking), diagnosis fluctuated between faults 4 and fault 
5 (PP-681 fault) which had similar fault profiles.  Also, in the case of Heating faults, the 
fault diagnosis  probabilities were significantly lower than  in the  two-step approach.  
Probabilities ranged between 0.56 to 0.913.  The reason for this is that there is more 
data in which the network must classify the fault numbers.  Thus the network is not so 
certain  about  its  diagnosis  result.    Faults  were  sometimes  diagnosed,  even  in  the 
absence of faults in the plant. 
 
Table 5.10.  Fault detection times for total plant network 
No.  Fault  Detection 
time (sec) 
Pr.  Correct fault 
Separation faults 
1.  NUFP-561  15  0.8  Yes 
2.  LT-542  5
*  0.913  Yes 
3.  LT-501  10  0.788  Yes 
Heating faults 
4.  Heating 
tank 3 
15
*  0.612  No – Fault 5 
detected 
5.  PP-681  Does not detect fault. 
6.  LT-667  150  0.56  Yes 
* In these cases, there was a false detection of faults in  
  the system, before the fault actually occurred. 
 
 
5.7.3  Petri nets for fault detection: a comparison 
This  section  provides  a  comparison  between  the  Petri  net  methodology  for  fault 
detection developed by Prock (1991 and 2000) and the Petri net technique developed 
for fault detection developed as part of this thesis.  The similarities between the two 
methods are listed as follows.  Both methods: 
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￿￿ Use condition / event Petri nets for fault detection. 
￿￿ Limit fault detection to the identification of sensor or process errors that are 
manifested in signals related to physical conservation quantities. 
￿￿ Use dynamic measurement signals. 
￿￿ Have low computational effort. 
￿￿ Are currently only applied to mass transport. 
 
One of the main differences between the two methods is the way in which the Petri nets 
are used to detect faults.  In the methodology developed by Prock (1991 and 2003), the 
structure  of  the  process  is  mapped  into  a  place  /  transition  Petri  net  where  places 
represent passive components such as tanks and transitions represent active components 
such  as  pipes,  rotating  machines  and  instrumentation.    The  firing  of  tokens  then 
represents the transportation of physical conservation quantities.  A residual is then 
calculated which is the difference between the current Petri net marking and the initial 
marking.  This residual is compared to a residual limit in order to detect faults. 
 
In the method of fault detection developed as part of this thesis, mass (and energy) 
balances are formed around sections of a large-scale plant.  Limits are then chosen to 
specify normal operation in relation to the mass (and energy) balance and boundary 
sensors.  These mass (and energy) balance, coupled with the boundary limits are used as 
inputs (places) of a condition-event Petri net.  When certain combinations of conditions 
are satisfied, transitions are fired and the fault detection Petri net directs the diagnosis to 
a particular plant section.  The movement of tokens therefore represents the propagation 
of the faults in the plant.  When applying this technique, on-line in real time, the mass 
and energy balances and boundary sensor conditions are calculated and checked against 
their limits within procedures at the scan interval of the DCS using data from the DCS.  
The results are then mapped to the associated Petri net input places. 
 
Some of the other differences between the two methods are outlined in Table 5.11. 
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Table 5.11. Differences between fault detection Petri nets 
Technique developed by Prock  Technique developed as part of  
this thesis 
￿￿ Applied to a nuclear power plant, 
specifically to the water transport in a 
pressurized water reactor secondary 
cooling loop. 
￿￿ Applied to the Bayer process, 
(running on water only) specifically 
to the Separation and Heating section 
of the plant. 
￿￿ Tested off line using historical data 
stored on magnetic tape. 
￿￿ Tested on-line in real time on the 
Pilot plant at Murdoch University 
School of Engineering Science. 
￿￿ Separate Petri nets required for the 
mass and energy balances. 
￿￿ The mass and energy balance can be 
included in a single Petri net. 
￿￿ Detailed modeling and process 
knowledge required. 
￿￿ Simplified process modeling. 
￿￿ Large development time.  ￿￿ Short development time. 
￿￿ Individual pieces of equipment must 
be modeled. 
￿￿ Total plant section consisting of 
several pieces of equipment can be 
lumped together. 
￿￿ Only valid for failures with slow time 
constants.  Not suitable for the 
detection of large faults like big leaks 
or the total breakage of pipes. 
￿￿ Valid for large leaks and failures with 
fast time constants. 
￿￿ After fault is detected, a prognosis of 
future behavior can be provided. 
￿￿ Prognosis of future behavior cannot 
be provided. 
￿￿ Large amount of modeling time 
required when applying this 
technique to large-scale systems. 
￿￿ Specifically developed for fault 
detection in large scale systems. 
￿￿ Does not provide fault isolation.  ￿￿ Isolates plant section where fault is 
detected. 
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5.8  G2 Implementation of Fault Detection and Diagnosis Module 
This section provides sample screen shots of the FDD module that was developed in 
G2.  The fault detection Petri net has been presented in Fig. 5.9.  The operator has 
access  to  the  FDD  workspaces  from  the  “Module  Overview”  screen,  which  was 
presented in Chapter 4, Fig. 4.3. 
 
The “FDD Operator Input” workspace (Fig. 5.10) can be accessed via the button labeled 
“Operator  Input”  from  the  “Module  Overview”  workspace.    The  first  icon  labeled 
“FDD-Running” indicates if the FDD module is “running”, “not running” or “in error”.  
The workspace has options allowing the operator to start and stop the FDD module and 
manually run each individual neural network.  It also has an option, which allows the 
operator  to  indicate  that  a  fault  has  been  manually  diagnosed.    Four  displays  are 
provided to indicate if a fault is detected and the diagnosed fault number.  A list of fault 
numbers with the corresponding fault is provided. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.10. Fault detection and diagnosis operator input 
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By selecting the action button labeled “Boundary Graphs” the operator has access to the 
boundary graphs for FT-569 and the Separation and Heating sections of the Pilot plant.  
The “Boundary Graphs” workspace is shown in Fig. 5.11.  The red lines on each graph 
indicate upper and lower bounds.  The black line indicates current values.  When the 
current value no longer lies within these bounds, the process (section) contains a fault. 
 
This  icon  labeled  “time”  indicates  the  current  time.    By  selecting  the  icon  labeled 
“Petri-net -Parameters” the operator has access to the values of the lower and upper 
bounds and the current values of FT-569, Heating difference and Separation difference.  
By selecting the action button labeled “Record this Data” a text file is formed with the 
history of these variables for the last five minutes worth of data.  Three action buttons 
are provided to run the three separate neural networks for (i) the Separation section, (ii) 
the Heating section and (iii) the total plant.  Three separate lists of corresponding faults 
for the three plant neural networks are also provided. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.11. Boundary graphs 
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The “Alarms” workspace contains a list of faults, which have been detected by the FDD 
module occurring in the Pilot plant.  Each fault has details regarding the section that the 
fault was detected, the fault number, detection time and a probability to indicate the 
certainty  of  the  fault  classification  (the  closer  to  “1”,  the  more  certain  the  neural 
network that the fault has been classified correctly). 
 
When a fault is detected and diagnosed, a pop-up workspace is created indicating the 
plant section, fault number and fault description of the fault diagnosed (Fig. 5.12).  The 
operator must select the action button labeled “Acknowledge” on this workspace in 
order to confirm the presence of the fault. 
 
 
Fig. 5.12. Pop-up workspace to inform operator of fault diagnosed 
 
5.9  Conclusion 
This  chapter  has  outlined  a  hierarchical  fault  detection  and  diagnosis  framework 
implemented in G2.  A Petri net is used for fault detection and localization of the fault 
to  a  particular  plant  section  and  G2  NOL  Radial  Basis  Function  Neural  Networks 
(trained on dynamic fault data) are used for fault diagnosis. 
 
The method proposed in this chapter can be used for fault detection and localization 
within large-scale systems.  It can be easily extended to incorporate more plant sections, 
is easy to implement and to understand.  The use of a Petri net for supervision by 
examination of  plant boundary  conditions  allows the detection of  new faults.   This 
method can be extended to include multiple faults. 
 
The two-step approach represents a more robust fault detection and diagnosis technique 
than a total plant detection and diagnosis neural network.  Fault diagnosis is potentially Fault Detection and Diagnosis                                                                          Chapter 5 
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more accurate when using smaller plant networks.  Fault probabilities were also higher 
(or the networks were more “sure” of the faults) when using the two-step approach.  
Smaller networks are easier to develop when using smaller data samples in order to 
train the networks and training time is significantly reduced. 
 
The final section of this chapter presented some of the G2 screen shots of the fault 
detection and diagnosis module. 
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  Chapter 6 
Development of Integration Petri Nets 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
Chapter  2  introduced  the  Coordinated  Knowledge  Management  method  for  task 
integration.  This chapter covers the framework in more detail including descriptions of the 
Petri net (PN) and module interactions.  Specific details regarding the implementation of 
individual integration Petri nets are provided including details regarding the types of places 
found in the integration Petri nets for data reconciliation (DR), supervisory control (SC) 
and fault detection and diagnosis (FDD).  The development of the integration Petri nets 
reveals how they coordinate events through module interactions. 
 
The  chapter  begins  by  presenting  the  Coordinated  Knowledge  Management  method 
framework followed by a description of the different types of places that exist within the 
Petri nets.  The second part of this chapter presents diagrams, tables and descriptions of 
individual integration Petri nets.  The final section of this chapter provides screen shots of 
the integration Petri nets developed in G2. 
 
6.2  The Coordinated Knowledge Management Method 
The Coordinated Knowledge Management method uses Petri nets for task coordination 
forming a self-monitoring system, which takes into account information flow and timing in Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                    Chapter 6 
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a continuously changing environment.  The framework is presented in Fig. 6.1.  In this 
framework, places and transitions are used to model conditions and events occurring within 
the  system.    The  structure  of  the  integration  Petri  nets  is  then  used  to  model  task 
coordination.  The tokens moving throughout the Petri nets monitor the current state of the 
system, activating modules when needed.  Petri net / module interaction are described in 
the following paragraphs. 
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In the Coordinated Knowledge Management method the process is maintained at its desired 
set points by the regulatory control module, usually forming part of the distributed control 
system (DCS).  As explained in Chapter 2, section 2.4.1, regulatory control in the Pilot 
plant is performed by the Honeywell Scan3000 system, which monitors the Allen Bradley 
PLC.  Regulatory control is a basic requirement for any process control system.  Process 
variables such as temperatures, flows, and pump speeds are then read into the global data 
structures in the process monitoring (PM) module.  This module performs basic filtering 
and checks that the sensor values are within appropriate limits. The process monitoring 
module also checks if the process is at steady state.  The regulatory control and process 
monitoring  modules  provide  basic  data  for  the  system  to  operate  and  are  constantly 
running. 
 
By examining the integration Petri nets presented in Fig. 6.1, it can be noted that there is an 
inherent hierarchy between modules.  Hierarchy can be implemented using hierarchical 
Petri nets (Ang, 2001; Dittrich, 1995; Fehling, 1993).  This hierarchy is not as rigid as 
previously  proposed  integration  structures  such  as  the  functional  hierarchy.    Although 
modules run autonomously, there is an overlap between tasks performed by each module 
and the results of one module can affect other modules.  The structure of this hierarchy is 
described in the following sections. 
 
The supervisory control module uses reconciled data values, which are calculated by the 
data reconciliation module in its set point calculations.  So, before the supervisory control 
module can be run, the reconciled data values must first be written to the appropriate global 
data structure.  Once these reconciled values are updated, the supervisory control module 
can use them for set point calculations.  After the supervisory control module is run, the 
new set points are updated in the appropriate data structure and are sent to the regulatory 
control  module.    In  order  to  represent  this  order  of  events,  the  data  reconciliation 
integration Petri net (which activates and monitors the data reconciliation module) is a 
refinement of the supervisory control integration Petri net (which activates and monitors 
the supervisory control module) and is placed in a hierarchically structured net.   
 Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                    Chapter 6 
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The fault detection module is continuously running, however, if the supervisory control 
module introduces a set point change to the regulatory control module (an event monitored 
by the supervisory control integration Petri net), the fault detection and diagnosis module 
must stop running until the process has reached its new steady state (a condition/event 
indicated by the process monitoring module).  This avoids false detection of faults as the 
process is changing states.  Hence, a set point change necessitates that the fault detection 
module pause and wait until the process monitoring module indicates that the process has 
reached its new steady state.  The arrow linking the supervisory control integration Petri net 
to  the  fault  detection  and  diagnosis  integration  Petri  net  in  Fig.  6.1  illustrates  this.  
Similarly,  if  a  fault  is  detected  in  the  process,  the  supervisory  control  and  data 
reconciliation modules should not be run until the fault is corrected.  This hierarchy is 
indicated by the outer dashed line, which encompasses all integration Petri nets. 
 
The data reconciliation module can be run independently of the supervisory control module 
in order to reconcile raw sensor values and to detect sensor drift.  If the data reconciliation 
module  detects  sensor  drift,  the  supervisory  control  module  should  not  use  this  sensor 
values in its optimization calculations.  Similarly, while sensor drift is present, the fault 
detection and diagnosis module may falsely detect sensor drifts as process faults. 
 
6.3  Types of Places 
As described in Chapter 3, Petri net tokens are distributed according to the firing sequence 
of the transitions.  In the Coordinated Knowledge Management method tokens not only 
arise  due  to  the  firing  sequence  of  transitions,  but  also  are  created  on  particular  pre-
specified places by operator inputs, rules
1 and procedures
2 that monitor events occurring 
within the modules.  Rules and procedures also monitor several pre-specified places.  When 
tokens  arrive  on  these  particular  places  a  rule  is  activated,  which  calls  a  particular 
procedure sending a signal or command to the associated module.  This has resulted in the 
                                                 
1 A rule expresses a programmatic response to a set of conditions (Gensym, 1997). 
2 A procedure is a predefined sequence of operations that execute sequentially and/or in parallel each time the 
procedure is invoked (Gensym, 1997). Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                    Chapter 6 
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development of several different types of places in the integration Petri nets.  These places 
are grouped according to module and type of communication.   
 
The following sections describe special input and output places, which communicate with 
the DR, SC and FDD modules.  These types of places have been color-coded as shown in 
Table 6.1.  Specific examples of these types of places can be found in the descriptions of 
the integration Petri nets for each particular module. 
 
Table 6.1. Colors and description for integration Petri net places 
Name  Color  Place description 
Process monitoring 
place 
Pink  Signals coming from the 
PM module. 
Operator input 
place 
Green  Operator requests or 
choices. 
State place  Orange  State of the process / 
integration Petri nets. 
DR module input / 
output (i/o) place 
Tan  Requests to / signals 
from the DR module. 
SC module input / 
output (i/o) place 
Yellow  Requests to / signals 
from the SC module. 
FDD module input / 
output (i/o) place 
Blue  Requests to / signals 
from the FDD module. 
 
 
6.3.1  Process monitoring places 
Process monitoring provides an integral part in interacting with the integration Petri nets.  
The PM module is responsible for indicating to the DR integration Petri net when the 
process is at steady state so that DR (or SC) calculation(s) can be performed.  Similarly the 
PM module indicates to the FDD integration Petri net when the process is at steady state so 
that the FDD module can start running.  Thus a good PM module is essential.  Whenever 
the process is at steady state, tokens are created on the Petri net process monitoring places 
PM1 and PM2 by a rule which monitors the PM module and recognizes the conditions 
necessary to activate a procedure which creates these tokens (Chapter 4, section 4.3.1). Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                    Chapter 6 
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6.3.2  Operator places 
Operator input into the integration Petri nets is via the operator input places.  Generally 
operator input is activated either by (i) an action button
3 on the operator input screens for 
each particular module or integration Petri net, or (ii) action buttons on pop-up workspaces
4 
asking for operator responses.  When pressed, these action buttons create tokens on the 
particular places with which they are associated. 
 
Pop-up workspaces are created when tokens arrive at specific places in the integration Petri 
nets.  The tokens arriving on the places activate rules, which call the appropriate procedures 
to  create  pop-up  workspaces.    These  workspaces  contain  options  indicated  by  action 
buttons.  When the operator presses one of these action buttons, a token is created on the 
place associated with the action button and the pop-up workspace is deleted.  In some 
cases,  if  the  operator  does  not  respond  to  the  pop-up  workspace,  the  workspace  is 
automatically deleted after a certain time and a default path is followed. 
 
6.3.3  State places 
The current state of the system is represented by tokens located on state places.  Further 
details about these places can be found in the integration Petri net description for each 
particular module.  Note also that the output of each transition represents the current state 
of the system. 
 
6.3.4  DR module input / output places 
Requests to and from  the  data  reconciliation  module are  made  through  DR  module  i/o 
places.  Tokens are created on the DR module input places by rules, which monitor the 
current status of the DR module.  Depending on the status of the DR module, procedures 
are then called which create tokens on corresponding places.  Because these tokens may 
                                                 
3 An action button lets you start one or more actions interactively (Gensym, 1997). 
4 Workspaces organize a set of items within a region.   They are used primarily to collect and contain other 
items (Gensym, 1997). Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                    Chapter 6 
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sometimes be consumed when a transition connected to an input place fires, the rule (used 
to activate a procedure) which monitors the status of the DR module and updates the DR 
module input places is polled every 5 seconds.  This ensures that even when a transition 
may  have  fired,  removing  a  token  from  the  DR  module  input  place,  this  token  is 
immediately replaced to indicate the current status of the module. 
 
DR module output places represent requests that are sent to the DR module.  If a token 
arrives on a particular DR module output place, then a specific rule is activated which is 
used to monitor this place.  This rule then activates a specific procedure starting an action 
in the DR module, eg. “start DR module”.  Further details about DR module i/o places are 
found in section 6.4.1 (Data reconciliation integration Petri net). 
 
6.3.5  SC module input / output places 
Requests to and from the supervisory control module are made through SC module i/o 
places.  These are similar to the DR module i/o places described in section 6.3.4 except that 
in this case, the SC module is involved.  Further details about SC module i/o places are 
found in section 6.4.2 (Supervisory control integration Petri net). 
 
6.3.6  FDD module input /output places 
Requests to and from the fault detection and diagnosis module are made through FDD 
module i/o places.  These are similar to the i/o places of the DR and SC integration Petri 
nets except in this case the FDD module is involved.  Further details about FDD module i/o 
places are found in section 6.4.3 (Fault detection and diagnosis integration Petri net). 
 
6.4  Integration Petri Nets 
Section 6.3 has outlined some of the special types of places, which exist in the integration 
Petri nets.  The remaining sections will present the structures of the DR, SC and FDD 
integration Petri nets.  In each case, a diagram of the integration Petri net is provided 
followed by a table describing each individual place.  Entries in the tables are grouped Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                    Chapter 6 
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according to the type of places.  The integration Petri net diagrams have been divided into 
labeled sections.  These labels correspond to the sub-headings, which form part of the 
descriptions of each integration Petri net.  A description of events occurring within each 
section is then provided followed by the conditions used to form the events. 
 
6.4.1  Data reconciliation integration Petri net 
When implementing the DR integration Petri net, the following points have to be kept in 
mind: 
 
￿￿ When running DR for the first time, raw sensor values must be used in the data 
reconciliation calculation. 
￿￿ If sensor drift is detected, both raw and nominal sensor values can be used in the 
data reconciliation calculation.  The use of nominal values in the DR calculation 
is discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.2.3.6. 
￿￿ The DR integration Petri net must distinguish if requests to run have come from 
the DR integration Petri net or the SC integration Petri net. 
￿￿ The process must be at steady state before the request to run the DR module can 
be sent to the DR module. 
￿￿ If a fault is detected, the DR module must not be run. 
 
The sequence of conditions and events (assuming no faults are detected) comprising of the 
DR integration Petri net is summarized in the flow diagram shown in Fig. 6.2. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                    Chapter 6 
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Is there an error in
the DR module?
Yes
No
Is sensor drift
detected?
No
Activate pop-up
workspace asking
for operator input.
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Does operator
respond to pop-up
workspace?
Yes
Set status attribute to
use both “raw and
nominal values” in the
reconciliation.
Default path: set status
attribute to “use
nominal values” for
sensors in error.
No
DR OK, plant OK!
Send request to run
DR module to DR
module.
Request to run DR
module.
Is process at
steady state?
Yes
No
Operator confirms
and repairs error.
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The DR integration Petri net is illustrated in Fig. 6.3.  Operator inputs and module requests 
can be converted into conditions relating to event occurrences.  These conditions translate 
to places in a Petri net.  A description of the DR integration Petri net places is presented in 
Table 6.2.  Note that some of the places in the DR integration Petri net relate to other 
integration Petri nets and the reader will have to refer to the appropriate section to obtain 
definitions and further details. 
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DR0
DR1
DR2
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DR4
DR5
DR6
DR3A
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DR5A
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DR10
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DR0A
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3
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3
DR-
Timer X
X
DR24
DR25
FDD
12H 125
FDD
CCII
FDD
12M
DR3
Starting DR
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Request
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Table 6.2. Place descriptions for DR integration Petri net 
Place Name  Description 
Operator input places 
DR0  Operator requests running DR module. 
DR11  Operator confirms/fixes sensor drift. 
DR12  Operator confirms/fixes DR module error. 
DR Petri net timer 
DR-Timer  Frequency (entered by operator) at which DR module 
should be run. 
Module input / output (i/o) places 
DR1  Module requesting to run DR module. 
DR1A  Automatic request to run DR module (from DR-Timer). 
DR3  Signal to DR module – send request to run DR module. 
DR3A  Signal from DR module – error in DR module. 
DR4  Signal from DR module – DR module is running. 
DR6  Signal from DR module – DR module has finished / is 
not running. 
DR10  Signal from DR module – sensor drift detected. 
DR16  Signal to DR module – change all sensors with sensor 
drift to use nominal values in their reconciliation 
calculation. 
DR19  Signal to  DR  module – use raw sensor  values for all 
sensors. 
DR integration Petri net state places 
DR5  DR module running. 
DR5A  Error in DR module (activates pop-up workspace). 
DR7  DR module finished/not running. 
DR8  DR ok and plant ok. 
DR9  Plant not ok – sensor drift detected (activates pop-up 
workspace). 
Petri net output places 
DR0A  Inform operator – request to run DR module aborted. 
DR23  Inform operator – DR aborted because of sensor drift & 
fault detected by FDD module. 
Intermediate places 
RA0  Resource allocation place for DR integration Petri net. 
DR2  Waiting for process to be at steady state. 
DR2A  Use raw sensor values in DR (pathway). 
DR2B  Use  both  raw  and  nominal  sensor  values  in  DR 
(pathway). 
DR13  Used to remove tokens from DR14. 
DR14  Sensor drift detected (holding place). 
DR15  Used to remove tokens from DR9. 
DR17  Ready  to  request  DR  running  (intermediate  place  – 
using  both  nominal  &  raw  sensor  values  in  the 
reconciliation).  
DR18  Ready to request DR (using only raw sensor values in 
the reconciliation). 
DR20  Bypass place DR19 so that both raw and nominal sensor 
values can be used in the reconciliation. 
DR21  Used to remove tokens from place DR2B. 
DR22  Intermediate place – request to run DR. 
DR24  Intermediate place – reset resource allocation. 
DR25  Intermediate place – reset resource allocation. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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6.4.1.1  Starting DR 
The data reconciliation module is used to reconcile raw data values and to detect sensor 
drift.  It can be run either:  
 
(i)  Continuously at a frequency entered by the operator (events D0 and D3). 
(ii)  Following an operator request (event D1). 
(iii)  Following a request from another module (such as the supervisory control 
module) (event D2). 
 
These cases are covered by the following events. 
 
Event D0: The DR module can be set to run automatically at a frequency entered by the 
operator.  This entered time interval (X seconds) is then used as the time delay on the 
place  labeled  DR-Timer.    The  transition  connecting  DR-Timer  to  DR1A  then  fires 
automatically at this rate. 
 
Events D1 and D2: Operator requests to start the DR module are represented by tokens 
located  on  place  DR0.    The  operator  pressing  an  action  button  creates  this  token.  
Similarly, another module requesting to run the DR module is indicated by a token on 
DR1.  Tokens arriving on DR1 are dictated by the structure of the integration Petri nets. 
 
Resource allocation place: DR integration Petri net 
Events D1 to D7: The place labeled RA0 can be thought of as resource allocation place 
and prevents the build-up of tokens on place DR2.  For example, if the operator requests 
to run the DR module (indicated by a token located on place DR0) and the DR module is 
not  already  running  (indicated  by  a  token  located  on  place  RA0),  then  the transition 
attached to DR0, RA0 and DR2 fires removing a token from DR0, RA0 and adding a 
token to DR2.  If then a request comes from another module to run the DR module, a 
token is placed on DR1.  Now, at this point, no token is located on RA0 and so the 
transition connected  to  RA0  (through  the  inhibitor  arc)  and  DR1  fires,  removing  the Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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token  from  DR1,  thus  preventing  tokens  building  up  on  this  place.    A  message  is 
displayed for the operator activated by a token arriving at DR0A to inform the operator of 
this event.  The token on RA0 is replaced when the DR module can be run again. 
 
The resource allocation place also serves a second purpose.  If a fault is detected, the DR 
module should not be run.  Hence, once a fault is detected, the FDD integration Petri net 
removes the token from RA0, stopping any requests to run the DR module being sent to 
the DR module until the fault is repaired.  This is covered in more detail in section 
6.4.3.6, FDD cross connections II (condition D36). 
 
Events D1 to D6: There is a 3-second time delay on places DR0, DR1 and DR1A.  This is 
to ensure that the resource allocation place (RA0) has time to reset if tokens appear on 
RA0 and DR0, DR1 or DR1A simultaneously. 
 
(D0)    If DR-Timer (after X minute wait), then DR1A and DR-Timer. 
(D1)    If RA0 and DR0 OR… 
(D2)    If RA0 and DR1 OR… 
(D3)    If RA0 and DR1A then DR2. 
(D4)    If  0 RA  and DR0 OR… 
(D5)    If  0 RA  and DR1 OR… 
(D6)  If  0 RA  and DR1A then DR0A (inform the operator that “the request to 
run the DR module cannot be made as there is it is already running or 
there is a fault detected by the FDD module.”). 
(D7)    If DR0A then remove tokens DR0A. 
 
Check that the plant is at steady state 
Event D8: Once the request to run has been made (DR2), in order for the DR module to 
run, the plant must be at steady state, which is indicated by a token located on PM2 
(created as explained in section 6.3.1).  When these conditions are satisfied, the transition Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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fires and tokens are created on places DR2A and DR2B relating to the use of raw or 
nominal values in the DR calculation.  This is further explained in the following sections. 
 
(D8)    If DR2 and PM2 then DR2A and DR2B. 
 
6.4.1.2  Raw or nominal values 
Data reconciliation using raw values 
Event D9: The first pathway (DR2A) involves running the DR module for the first time 
when  the  raw  value  of  sensor  variables  should  be  used  when  performing  the  DR 
calculation.  Raw values are used because initially, it is assumed that there is no sensor 
drift in the plant.  When programming this into the DR module in G2, this is achieved by 
setting the attribute “use-nominal-value” to “0” for each of the sensor variables used in 
the DR calculation, indicating that raw values should be used.  A token arriving on place 
DR19 is monitored by a rule, which activates a procedure (as explained in section 6.3.4, 
DR module output places) ensuring that all “use-nominal-values” are set to “0”.  In this 
case, a token is also created on place DR21, discussed further under event D11. 
 
(D9)    If DR2A and  20 DR  then DR19 and DR21. 
 
Event D10: Place DR3 is monitored by a rule so that the arrival of a token on place DR3 
activates this rule starting a procedure which starts the DR module.   
 
(D10)    If DR19 then DR3. 
 
Event D11: If the first pathway (DR2A) is taken, a token arriving on DR21 is used to 
remove tokens from place DR2B (pathway which uses both raw and nominal values in 
the DR calculation), which is not needed in this case. 
 
(D11)    If DR2B and DR21 then remove tokens DR2B. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Data reconciliation using raw and nominal values 
Event D12: The second pathway (DR2B) arises after the DR module is automatically 
requested to run a second time following the detection of sensor drift.  This allows for 
DR using both raw and nominal values in the DR calculation.  The place, which sets the 
attribute specifying that only raw values should be used in the DR calculation (DR19), is 
bypassed, allowing for the reconciliation of values in the presence of sensor drift.  By 
including  place  DR2A  under  event  D12,  excess  tokens  are  also  removed  from  place 
DR2A. 
 
(D12)    If DDR2A, DR2B and DR20 then DR3. 
 
6.4.1.3  Request to run DR module 
Events D13 and D14: The arrival of a token on place DR3 is monitored by a rule that 
activates a procedure to start the DR module.  After this request has been sent to the DR 
module and the DR module is running, a rule activating a procedure monitoring the DR 
module (refer to section 6.3.4, DR module input places) creates a token on either place 
DR4 or DR3A indicating that (i) the “DR module is running” (DR4) or (ii) there is an 
“error in the DR module” (DR3A) respectively. 
 
DR module running 
Event D13: As in case (i) above, when the DR module is currently running, a token is 
created  on  place  DR4  by  a  rule  recognizing  the  conditions  necessary  to  activate  a 
procedure monitoring the DR module.  The DR integration Petri net can indicate its “DR 
module running” state place (DR5).   
 
(D13)    If DR3 and DR4 then DR5. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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6.4.1.4  Error in DR module 
Event D14: As in case (ii) described previously, when there is an error in the DR module 
(such  as  no  input  comma  separated  variable  (csv)  file  to  store  the  inputs  for  the  c-
program, the input file being open or the process no longer being at steady state) a rule 
recognizing the conditions necessary to activate a procedure monitoring the DR module 
creates a token on place DR3A so that the DR integration Petri net can indicate “error in 
DR module” state place (DR5A).   
 
(D14)    If DR3 and DR3A then DR5A. 
 
Event D15: There could also be an error in the DR module once the DR module has 
finished running (after a token arrives on place DR5).  In this case tokens are created on 
place DR3A by a rule activating a procedure monitoring the DR module.  This is taken 
into consideration in the following event: 
 
(D15)    If DR3A and DR5 then DR5A. 
 
Event D16: Once an error has occurred in the DR module, the operator must confirm 
and fix the error so that DR can run again.  This is done through an action button 
appearing on the pop-up workspace shown in (Fig. 6.4).  This pop-up workspace is 
created  by  a  rule  activating  a  procedure  monitoring  the  arrival  of  tokens  on  place 
DR5A.  When the operator responds to this workspace, by pressing the action button 
“DR Module Error Fixed”, a token is created on place DR12 and the DR integration 
Petri net requests for the DR module to be re-run (DR18).  Note that nothing further can 
be done until the operator responds to this workspace. 
 
(D16)    If DR5A and DR12 then DR18. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Fig. 6.4. Pop-up workspace for operator input indicating that DR module error 
has been repaired 
 
Events D17 and D18: Once the DR module has been requested to be re-run (DR22), the 
shared resource (RA0) will be reset and a request will be made to run the DR module 
(DR1). 
 
(D17)    If DR18 then DR22. 
(D18)    If DR22 then DR1 and DR24. 
 
Events D19 and D20: In this case, when resetting the shared resource, the delay in DR1 
is  important  so  that  the  shared  resource  (RA0)  is  reset  before  the  request  is  made.  
Events D19 and D20 are necessary to ensure that there is no token buildup on place 
RA0.  
 
(D19)    If DR24 and  0 RA  then RA0. 
(D20)    If DR24 and RA0 then RA0. 
 
6.4.1.5  DR module finished running 
Event D21: Once the DR module has finished running with no error, a rule activating a 
procedure monitoring the DR module creates a token on place DR6 allowing the DR 
integration Petri net to indicate the “DR module finished / not running” state (DR7). Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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(D21)    If DR5 and DR6 then DR7. 
 
6.4.1.6  No sensor drift 
Event D22: When the DR module has finished running (DR7) and no sensor drift is 
detected ( 10 DR ) then a token on place DR8 indicates the state “DR ok / plant ok”.  The 
token remains in this state place for the time interval (X) indicated on DR-Timer. 
 
(D22)  If DR7 and  10 DR  then DR8 (hold for X seconds), DR25 and SC5C (refer 
to SC integration Petri net). 
 
Events D23 and D24: When the DR module has finished successfully running, the shared 
resource (RA0) must be reset to allow further requests to run the DR module.  Both 
events D23 and D24 are necessary to make sure that there is no token buildup on RA0 if 
this token has been replaced by another module. 
 
(D23)    If DR25 and  0 RA  then RA0. 
(D24)    If DR25 and RA0 then RA0. 
 
6.4.1.7  Sensor drift 
Sensor drift and no fault 
Event D25: When the (i) “DR module finished / not running” (DR7), (ii) the “DR module 
has  detected  sensor  drift”  (DR10)  and  (iii)  “there  is  no  fault  detected  by  the  FDD 
module” ( M FDD12 ), then a token arrives at DR9 to indicate that the plant is not ok and 
that sensor drift has been detected.  The token arriving on place DR9 is monitored by a 
rule, which activates a procedure monitoring the place creating a pop-up workspace (Fig. 
6.5)  presenting  the  operator  with  several  options  with  actions  to  be  taken  relating  to 
sensor drift.  At the same time a token arrives on DR14, a timed place, which waits for Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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five minutes (or a time interval specified by the operator) for the operator to confirm or 
fix the sensor drift.   
 
(D25)    If DR7, DR10 and  M FDD12  then DR9 and DR14. 
 
 
Fig. 6.5. Pop-up workspace asking for operator input when sensor drift is detected 
 
Events D26 and D27: If the operator confirms and fixes the sensor drift by pressing the 
action button labeled “DR Module Error Fixed” (Fig. 6.5), a token is created on place 
DR11.  Note that if the operator decides to fix the sensor drift, by responding to the 
workspace shown in Fig. 6.5, all sensors with drift detected must be acknowledged.  The 
DR module is then automatically requested to be re-run using both raw and nominal 
sensor values in the DR calculation (DR17).  A token created on place DR13 is used to 
remove tokens from place DR14 so that the default “timer pathway” is not followed 
which indicates no operator input and uses only nominal sensor values for sensors in 
error in the DR calculation. 
 
(D26)    If DR9 and DR11 then DR13 and DR17. 
(D27)    If DR13 and DR14 then remove tokens DR13 and DR14. 
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Events D28 to D30: If the operator does not respond to this pop-up workspace (Fig. 6.5) 
within  five  minutes  then  the  pop-up  workspace  is  automatically  deleted  (by  a  rule 
activating a procedure monitoring the arrival of a token on place DR16).  The DR module 
then is set to use the nominal value for each sensor where drift has been detected (DR17) 
and the DR module is re-run. 
 
(D28)    If DR14 (after 5 minutes) and  13 DR  then DR15 and DR16. 
(D29)    If DR16 then DR17. 
(D30)    If DR17 then DR20 and DR22. 
 
Event D31: The token on place DR15 is used to remove the token on place DR9 that 
would otherwise accumulate tokens following no operator input. 
 
(D31)    If DR9 and DR15 then remove tokens DR9 and DR15. 
 
Sensor drift and fault 
Event D32: Refer to section 6.4.3.5 (FDD cross connections I). 
 
(D32)  If DR23 then inform the operator that “sensor drift is detected but there 
is also a fault detected by the FDD module, so the DR module will not be 
re-run”.  Remove tokens DR23. 
 
Other Places 
The places labeled SC5, SC5B, SC5C, SC5D and FDDCCII, FDD12H and FDD12M 
form part of the SC and FDD integration Petri nets respectively and are described in the 
following sections. 
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6.4.2  Supervisory control integration Petri net 
When implementing the SC integration Petri net, the following three points should be 
kept in mind: 
 
￿￿ The DR module must be run before SC module can be run. 
￿￿ If there is a set point change, the FDD module must be stopped. 
￿￿ If there is a fault detected, the SC module cannot be run. 
 
The sequence of conditions and events (assuming no faults are detected) comprising of 
the SC integration Petri net is summarized in the flow diagram shown in Fig. 6.6. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Fig. 6.6. Flow diagram for SC integration Petri net 
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The  application  of  a  Petri  net  to  SC  task  integration  is  illustrated  in  Fig.  6.7.    A 
description of places is presented in Table 6.3.  Place descriptions are similar to those 
described for the DR integration Petri net.  Note that some of the conditions in the SC 
Petri net are related to other integration Petri nets.  The reader will have to refer to the 
tables for the particular section to obtain definitions and further details.  
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Table 6.3. Place descriptions for SC integration Petri net 
Place Name  Description 
Operator input places 
SC0  Operator requests running SC module. 
SC14  Operator confirms/fixes SC module error. 
SC Petri net timer 
SC-Timer  Frequency (entered by operator) at which SC module 
should be run. 
Module input / output (i/o) places 
SC2  Automatic request to run SC module. 
SC4  Module requesting to run SC module – input water 
temperature change. 
SC5C  DR module requesting to run SC module once DR 
has completed successfully. 
SC6  Signal to SC module – send request to run SC 
module. 
SC7  Signal from SC module – SC module is running. 
SC9  Signal from SC module – SC module has finished / is 
not running. 
SC9A  Signal from SC module – error in SC module. 
SC13  Signal from SC module – set point change. 
SC15  Module request running SC module. 
State places 
SC5B  DR module finished running and DR ok. 
SC8  SC module running. 
SC8A  Error in SC module (activates pop-up workspace). 
SC10  SC module finished/not running. 
SC11  SC ok and SP change. 
SC12  SC ok and no SP change. 
SC19  SP change. 
Petri net output places 
SC0A  Inform operator – request to run SC module aborted. 
SC16  Inform operator – SC aborted because of error in SC 
module and fault detected by FDD module. 
SC17  Inform operator – SP’s not written as fault detected 
by FDD module. 
Intermediate places 
SC5  Request to run SC module requires DR module to run 
first. 
RA1  Resource allocation place for SC integration Petri net. 
SC5D  Request  for  DR  module  to  run  has  come  from  SC 
module. 
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6.4.2.1  Starting SC 
The supervisory control module is responsible for the on-line calculation of process set 
points.  It can be run either: 
 
(i)  Continuously at a frequency entered by the operator (events S0 and S2). 
(ii)  Following an operator request (event S1). 
(iii)  Following a product quality (temperature) specification change that must 
be confirmed by the operator (event S1). 
(iv)  Following  a  significant  temperature  disturbance  or  product  flow  rate 
change (event S3). 
(v)  Following  a  request  from  another  module  (eg.  fault  detection  and 
diagnosis) (event S4). 
 
Resource allocation place: SC integration Petri net 
Events S0 to S8: As described in the DR integration Petri net section, the SC integration 
Petri net also makes use of the resource allocation place (RA1).  RA1 must initially have 
a token located on it for any requests to start the SC module being sent to the SC module.  
When the SC module is running, the token on RA1 is removed so that no requests to run 
SC can occur (all tokens on the requesting places are removed).  When SC module is not 
running and there is no fault in the plant, a token will exist on RA2 and so any requests 
occurring on SC0, SC2, SC4 or SC15 can be sent to the SC module. 
 
The resource allocation place is also used to prevent the SC module from running if a 
fault is detected.  When a fault is detected, the FDD integration Petri net removes the 
token from RA1, so that no requests to run the SC module can be made until the fault is 
repaired and RA1 is replaced.  This is covered in more detail in section 6.4.3.6, FDD 
cross connections II (condition S34). 
 
Events S5 to S9: When a request to run the SC module is made and there is no token on 
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the SC module already running, then a message is displayed for the operator for this 
event. 
 
(S0)    If SC-Timer (after X minute wait) then SC2 and SC-Timer. 
(S1)    If RA1 and SC0 OR….. 
(S2)    If RA1 and SC2 OR… 
(S3)    If RA1 and SC4 OR… 
(S4)    If RA1 and SC15 then SC5. 
(S5)    If  1 RA  and SC0 OR... 
(S6)    If  1 RA  and SC2 OR... 
(S7)    If  1 RA  and SC4 OR... 
(S8)  If  1 RA  and SC15 then SC0A (inform the operator that “the request to run 
the SC module cannot be made as there is it is already running or there is a 
fault detected by the FDD module.”). 
(S9)  If SC0A then remove tokens SC0A. 
 
Event S10: As described previously, in order for the SC module to run, the DR module 
must be run first.  Thus the DR integration Petri net forms part of the SC integration Petri 
net and is indicated by the boxed area in Fig. 6.7, which encapsulates the places labeled 
DR1 and SC5C.  In other words, when there is a request to run the SC module (indicated 
by  a  token  located  on  SC5),  the  transition  connecting  SC5  to  SC5D  and  DR1  fires, 
removing a token from SC5 and creating tokens on SC5D and DR1.  A token is placed on 
SC5D to indicate that the request to run the DR module came from the SC module and 
not some other module.  Once the DR module has successfully run, SC can continue. 
 
(S10)    If SC5 then DR1 and SC5D. 
 
6.4.2.2  Request to run SC module 
Event S11: After the DR module has been run successfully, a token is created on state 
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(S11)    If SC5C and SC5D then SC5B. 
 
Event  S12:  Whenever  the  DR  module  runs  successfully,  a  token  is  created  on  place 
SC5C.  If the request to run the DR module did not come from the SC module, then this 
token is not needed and should be discarded.  This is achieved by the following event: 
 
(S12)    If SC5C and  D SC5  then discard tokens SC5C. 
 
Event S13: Once DR has finished running, the SC module can continue running.  The 
arrival of tokens on place SC6 is monitored by a rule, which activates a procedure that 
starts the SC module (refer to section 6.3.5, SC module output places). 
 
(S13)    If SC5B then SC6. 
 
Event S14: A rule activating a procedure monitoring the SC module indicates when the 
SC  module  is  running  and  creates  a  token  on  place  SC7  (refer  to  section  6.3.5,  SC 
module  input  places).    The  firing  of  the  corresponding  transition  enables  the  SC 
integration Petri net to indicate the “SC module running” state place (SC8). 
 
(S14)    If SC6 and SC7 then SC8. 
 
6.4.2.3  Error in SC module 
Event S15: The case of an error in the SC module (such as the SC executable not being 
found so that the SC module cannot be run) is indicated by a token located on place 
SC9A.  A rule activating a procedure monitoring the SC module creates this token.  The 
SC integration Petri net then indicates this scenario by creating a token on the “error in 
SC module” state place (SC8A). 
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Event S16: If the SC module is running and an error occurs during the running of the 
module  (such  as  the  csv  file  not  being  found)  then  a  rule  activating  a  procedure 
monitoring the module creates a token on place SC9A.  A token is then created on the 
“error in SC module” state place (SC8A). 
 
(S16)  If SC8 and SC9A then SC8A. 
 
Event S17: A token arriving on place SC8A activates a pop-up workspace (Fig. 6.8) 
indicating an error in the SC module.  No further actions can be taken until the operator 
responds to the action button labeled “SC Module Error Fixed” on this workspace which 
creates a token on place SC14.  If the operator fixes the error in the SC module (SC14) 
and there is no fault detected by the FDD module, then the SC module is re-run (SC15). 
 
(S17)    If SC8A, SC14 and  L FDD12  then RA1 and SC15. 
 
 
Fig. 6.8. Pop-up workspace for operator input indicating that the SC module  
error has been repaired 
 
Error in SC module and fault detected 
Event S18: Refer to section 6.4.3.5 (FDD cross connections I). 
 
(S18)  If SC16 then inform the operator that “there is an error in the SC module 
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FDD module, so the SC module will not be re-run”.  Remove tokens 
DR16. 
 
Event  S19: When  a fault  is  detected  in  the  process  by  the  FDD  module and  the  SC 
module has been successfully run during this interval (and / or a set point change has 
automatically been sent to the DCS during this interval) then a message is displayed for 
the operator to inform of this event.  This case is covered in more detail in section 6.4.3.5 
(FDD cross connections I). 
 
(S19)  If  SC17  then  inform  the  operator  that  “the  SC  module  has  been  run 
successfully, however, there was a fault detected by the FDD module”.  
Remove tokens SC17. 
 
6.4.2.4  SC module finished running 
Event  S20:  When  the  SC  module  has  finished  running  successfully  then  a  rule 
activating  a  procedure  monitoring  the  SC  module  creates  a  token  on  place  SC9  to 
indicate this.  The redistribution of a token onto place SC10, indicates the state “SC 
module finished not running”.  At this point the resource allocation place RA1 is re-set 
so that further request to run the SC module can be made. 
 
(S20)    If SC8 and SC9 then SC10 and RA1. 
 
6.4.2.5  No set point (SP) change 
Events S21 and S22: When the SC module has finished running (SC10) and there is no 
set point change ( 13 SC ) then a token is created on the “SC ok and no SP change” state 
place (SC12).  In this case the process must be fault free ( K FDD12 ).  Tokens remain on 
place SC12 until the SC module is automatically re-run. 
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(S22)  If SC12 then wait for X seconds (indicated by the time delay X on SC-
Timer) and remove tokens from SC12. 
 
6.4.2.6  SP change 
Event S23: When the SC module has finished running (SC10) and there is a set point 
change, a rule and a procedure monitoring the SC module creates a token on place SC13.  
The re-distribution of tokens in the SC integration Petri net then indicate the “SC ok and 
SP change” state (SC11).  Note that in this case, there must be no faults detected by the 
FDD module ( K FDD12 ). 
 
(S23)    If SC10, SC13 and  K FDD12  then SC11. 
 
Events S24 and S25: When there is a set point change, the FDD module must be stopped 
(through the FDD sub-net).  The token on state place “SP change” (SC19) remains until 
SC is automatically re-run after X minutes, which is the time delay on the place labeled 
SC-Timer. 
 
(S24)    If SC11 then SC19 and FDD7. 
(S25)    If SC19 then wait for X minutes then remove tokens SC19. 
 
Transitions relating to places FDD12I, FDD12L and FDD7 are described as part of the 
FDD integration Petri nets (section 6.4.3).  If a fault is detected while the SC (or DR) 
module is running, the SC (or DR) module will cease running until the fault has been 
cleared. 
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6.4.3  Fault detection and diagnosis integration Petri nets 
When implementing the FDD integration Petri nets, the following points were kept in 
mind: 
 
￿￿ If a fault is detected, the DR and SC modules should not be run. 
￿￿ Once  a  fault  is  repaired,  the  FDD  module  should  not  re-start  until  the 
boundary conditions indicate normal operation. 
 
The sequence of conditions and events comprising of running the FDD integration Petri 
nets are summarized in the simplified flow diagram shown in Fig. 6.9. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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The FDD integration Petri net including all interconnections is illustrated in Fig. 6.10.  
Because this integration Petri net is large, it has been divided into six smaller Petri net 
sections and diagrams.  These sections are as follows: 
 
1.  Starting fault detection and diagnosis integration Petri net (Fig. 6.11). 
2.  Stopping fault detection and diagnosis integration Petri net (Fig. 6.11). 
3.  Fault detected integration Petri net (Fig. 6.12). 
4.  Repair fault integration Petri net (Fig. 6.15). 
5.  Fault detection and diagnosis cross connections I (Fig. 6.20). 
6.  Fault detection and diagnosis cross connections II (Fig. 6.21). 
 
A description of all FDD integration Petri net places is presented in Table 6.4.  
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Table 6.4. Place descriptions for FDD integration Petri net 
Place Name  Description 
Operator input places 
FDD0  Operator requests running FDD module. 
FDD6  Operator request stopping FDD module. 
FDD12E  Indicates operator has responded to the pop-up workspace created 
by token located on FDD12C. 
FDD14  Operator diagnoses fault. 
FDD16A  Operator cannot diagnose fault. 
FDD17  Operator confirms and fixes fault. 
FDD22  Operator cannot fix fault. 
FDD23  Manual control of plant section. 
FDD24  Shutdown plant. 
FDD26D  Remind operator that plant is operating in faulty ‘auto’ state after X 
minutes. 
FDD27  Operator schedules repairs. 
FDD28C  Confirm plant is operating in ‘auto’ mode. 
FDD29  Repairs made. 
Module input / output (i/o) places 
FDD1  Module requests to run FDD module. 
FDD3  Signal to FDD module – send request to start FDD module. 
FDD4  Signal from FDD module – FDD module running. 
FDD7  Module requests to stop running FDD module. 
FDD8A  Signal to FDD module – send request to stop FDD module. 
FDD9  Signal from FDD module – FDD module not running. 
FDD11  Signal from FDD module – fault detected. 
FDD13  Signal from FDD module – fault diagnosed. 
FDD37  Signal from FDD module – Fault detection boundary conditions 
within normal operation limits. 
State places 
FDD5  FDD module running. 
FDD10  FDD module stopped/not running. 
FDD12  Fault detected. 
FDD12D  Fault not diagnosed. 
FDD15  Fault diagnosed. 
FDD15A  Fault detected and diagnosed. 
FDD18  Manual control of plant section (activates pop-up workspace). 
FDD20  Plant ok. 
FDD21  Plant not ok. 
FDD25  Plant shutdown. 
FDD26  Auto operation in ‘faulty’ state (activates pop-up workspace). 
FDD28  Request repairs (activates pop-up workspace). 
FDD28A  Request repairs (coming from ‘manual’ control state). 
Requests to FDD module 
FDD2  Check that process is at steady state. 
FDD8  Check request stop running FDD module. 
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Intermediate places 
RA2  Resource allocation place for starting the FDD integration Petri net. 
RA3  Resource allocation place for fault detected integration Petri net.. 
RA4  Resource allocation place for stopping FDD integration Petri net. 
FDD5A  Intermediate place - FDD module running. 
FDD12A  Fault  detected  –  waiting  for  operator/module  input  within  5 
minutes. 
FDD12B  Fault  detected  –  waiting  for  operator/module  input  within  5 
minutes. 
FDD12C  Fault not diagnosed – waiting for operator input (activates pop-up 
workspace). 
FDD15C  Pop-up box asking if fault has been fixed or not (activates pop-up 
workspace). 
FDD12F  Intermediate place – fault detected – used for token removal from 
FDD12D. 
FDD12G  Intermediate place – fault detected. 
FDD12H  Intermediate place - fault detected – used for token removal from 
DR20. 
FDD12I  Intermediate place - fault detected – used for token removal from 
SC5D. 
FDD12J  Intermediate place – fault detected. 
FDD12K  Intermediate place – fault detected – used for token removal from 
SC10 & SC13. 
FDD12L  Intermediate place - fault detected – used for token removal from 
SC8A & SC14. 
FDD12M  Intermediate place - fault detected – used for token removal from 
DR7 & DR10. 
FDD15B  Default path – no operator input to say if fault has been fixed or not 
fixed (default).   
FDD15D  Default path – no operator input from FDD15C leading to plant not 
ok state (FDD21). 
FDD15E  Fault not detected but the operator manually diagnoses a fault. 
FDD15F  Fault not detected but the operator manually diagnoses a fault. 
FDD15G  Fault detected by the plant or manually by the operator. 
FDD16C  Default path – no operator input to say if fault has been diagnosed 
or not (default), leading to plant not ok state (FDD21). 
FDD26E  Delay – wait for X seconds (X entered by operator). 
FDD28B  Activates operator pop-up box asking operator to change to ‘auto’ 
control (activates pop-up workspace). 
FDD28D  Intermediate place – plant ok. 
FDD30  Intermediate place for token removal from FDD5 to indicate that 
the FDD module is not running. 
FDD31  Intermediate place - plant ok – used for token replacement on RA3. 
FDD32  Intermediate place - plant ok – used for token replacement on RA0 
and DR2. 
FDD33  Intermediate place - plant ok – used for token replacement on RA1. 
FDD34  Intermediate  place  -  fault  detected/diagnosed  –  used  for  token 
removal from RA0 and DR2. 
FDD35  Intermediate  place - fault detected / diagnosed – used for token 
removal from RA1. 
FDD36  Intermediate place – plant ok. 
 Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
Page 6.39 
6.4.3.1  Starting FDD integration Petri net 
The diagram shown in Fig. 6.11 shows the (i) Starting and (ii) Stopping FDD integration 
Petri nets. 
 
FDD5
FDD1
FDD0
FDD2 RA2
PM3
FDD3
FDD4
Starting FDD
FDD7
FDD6
FDD8
FDD8a FDD10
FDD9
FDD30
Stopping FDD
FDD36
RA4
60
FDD5A
FDD37
 
Fig. 6.11. Starting and stopping FDD integration Petri nets 
 
This section describes the section labeled Starting FDD.  Generally the fault detection 
module is continuously running.  However, if the fault detection and diagnosis module is 
not running, it can be started:  Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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(i)  Following an operator request (event F0). 
(ii)  Following a module request (event F1). 
 
Resource allocation place: Starting FDD integration Petri net 
Events  F0  to  F3:  The  resource  allocation  places  RA2  and  RA4  are  used  to  ensure 
multiple requests to start or stop the FDD module are not made simultaneously.  The 
resource allocation place RA2 must initially have a token on it so that the FDD module 
can be started.  When the FDD module is running, RA2 does not have a token and so no 
requests to run FDD can be sent to the FDD module.  When FDD has stopped running, 
RA2 has a token on it thus enabling request to run the FDD module to be sent to the FDD 
module. 
 
(F0)    If RA2 and FDD0 OR….. 
(F1)    If RA2 and FDD1 then FDD2. 
(F2)    If  2 RA  and FDD0 then remove tokens FDD0. 
(F3)    If  2 RA  and FDD1 then remove tokens FDD1. 
 
Event F4: If the FDD module is already running which is indicated by a token located 
upon place FDD4, created by a procedure activated by a rule monitoring the FDD module 
(refer to section 6.3.6, FDD module input places), then the token on RA2 is removed (so 
that no further request can be made). 
 
(F4)    If RA2 and FDD4 then remove tokens RA2. 
 
Event F5: Once the request has been made, the request to start the FDD module is not 
sent directly to the module, but waits in state FDD2 until the process has reached steady 
state, indicated by a token located on PM3, which is created by procedure activated by a 
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a rule monitoring the arrival of tokens on this place activates a procedure which starts the 
FDD module (refer to section 6.3.6, FDD module output places). 
 
(F5)    If FDD2 and PM3 then FDD3. 
 
Event F6: The FDD module is monitored by a rule, which activates a procedure, so that 
when the FDD module is running a token is created on place FDD4.  Even though the 
FDD module is running, a token is not created on the “FDD running” state (FDD5) until 
the  fault  detection  boundary  conditions  indicate  normal  operation,  ensuring  that  the 
process has completely recovered from the previously detected fault or set point change 
indicated by a token created on FDD37.  When the fault detection boundary conditions 
are within their normal operating limits (Chapter 5, section 5.5.3) a rule activating a 
procedure monitoring these boundary conditions creates a token on place FDD37.  The 
token, which is redistributed onto FDD5A, is used to indicate the “FDD running” state. 
 
(F6)    If FDD3, FDD4 and FDD37 then FDD5 and FDD5A. 
 
6.4.3.2  Stopping FDD integration Petri net 
This section describes the section labeled Stopping FDD in Fig. 6.11.  The fault detection 
and diagnosis module can be stopped:  
 
(i)  Following the detection and diagnosis of a fault (event F8). 
(ii)  Following an operator request (event F7) or 
(iii)  Following the request from another module (eg. the supervisory control 
module introducing a set point change to the regulatory control module) 
(event F8). 
 
Event F8: Generally, requests to stop the FDD module will occur when the process is no 
longer at steady state, for example, following a request for a set point change from the SC 
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detected and diagnosed allows the process to recover before the FDD module is restarted 
and avoids false detection of faults. 
 
(F7)    If FDD6 and RA4 OR…  
(F8)    If FDD7 and RA4 then FDD8. 
 
Events F9 to F11: If the FDD module is not running (FDD9) or a request to stop the FDD 
module has already been sent to the FDD module then do not send further requests to 
stop running the FDD module to the FDD module. 
 
(F9)  If FDD6 and  4 RA  then remove tokens FDD6. 
(F10)  If FDD7 and  4 RA  then remove tokens FDD7. 
(F11)    If FDD8 and FDD9 then remove tokens FDD8. 
 
Events F12: The FDD module is monitored by a rule, which activates a procedure, so that 
when the FDD module is not running, a token is created on place FDD9.  If the FDD 
module is running, there is no token on FDD9 indicated as  9 FDD . 
 
When there is a request waiting to stop the FDD module (FDD8) and FDD module is 
running  9 FDD  then the arrival of a token on FDD8A is monitored by a rule which 
activates a procedure which stops the FDD module. 
 
(F12)    If FDD8 and  9 FDD  then FDD8A. 
 
Event F13: When the FDD module has stopped running, a token is created on FDD9 by a 
rule activating the procedure monitoring the FDD module.  Once the FDD module is not 
running, a token on FDD10 indicates the state “FDD not running” (FDD10) and tokens 
are removed from the “FDD running” state place (FDD5) through FDD30.  The resource 
allocation place RA2 is re-set so that requests to start running the FDD module can be 
made. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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(F13)    If FDD8A and FDD9 then FDD10, FDD30 and RA2. 
 
Event F14: The following condition removes tokens from the “FDD running” state place 
when the FDD module is stopped. 
 
(F14)    If FDD5 and FDD30 then remove tokens FDD5 and FDD30. 
 
Event F15: When the FDD module has stopped running (FDD10), an automatic request is 
made to start the FDD module (FDD1).  This request is sent 1 minute (this interval can be 
changed depending on the process) after the FDD module has been stopped to make sure 
that any changes made to the plant (for example, set point changes from the SC module) 
have had time to propagate into the plant. 
 
(F15)    If FDD10 then wait for 1 minute then FDD1. 
 
Events F16 and F17: After the request to run the FDD module has been.  The resource 
allocation place RA4 must have a token on it, which allows for further requests to stop 
the FDD module.  Event F17 is to ensure that there is only one token on place RA4 at this 
time. 
 
(F16)  If FDD5A and  4 RA  then RA4. 
(F17)  If FDD5A and RA4 then RA4. 
 
6.4.3.3  Fault detected integration Petri net 
The third section Fault Detected (Fig. 6.12) represents a fault occurring in the plant and 
the actions taken in order to diagnose the fault.  Once the FDD module detects a fault, 
fault diagnosis can take place either automatically by the FDD module or manually by the 
operator.    If  the  operator  suspects  a  fault,  which  has  not  been  detected  by  the  FDD 
module, then the operator is able to manually run the fault diagnosis neural networks.   
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Once a fault is detected, operator interaction with the fault detected integration Petri net 
is achieved via pop-up workspaces shown in Fig. 6.13 and Fig. 6.14.  If the operator does 
not respond to these workspaces within a specified time interval, then the tokens in the 
Fault detected integration Petri net follows a default path, which leads to the “plant not 
ok” state place (FDD21). 
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Fault detected 
Event F18: When the FDD module is running (FDD5) and a fault is detected, a rule 
activating a procedure monitoring the FDD module creates a token on place FDD11.  The 
Fault detected Petri net can then indicate its “fault detected” state place (FDD12). 
 
(F18)    If FDD5 and FDD11 then FDD12. 
 
Event F19: The occurrence of a fault affects the SC and DR modules, and so places 
FDD12G and FDD12J are used to link the DR and SC integration Petri nets to the “fault 
detected” state places.  The occurrence of a fault also requires operator interaction and so 
places FDD12A and FDD12B are used for these cases. 
 
(F19)    If FDD12 then FDD12A, FDD12B, FDD12G and FDD12J. 
 
Fault diagnosed 
Events F20 to F23: After a fault is detected, the FDD module (FDD13) or the operator 
(FDD14) diagnoses the fault.  If a fault is detected and the plant or operator diagnoses the 
fault  then  the  redistribution  of  tokens  creates  a  token  on  the  “fault  detected  and 
diagnosed” state (FDD15).  Note that there is a two-second delay on FDD13, FDD14 and 
FDD16A to avoid token buildup at FDD15G, if FDD15 fires before FDD12.  Once a 
diagnosis  of  the  fault  is  offered,  the  token  on  the  resource  allocation  place  RA3  is 
removed so that no further diagnosis can be given. 
 
(F20)    If FDD13 and RA3 OR… 
(F21)    If FDD14 and RA3 then FDD15. 
(F22)    If FDD13 and  3 RA  then remove tokens FDD13. 
(F23)    If FDD14 and  3 RA  then remove tokens FDD14. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Fault detected and diagnosed 
Event F24: When the fault is detected and diagnosed (as opposed to being just diagnosed, 
eg. by the operator running one of the neural networks when a fault is suspected), tokens 
are re-distributed to indicate the “fault detected and diagnosed” state (FDD15A). 
 
(F24)    If FDD12B and FDD15 then FDD15A. 
 
Event F25: When the fault has been diagnosed within five minutes (or a time interval set 
as a time delay on place FDD12A by the developer) of detection ( B FDD12 ), then the 
token  is  removed  from  the  default  path  (FDD12A),  which  is  followed  following  no 
diagnosis of the fault.  This event is explained in more detail in the following sections. 
 
(F25)    If FDD12A and  B FDD12  then remove tokens FDD12A. 
 
Operator cannot diagnose fault 
Event F26: When the fault has been detected and the fault has not been diagnosed five 
minutes  after  the  detection  time  (FDD12A  and  B FDD12 ),  the  transition  connecting 
FDD12A  and  FDD12B  to  FDD12C  and  FDD12D  fires,  redistributing  tokens  onto 
FDD12C and FDD12D.  A token arriving on FDD12C is monitored by a rule activating a 
procedure that creates the pop-up workspace displayed in Fig. 6.13.  This workspace 
reminds the operator that a fault has been detected and asks for operator input as to 
whether the fault can be diagnosed. 
 
(F26)    If FDD12A and FDD12B then FDD12C and FDD12D. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Fig. 6.13. Pop-up workspace asking for operator input regarding fault diagnosis 
 
If the operator responds to the action button “Fault has been diagnosed” in Fig. 6.13, then 
the action button creates a token on place FDD14 to indicate that the fault has been 
diagnosed  (events  F21  and  F33  are  then  followed)  and  a  token  is  created  on  place 
FDD12E to indicate that the operator has responded to this pop-up workspace (events 
F29 and F30 are then followed).   
 
Events F27 and F28: If the operator responds the action button labeled “Fault cannot be 
diagnosed” in Fig. 6.13 indicating that the fault cannot be diagnosed, a token is created 
on the “operator cannot diagnose fault” place (FDD16A).  A token is also created on 
place  FDD12E  to  indicate  that  the  operator  has  responded  to  this  pop-up  workspace 
(events F29 and F20 are then followed).  Following the token arrival on place FDD12E, 
the token distribution indicates the “plant not ok” state (FDD21).  Note that when the 
transition connecting FDD16A and RA3 to FDD21 fires, tokens are removed from the 
resource allocation place RA3 so that no further diagnosis can be given. 
 
(F27)    If FDD16A and RA3 then FDD21. 
(F28)    If FDD16A and  3 RA  then remove tokens FDD16A. 
 
Events F29 and F30: If the operator responds to the pop-up workspace shown in Fig. 
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is automatically created on place FDD12E by the action buttons on the workspace.  The 
transitions connecting these places then fires, removing tokens from the places. 
 
(F29)    If FDD12C and FDD12E then FDD12F. 
(F30)    If FDD12D and FDD12F then remove tokens FDD12D and FDD12F. 
 
Events F31 and F32: If the operator does not respond to the pop-up workspace shown in 
Fig. 6.13 within 5 minutes, the transition connecting FDD12C and FDD12D to FDD16C 
fires.  Tokens are removed from FDD12C and FDD12D and a token is created on place 
FDD16C.  The pop-up workspace is automatically deleted by a procedure, activated by a 
rule, monitoring token arrival on place FDD16C.  The token, which is created on place 
FDD21, indicates the “plant not ok” state. 
 
(F31)    If FDD12C and FDD12D then FDD16C. 
(F32)    If FDD16C then FDD21. 
 
Events F33 and F34: For the case of a fault not being detected by the FDD module 
B FDD12 , however, the operator manually runs the fault diagnosis neural networks and 
finds a fault, then a token on place FDD15 is created indicating the “fault diagnosed” 
state. 
 
(F33)  If FDD15 and  B FDD12  then FDD15E and FDD15F. 
(F34)    If FDD15E then FDD15B and FDD15C. 
 
Event F35: When the fault is detected and diagnosed (FDD15A), tokens are created on 
places FDD15B and FDD15C.  The arrival of a token on place FDD15C is monitored by 
a rule which activates a procedure which creates the pop-up workspace shown in Fig. 
6.14 asking for operator input as to whether the fault has been repaired.  The operator 
must respond to this workspace within 5 minutes (or a time interval entered on place 
FDD15B specified by the developer), otherwise tokens are created on the default path 
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(F35)  If FDD15A then FDD15B and FDD15C. 
 
 
Fig. 6.14. Pop-up workspace for operator input regarding fault repair 
 
Event F36: If the operator selects the action button labeled “Fault Fixed” on the pop-up 
workspace shown in Fig. 6.14 a token is created on place FDD17 (by the action button) to 
indicate  this  choice  and  the  pop-up  workspace  is  automatically  deleted.    The  token 
distribution on the Fault detected integration Petri net then indicates the “Plant ok” state 
(FDD20).  
 
(F36)  If FDD15C and FDD17 then FDD20. 
 
Event  F37:  If  the  operator  selects  the  action  button  labeled  “Fault  cannot  be  fixed 
immediately” on the pop-up workspace shown in Fig. 6.14, a token is created on place 
FDD22  (by  the  action  button)  to  indicate  this  choice  and  the  pop-up  workspace  is 
automatically deleted.  The token distribution on the Fault detected integration Petri net 
then indicates the “Plant not ok” state (FDD21). 
 
(F37)  If FDD15C and FDD22 then FDD21. 
 
Event F38: The arrival of a token on place FDD15B is used to activate a timer, which 
waits for the operator to respond the pop-up workspace shown in Fig. 6.14.  When the 
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operator  does  not  respond  to  this  workspace,  then  a  default  path  is  followed  which 
automatically redistributes tokens in the Fault detected integration Petri net to indicate the 
“Plant not ok” state (FDD21) as described by events F39 to F40.  
 
(F38)  If FDD15B and  C FDD15  then remove tokens FDD15B. 
 
Events F39 and F40: If the operator does not respond to the pop-up workspace (Fig. 
6.14) within 5 minutes, then the transition connecting FDD15B and FDD15C to FDD15D 
fires, removing tokens from FDD15B and FDD15C and depositing a token on FDD15D.  
A procedure activated by a rule monitoring the arrival of tokens on FDD15D deletes the 
workspace.  This transition firing sequence represents the default path, which is taken 
following  no  operator input  leading  to  the  “plant  not  ok” state  place  (FDD21)  being 
marked. 
 
(F39)  If FDD15B and FDD15C then FDD15D. 
(F40)  If FDD15D then FDD21. 
 
Event F41: When a fault is detected or diagnosed by the operator (without being detected 
by  the  FDD  module),  the  DR and  SC modules  must  not  run.    The  places  FDD12G, 
FDD12J,  FDD15F  and  FDD15G  have  been  included  specifically  for  the  purpose  of 
removing tokens from the resource allocation places RA0 and RA1.  Tokens on FDD12G 
and FDD12J represent a fault being detected by the FDD module and tokens on FDD15F 
represents  an  operator  diagnosing  a  fault  when  the  plant  has  not  detected  this  fault.  
Further  details  regarding  these  events  are  found  in  sections  6.4.3.5,  FDD  cross 
connections I and 6.4.3.6, FDD cross connections II. 
 
(F41)    If FDD12G or FDD15F then FDD15G. 
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6.4.3.4  Repair fault integration Petri net 
The fourth section Repair fault (Fig. 6.15) represents the actions taken by the operator in 
order to repair faults in the plant. 
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Fig. 6.15. Repair fault integration Petri net 
 
Event F42: When the plant is not ok (FDD21), then tokens on the Repair fault integration 
Petri net indicates the “faulty auto control” state (FDD26).   A token arriving on place 
FDD26 is monitored by a rule activating a procedure that creates a pop-up workspace 
(Fig. 6.16) asking if the operator would like to: 
 
(i)  “Remain in faulty ‘auto’ operation”, 
(ii)  “Change plant section to ‘manual’ control”, 
(iii)  “Schedule repairs” or  
(iv)  “Shutdown the plant”.   Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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The operator’s choice depends on the fault severity. If the operator does not respond to 
this workspace, the plant remains in faulty ‘auto’ operation. 
 
(F42)    If FDD21 then FDD26. 
 
 
Fig. 6.16. Operator choice workspace for faulty auto plant operation 
 
Events F43 and F44: If the fault is not serious, the operator can choose to continue 
operating the plant in ‘auto’ control mode.  The operator is given the option to enter a 
time-interval in the type-in box shown in Fig. 6.16 with which he / she would like to be 
reminded that the plant is operating in ‘auto’ control while there is a fault in the plant.  
The time interval entered into the type-in box sets the time delay on place FDD26E.  The 
action button labeled “Remain in Fault ‘Auto’ Operation” must then be pressed which 
creates a token on FDD26D and automatically deletes the workspace shown in Fig. 6.16.  
The operator is then reminded that the plant is operating in this “faulty auto control” 
mode after the entering the time-interval. 
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(F43)    If FDD26 and FDD26D then FDD26E. 
(F44)    If FDD26E then wait for X then FDD26. 
 
Event F45: Alternatively, if the operator chooses the action button labeled “Change plant 
section  to  ‘manual’  control”,  the faulty  plant  section  /  controllers  can be  changed  to 
manual operation.  In this case, when the operator selects the action button a token is 
created on place FDD23 and the pop-up workspace (Fig. 6.16) is deleted.  The token 
distribution in the Repair fault integration Petri net then indicates the “manual control of 
plant section” state (FDD18).  Token arrival on place FDD18 is monitored by a rule 
activating  a  procedure  which  creates  a  pop-up  workspace  (Fig.  6.17)  presenting  the 
operator with the options of scheduling repairs on the plant, or for the case of a serious 
fault, shutting down the plant. 
 
(F45)  If FDD23 and FDD26 then FDD18. 
 
 
Fig. 6.17. Pop-up workspace for operator input when plant section is operating  
in manual mode 
 
Plant repairs from auto mode 
Event  F46:  If  the  operator  chooses  to  schedule  repairs,  the  action  button  labeled 
“Schedule repairs” in Fig. 6.16 is chosen.  This action button creates a token on place 
FDD27 and automatically deletes the pop-up workspace.  The transition connecting place 
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created on place FDD28.  A rule monitoring token arrival on place FDD28 activates a 
procedure, which creates a pop-up workspace (Fig. 6.18) asking the operator to indicate 
when repairs have been made.  Tokens remain in the Repair fault integration Petri net 
“request repairs” state place until the operator responds to this workspace. 
 
(F46)    If FDD26 and FDD27 then FDD28. 
 
 
Fig. 6.18. Pop-up workspace to indicate when plant repairs have been made 
 
Event F47: The operator must indicate when repairs have been made by selecting the 
action button labeled “Repairs Finished” (Fig. 6.18).  This action button creates a token 
on place FDD29 and deletes the pop-up workspace.  The transition connecting FDD28, 
A FDD28  and FDD29 to FDD28D fires, redistributing tokens allowing for the Repair 
fault  integration  Petri  net  to  indicate  the  “Plant  ok”  state  (FDD20).    Note  that  the 
condition  A FDD28   is  also  included  in  this  expression  because  the  option  “Repairs 
Finished” can  be  made following  plant  repairs from  ‘manual’  control mode  (refer  to 
events F48 to F50). 
 
(F47)  If FDD28,  A FDD28  and FDD29 then FDD28D. 
 
Plant repairs from manual mode 
Event F48: If the faulty plant section is in ‘manual’ mode (FDD18) and the operator 
chooses the action button labeled “Schedule Repairs” (Fig. 6.17), a token is created on 
FDD27 and the pop-up workspace is deleted.  The transition connecting FDD18 and 
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creating tokens on FDD28 and FDD28A.  The arrival of tokens on FDD28 is monitored 
by a rule, which activates a procedure that creates a pop-up workspace shown in Fig. 
6.18.   The  token created  on  place  FDD28A  is used  to  indicate  that the  repairs  were 
scheduled from ‘manual’ control mode.  
 
(F48)    If FDD18 and FDD27 then FDD28 and FDD28A. 
 
Event F49: When the operator confirms that the repairs have been made by responding 
the action button on the pop-up workspace shown in Fig. 6.18, the action button creates a 
token  on  place  FDD29  and  the  pop-up  workspace  is  automatically  deleted.    In  this 
situation, there are now tokens on places FDD28, FDD28A and FDD29, so the transition 
connecting these places to FDD28B fires, removing tokens from FDD28, FDD28A and 
FDD29 and creating a token on FDD28B.  The arrival of a token on place FDD28B is 
monitored by a rule which activates a procedure that creates a pop-up workspace, shown 
in Fig. 6.19 asking for the operator to return the faulty plant section to ‘auto’ control 
mode.  No further actions can be taken until the operator responds to this workspace. 
 
(F49)    If FDD28, FDD28A and FDD29 then FDD28B. 
 
 
Fig. 6.19. Pop-up workspace to indicate when plant section has been returned to ‘auto’ 
operation 
 
Events F50 and F51: When the operator responds to the action button “Plant in Auto” 
(Fig. 6.19), a token is created on place FDD28C and tokens are redistributed such that the 
Repair fault integration Petri net then indicates the “plant ok” state (FDD20). Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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(F50)  If  FDD28B  and  FDD28C  then  FDD28D  (intermediate  state  leading  to 
FDD20. 
(F51)  If FDD28D then FDD20. 
 
Events F52 and F53: For the case of a serious fault, the plant can be shutdown (FDD25) 
either: 
 
(i)  From “auto control” mode (FDD26) by choosing the last option labeled 
“Shutdown the Plant” in Fig. 6.16.  This action button creates a token on 
place FDD24 and deletes the pop-up workspace (event F52). 
(ii)  From “manual control” mode (FDD18) by choosing the option “Shutdown 
the Plant” in Fig. 6.17.  This action button also creates a token on place 
FDD24 and deletes the pop-up workspace shown in Fig. 6.17 (event F53). 
 
(F52)  If FDD24 and FDD26 then FDD25. 
(F53)    If FDD18 and FDD24 then FDD25. 
 
Event  F54:  The  distribution  of  tokens  in  the  Repair  fault  integration  Petri  net  then 
indicates the “Plant Shutdown” state (FDD25). 
 
(F54)  If  FDD25  then  wait  for  5  minutes  (or  a  time  interval  entered  by  the 
developer) and remove tokens FDD25. 
 
6.4.3.5  FDD cross connections I 
The FDD cross connections I integration Petri net (Fig. 6.20) is used to link the FDD 
integration Petri nets with the DR and SC integration Petri nets.  When a fault is detected, 
the DR and SC module (which are activated by the DR and SC integration Petri nets) 
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modules can be stopped from running during the “faulty” period.  A request to run these 
modules can be made once the fault is repaired. 
 
In  some  cases,  the  token  distribution  on  the  DR  or  SC  Petri  nets  may  indicate  an 
intermediate state place when the fault is detected (eg. event D26).  By removing tokens 
from these places when a fault is detected, modules will not continue running.  If these 
tokens are not removed then this could lead to token buildup or an incorrect state being 
reached when the modules are re-run following the repair of the fault.  The boxes labeled 
“SC IPN” and “DR IPN” in Fig. 6.20 link to the SC and DR integration Petri nets shown 
in Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.7 respectively. 
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Fig. 6.20. Fault detection and diagnosis cross connections I 
 
Event F55: When a fault is detected, tokens are created on places FDD12H, FDD12I, 
FDD12K, FDD12L and FDD12M.  This allows interaction between the FDD integration 
Petri nets with the SC and DR integration Petri nets. 
 
(F55)    If FD12J then FDD12H, FDD12I, FDD12K, FDD12L and FDDM. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Inter module relationships: DR integration Petri net – sensor drift and fault 
Event D26: If the (i) DR module has “finished / not running” (DR7), (ii) DR module has 
detected “sensor drift” (DR10) and (iii) there is a “fault detected” (FDD12M) then data 
reconciliation should not continue.  In this case, the arrival of a token on place DR23 is 
monitored by a rule which activates a procedure to inform the operator that there are 
sensor errors, however since a fault has been detected DR will not continue. 
 
(D26)  If  DR7,  DR10  and  FDD12M  then  DR23  (inform  the  operator  that 
“sensor drift detected but DR will not continue because there is also a 
fault detected”). 
 
Event D27: A token is created on place FDD12M when a fault is detected.  If there are no 
tokens on DR7 and DR10 at this time, then the token on FDD12M needs to be cleared.  
 
(D27)  If FDD12M,  7 DR  and  10 DR  then remove tokens FDD12M. 
 
Event D28: When the DR module is in the middle of running and the DR integration Petri 
net indicates sensors in error (DR20), if fault is detected at this time (FDD12H) then any 
tokens that arrive on DR20 should be removed as the DR module should no longer be 
able to run. 
 
(D28)    If FDD12H and DR20 then remove tokens FDD12H and DR20. 
 
Event  D29:  Similar  to  event  D27,  when  a  fault  is  detected,  a  token  is  created  on 
FDD12H.  If there are no tokens on  20 DR  then the token on FDD12H must be removed. 
 
(D29)    If FDD12H and  20 DR  then remove tokens FDD12H. 
 
Note that the time delay on FDD12H is slightly longer than the time delay on DR14 to 
ensure that tokens have time to arrive on DR20 in order for the correct transition to be 
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Inter module relationship: SC integration Petri net 
Event S26: If the SC module is in the middle of running and a fault is detected (FDD12I) 
during this interval, then any tokens that arrive on SC5D should be removed because 
once a fault is detected the SC module should not continue running. 
 
(S26)    If FDD12I and SC5D then remove tokens FDD12I and SC5D. 
 
Event S27: Similar to events D27 and D29 for the DR case, when a fault is detected, 
tokens are created on FDD12I.  If there is not a token on SC5D at this time then the token 
on FDD12I must be removed. 
 
(S27)    If FDD12I and  D SC5  then remove tokens FDD12I. 
 
Events  S28  to  S29:  If the  SC  module  has  successfully  run  (SC10)  with  no  set  point 
change ( 13 SC ) or the SC module has run (SC10) with a set point change (SC13) and a 
fault is detected during this period (FDD12K), then a token is created on place SC13 
which activates a rule and a procedure informing the operator of this event.  This token is 
then removed from SC17 (event S19, section 6.4.2.3). 
 
(S28)    If FDD12K, SC10 and  13 SC  OR… 
(S29)    If FDD12K, SC10 and SC13 then SC17. 
 
Event S30: Similar to event S27, when a fault is detected, a token is created on FDD12K.  
If there are no tokens on SC10 and SC13 at this time, then the token on FDD12K should 
be removed. 
 
(S30)    If FDD12K,  10 SC  and  13 SC  then remover tokens FDD12K. 
 
Event S31: If a fault is detected (FDD12L) in the middle of the SC module running and 
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sensor  error  (SC14)  the  SC  module  should  not  continue  running.    The  transition 
connecting  place  FDD12L,  SC8A  and  SC14  to  SC16  fires  removing  tokens  from 
FDD12L, SC8A and SC14 and creates a token on SC16.  A rule monitoring token arrival 
on place SC16 activates a procedure informing the operator of this event. 
 
(S31)  If FDD12L, SC8A and SC14 then SC16 (inform the operator that “there 
was an error in the SC module which has been repaired, however, a fault 
has been detected, so SC will not continue). 
 
Event S32: Similar to event S30, when a fault is detected, a token is created on FDD12L.  
If there are no tokens on SC8A and SC14 at this time, then the token on FDD12L should 
be removed. 
 
(S32)    If FDD12L,  A SC8  and  14 SC  then remove tokens FDD12L. 
 
6.4.3.6  FDD cross connections II 
The FDD cross connections II integration Petri net (Fig. 6.21) is also used to link the 
FDD integration Petri nets with the DR and SC integration Petri net (i) when a fault is 
detected and (ii) when the plant returns to normal operation following the repair of a 
fault.    This  integration  Petri  net  is  primarily  concerned  with  token  removal  and 
replacement on the resource allocation places RA0, RA1 and RA3 so that no requests to 
run the module can be made during the faulty period, and when the fault is cleared, 
requests to run the modules can occur. 
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Fig. 6.21. Fault detection and diagnosis cross connections II 
 
Event F56: The following places represent fault detection intermediate state. 
 
(F56)    If FDD15G then FDD34 and FDD35. 
 
Event F57: The following places represent “plant ok” intermediate states after the repair 
of a fault in the plant. 
 
(F57)    IF FDD20 then FDD31, FDD32, FDD33, FDD36 and FDD7. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Inter module relationships: DR integration Petri net - fault detected 
Event  D36:  During  the  period  that a fault  is  detected  in the  plant  (FDD34),  the  DR 
module should not be able to run.  If the DR module is not in the middle of running and 
there is a token on resource allocation place RA0, then the token should be removed. 
 
(D36)    If FDD34 and RA0 then remove tokens RA0. 
 
Event D37: For the case of: (i) a fault being detected (FDD34) (ii) when a request has 
already been made for the DR module to run ( 0 RA ) and (iii) the DR integration Petri net 
is waiting for the process to be at steady state before sending the request to the DR 
module (DR2), this request should not be sent to the DR module.  The token is removed 
from DR2 so that the DR cannot run during the time that the plant has a fault. 
 
(D37)    If FDD34, DR2 and  0 RA  then remove tokens FDD34 and DR2. 
 
Inter module relationships: SC integration Petri net – fault detected 
Event S34: Similar to event D36, during the period that a fault is detected in the plant 
(FDD35), the SC module should not be able to run.  If the SC module is not in the middle 
of running and there is a token on resource allocation place RA1, then this token should 
be removed so that no requests to run the SC module can be sent to it. 
 
(S34)    If FDD35 and RA1 then remove tokens RA1. 
 
Fault repaired 
Event F58: When the fault in the plant has been repaired (FDD31) then the resource 
allocation place (RA3), which allows the diagnosis of faults should be reset. 
 
(F58)    If FDD31 and  3 RA  then RA3. 
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Event F59: If the resource allocation place has already has a token on it, no further tokens 
should be accumulated on RA3.  
 
(F59)    If FDD31 and RA3 then RA3. 
 
Inter module relationships: DR integration Petri net - fault detected and repaired 
Events D38 and D39: Once a fault in the plant has been repaired (FDD32) the resource 
allocation place (RA0) which allows requests to be sent to the DR module to run must be 
re-set so that the DR module is able to run again. 
 
(D38)    If FDD32, FDD34,  2 DR  and  0 RA  then RA0. 
(D39)    If FDD32,  34 FDD ,  0 RA  and  2 DR  then RA0. 
 
Events D40: If the resource allocation place (RA0) already has a token on it, then no 
further tokens should accumulate on this place. 
 
(D40)    If FDD32,  34 FDD ,  2 DR  and RA0 then RA0. 
 
Event D41: If a fault was detected, diagnosed and repaired while there was a request 
waiting to run the DR module (DR2), then continue with this request. 
 
(D41)  If FDD32, FDD34, DR2 and  0 RA  then DR2. 
 
Inter module relationships: SC integration Petri net - fault detected and repaired 
Events S35 and S36: Similar to events D38 and D39, once a fault in the plant has been 
repaired (FDD33) the resource allocation place (RA1) which allows requests to be sent to 
the SC module to run must be re-set so that the SC module is able to run again. 
 
(S35)    If FD33, FDD35 and  1 RA  then RA1. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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(S36)    If FDD33,  35 FDD  and  1 RA  then RA1.  
 
Event S37: Similar to events D40, if the resource allocation place (RA1) already has a 
token on it, then no further tokens should accumulate on this place. 
 
(S37)    If FDD33,  35 FDD  and RA1 then RA1. 
 
Event S38: When a fault has been detected and diagnosed and the plant is ok, make sure 
there are tokens on the “plant running” state place (FDD5) which are removed following 
the detection of a fault (event F18). 
 
(S38)    If FDD4,  5 FDD  and FDD36 then FDD5. 
 
Event S39: In some cases, the token on FDD5 is not removed, because the fault was 
diagnosed (by the operator) without being detected by the FDD module.  In this case, 
make sure that there is no token buildup in FDD5. 
 
(S39)    If FDD4, FDD5 and FDD36 then FDD5. 
 
6.5  G2 Implementation of Integration Petri Nets 
This  section  presents  some  screen  shots  of  the  integration  Petri  nets  which  were 
developed  in  G2.    The  integration  Petri  nets  are  accessed  by  selecting  the  “Task 
Coordination  Integration  Petri  net”  icon  from  the  “Module  Overview”  workspace 
presented in Chapter 4, section 4.5.1, repeated in Fig. 6.22 for convenience. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Fig. 6.22. Module overview workspace 
 
The  “Task  Coordination  Integration  Petri  net”  workspace  is  shown  in  Fig.  6.23.  
Integration Petri nets are grouped according to modules and then broken up into smaller 
Petri  net  sections for  clarity  so  that  individual workspaces are  not cluttered.    Action 
buttons that are provided for operator interaction with the integration Petri nets are green.  
The workspace shown in Fig. 6.23 provides the operator with the option to “Reset All 
Integration Petri Nets” or to “Disable All Integration Petri Nets”.  Once the integration 
Petri nets have been disabled, they should be re-set so that they are in the correct states 
when running. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Fig. 6.23. Task coordination integration Petri net workspace 
 
On individual integration Petri net workspace, when the operator selects any of the Petri 
net places, a pop-up workspace appears which provides a place description (Fig. 6.24). 
Every  place  obeys  the  color  coding  conventions  listed  in  Table  6.1  and  is  named 
according to Table 6.2 to Table 6.4.  Some additional places have been added whose 
names do not appear in the tables.  These places are included when Petri net is broken up 
into sections so that workspaces are not cluttered. 
 
Tokens are drawn as brown circles on top of the place.  The number of tokens is indicated 
next to the place (either “0” or “1”) and if there is a time delay associated with the place, 
this is also indicated next to the place.  Normal arcs are brown in color and inhibitor arcs 
are red. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Fig. 6.24. Place descriptions on integration Petri net 
 
Sample screens of individual integration Petri nets are shown in Fig. 6.25 to Fig. 6.34. 
 
6.5.1  G2 implementation of DR integration Petri net 
The “Inputs to DR Integration PN” workspace (Fig. 6.25) corresponds to the “Starting 
DR” portion of the data reconciliation integration Petri net (Fig. 6.3).  An extra place 
DR2C has been added in Fig. 6.25 because the DR integration Petri net has been broken 
up into two sections so that the workspace is not cluttered.  The operator can access 
connecting workspaces by selecting the connection post icon (small blue squares with 
brown dot), which are labeled DR-RA01, DR-RA0, DR-DR1, DR-DR2, -FDD34 in Fig. 
6.25.  The operator is also provided with an action button labeled “Request Running Data 
Reconciliation Module (DR0)” so that the DR module can be run manually.  A readout Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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display  is  provided  showing  the  operator  the  number  of  seconds  before  DR  will 
automatically be re-run. 
 
 
Fig. 6.25. DR input integration Petri net workspace 
 
The  “Data  Reconciliation  Integration  Petri  net”  workspace  shown  in  Fig.  6.26 
corresponds to the remaining sections of the data reconciliation integration Petri net of 
Fig. 6.3.  Again, the operator is provided with an action button allowing the DR module 
to be run and a display showing when DR will be automatically re-run.  There is also an 
action button labeled “Raw and Reconciled Values” enabling the operator to view the 
raw and reconciled values of the variables (Chapter 4, section 4.5.1.2, Fig. 4.7). Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Fig. 6.26. DR integration Petri net workspace 
 
6.5.2  G2 implementation of SC integration Petri net 
The “Inputs to SC Integration PN” workspace shown in Fig. 6.27 corresponds to the 
“Starting SC” portion of the supervisory control integration Petri net shown in Fig. 6.7.  
Again, an extra place SC5A has been added in Fig. 6.27 and workspaces have been 
linked through connection posts.  Similar to the case of the “Inputs to DR Integration PN” 
workspace, the operator is provided with an action button to manually run the SC module 
and a readout display showing the number of seconds before the SC module will be 
automatically re-run. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Fig. 6.27. SC input integration Petri net workspace 
 
The  “Supervisory  Control  Integration  Petri  net”  workspace  shown  in  Fig.  6.28 
corresponds to the remaining sections of the supervisory reconciliation integration Petri 
net of Fig. 6.7.  Again, the operator is provided with an action button to manually run the 
SC module and a readout display showing the number of seconds before the SC module 
will be automatically re-run. 
 
The “Supervisory Control Integration Petri net” workspace also introduces the “Sub-net” 
icons, which are drawn as large blue boxes enclosing a miniature Petri net.  These are 
labeled  “Data  Reconciliation  Integration  Petri  Net”  and  “Stopping  Fault  Detection  & 
Diagnosis Integration Petri Net” in Fig. 6.28 and are hierarchically structured nets.  In 
Fig.  6.28,  labeled  “Data  Reconciliation  Integration  Petri  Net”  represents  the  DR 
integration Petri net being called by the SC integration Petri net and “Stopping Fault 
Detection & Diagnosis Integration Petri Net” represents the “Stopping FDD” component Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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of the Starting and Stopping FDD integration Petri nets of Fig. 6.11.  By selecting the 
connection post (refer to section 6.5.1) on this “Sub-net” icon, the operator can access the 
corresponding integration Petri net.  By looking for the specific connection name, the 
operator is able to see the exact place to which the sub-net connects.  Sometimes the 
same connection name appears on more than one workspace such as in the case of the 
FDD cross connections integration Petri nets. 
 
 
Fig. 6.28. SC integration Petri net workspace 
 
6.5.3  G2 implementation of FDD integration Petri nets 
Sample Petri net workspaces for the FDD integration Petri nets are shown in Fig. 6.29 to 
Fig. 6.34. 
 
The “Starting Fault Detection and Diagnosis” workspace shown in Fig. 6.29 corresponds 
to the section labeled “Starting FDD” in Fig. 6.11.  This workspace provides the operator 
with the option of manual starting the FDD module by selecting the action button labeled 
“Request Start Running Fault Detection and Diagnosis Module (FDD)”.  The operator is 
also provided with an action button labeled “Boundary Graphs” which gives access to the 
boundary graphs shown in Chapter 5, section 5.8, Fig. 5.11. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
Page 6.72 
 
 
Fig. 6.29. FDD starting integration Petri net workspace 
 
The  “Stopping  Fault  Detection  and  Diagnosis”  workspace  shown  in  Fig.  6.30 
corresponds  to  the  section  labeled  “Stopping  FDD”  in  Fig.  6.11.    This  workspace 
provides the operator with the option of manual stop the FDD module by selecting the 
action  button  labeled  “Request  Stop  Running  Fault  Detection  and  Diagnosis  Module 
(FDD)”. 
 
 
Fig. 6.30. FDD stopping integration Petri net workspace Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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The “Fault Detection and Diagnosis” workspace shown in Fig. 6.31 corresponds to the 
“Fault Detected” integration Petri net shown in Fig. 6.12.  This workspace provides the 
operator  with  an  action  button  to  provide  a  manual  diagnosis  of  a  fault.    The  fault 
detection Petri net (Chapter 5, section 5.5.4, Fig. 5.9) can be accessed by selecting the 
“Fault Detection Petri Net” action button and the boundary graphs (Chapter 5, section 
5.8, Fig. 5.11) can be accessed by selecting the action button labeled “Boundary Graphs”. 
 
A list of faults, which the FDD module can diagnose, is provided on this workspace.  
When a fault is detected, the background color of the workspace changes as shown in 
Fig. 6.32.  Four readout tables are provided.  The first two readout tables in the top right 
hand corner of Fig. 6.31 relate to the detection and diagnosis of a fault in the Separation 
section of the Pilot plant and the second two readout tables relate to the Heating section.  
When the plant is operating normally, all readout tables should have a value of “0” in the 
plant section readout tables, namely “separation-section” and “heating-section” and “0.0” 
in  the  readout  tables  indicating  fault  numbers,  namely  “separation-fault-number”  and 
“heating-fault-number” in Fig. 6.31.  When a fault is detected, a “1” is indicated in the 
particular  plant  section  readout  table.    In  Fig.  6.32,  a  fault  has  been  detected  in  the 
Separation section of the Pilot plant.  When the fault is diagnosed, this is indicated in the 
fault  number  readout  tables  for  the  particular  plant  section.    These  fault  numbers 
correspond to the fault numbers listed on the workspace. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Fig. 6.31. Fault detection and diagnosis integration Petri net workspace 
 
 
Fig. 6.32. Fault detection and diagnosis integration Petri net workspace for  
the case of a fault detected Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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The “Repair Fault Integration Petri net” workspace shown in Fig. 6.33 corresponds to the 
“Repair fault” integration Petri net Fig. 6.15.  Operator interaction with this workspace 
occurs through the pop-up workspaces shown in Fig. 6.16 to Fig. 6.19 of section 6.4.3.4. 
 
 
Fig. 6.33. Repair fault integration Petri net workspace 
 
The “Fault Detection Cross Connections I” and “Fault Detection Cross Connections II” 
workspaces shown in Fig. 6.34 corresponds to the “Fault detection and diagnosis cross 
connections I” and the “Fault detection and diagnosis cross connections II” integration 
Petri nets of Fig. 6.20 and Fig. 6.21 respectively.  No operator interaction is required with 
these workspaces. Development of Integration Petri nets                                                                 Chapter 6 
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Fig. 6.34. FDD cross connections I and II 
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6.6  Conclusion 
This  chapter  began  by  presenting  the  Coordinated  Knowledge  Management  method 
framework for task integration.  Descriptions of specific types of places were presented.  
Details were provided on the structure of the integration Petri nets for the integration of 
the data reconciliation, supervisory control and fault detection and diagnosis modules.  
Details  of  individual  integration  Petri  nets  have  been  described  including  the  links 
between  all  integration  Petri  nets.    The  chapter  also  provides  an  overview  of  the 
developed intelligent system including G2 screenshots.  The final chapter will present the 
results of an integrated run using the integration Petri nets for task coordination. 
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  Chapter 7 
An Integrated Run, 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
7.1  Summary 
The aim of this work was to develop an intelligent system capable of integrating tasks 
through an intelligent architecture.  The developed intelligent system is able to execute 
tasks more efficiently within an integrated environment at all operational levels. 
 
In  this  chapter,  an  integrated  run  is  presented  demonstrating  the  effectiveness  of  the 
developed intelligent system based on the Pilot plant at the School of Engineering Science, 
Murdoch University.  Several events were simulated on the Pilot plant testing each of the 
developed modules.  The operator’s response was monitored with and without the use of 
the intelligent system.  A profit equation was also developed in order to map the operators’ 
response into an economic model.  In each case, plots of profit values versus time are 
presented which not only show the time response of the operator and intelligent system to 
events, but also the profit (loss) due to these response time.  
 
At the end of the chapter, potential improvements and future work are presented.  This has 
been broken up into three sections, representing the three main parts of the thesis including: 
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1.  Integration of tasks. 
2.  Fault detection and diagnosis. 
3.  Industrial implementation: opportunities and challenges. 
 
7.2  An Integrated Run 
In order to evaluate the Coordinated Knowledge Management method, eight test cases were 
developed.  These tested the process monitoring, data reconciliation, supervisory control 
and fault detection and diagnosis modules.  These test cases are presented in Table 7.1.  
Cases 1, 2, 5 and 7 involve measurement errors and cases 3, 4, 6 and 8 involve process 
events.  The plant was run continually over a period of five hours on two separate days with 
an  operator  monitoring  the  plant  performance  using  (i)  only  the  Honeywell  Scan3000 
system,  without  the  intelligent  system  (without  IS),  and  (ii)  the  Honeywell  Scan3000 
system with the developed intelligent system (with IS).  The test cases were simulated in 
the same order on both occasions.  The operator had a process engineering background and 
some training for using the intelligent system using examples of events, which could occur 
in the Pilot plant.  Two user manuals were given to the operator to operate the Honeywell 
Scan3000 system (Appendix III) and the intelligent system (Appendix IV). 
 
Logs were used to compare the operator’s response time to events in the plant with and 
without the use of the intelligent system.  Plant data was also recorded so that a profit 
equation could be developed and mapped into profit values.  The operator was asked to log 
the following details: (i) event description, (ii) detection time, (iii) repair time, (iv) time 
required for plant to return to steady state, and (v) a commentary on the event. 
 
Although the operator response time and the profit can be used as a basis for comparing the 
operator’s reaction with and without the intelligent system, one must keep the following 
points in mind: 
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1.  The  operator  had  a  process  engineering  background,  which  made  it  easier  to 
monitor the process without the intelligent system. 
2.  The operator had been exposed to several cases during the previous training session. 
3.  The Pilot plant is relatively small compared to processing plants.  The operator only 
needed to monitor two schematic screens and four trend charts.  The operator’s 
response  time  would  be  increased  and  accuracy  reduced  with  increased  plant 
complexity. 
 
Table 7.1. Test cases 
No.  Description  Module 
1.  FT-523 / FT-569 sensor drift.  Data reconciliation. 
2.  Heating fault: LT-667 sensor 
error. 
Fault detection & diagnosis. 
3.  Product set point temperature 
specification changed. 
Supervisory control. 
4.  Separation fault: NUFP-561 
leak. 
Fault detection & diagnosis. 
5.  TT-623 / FCV-622 sensor 
drift. 
Data reconciliation. 
6.  Heating fault: PP-681 leak.  Fault detection & diagnosis. 
7.  Separation fault: LT-542 
sensor error. 
Fault detection & diagnosis. 
8.  Temperature disturbance.  Supervisory control. 
 
 
7.2.1  Profit equation 
An economic model was developed in order to evaluate the profit of the plant with and 
without the intelligent system.  The developed plant profit equation is not based on actual 
figures, but provides a broad, basic model in order to demonstrate the effects the intelligent 
system would have on an economic objective function.  It is a hypothetical case study used 
only for comparison of a plant operating with and without the intelligent system.  It is 
difficult to quantify the actual economic model without specific plant data.  This economic An Integrated Run, Conclusions and Future Work                                               Chapter 7 
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model relates the profit ($/min) to the cost of materials used (input flow rate), cost of 
cleaning  up  any  spillage  (leaking  flow  rate),  the  operating  cost  of  the  plant  and  the 
operating conditions (steam usage).  Product values are based on the output temperature of 
the product, which could represent product quality.  If the product temperature is within 
one unit of its specified temperature, product value will be the highest.  If the product 
temperature is between one and two units from its specified temperature, the product values 
will be half the maximum value.  If the product temperature is greater than two units from 
its specified product temperature value then the product is worthless and has to be thrown 
away, resulting in a loss.  The operating profit over time is expressed as: 
 
P = g (output flow rate) - b (input flow rate) - d  (leaking flow rate) – OC 
                    (7.1) 
Where:  
P = Profit =  min $  
g = Product values 
If  1 0 £ - £ actual SP T T  then g = $10/L         (7.2) 
If  2 1 £ - < actual SP T T  then g = $5/L          (7.3) 
If  2 > - actual SP T T  then g = $0/L          (7.4) 
b = Cost of raw materials = $3/L 
d = Cost of clean up of spillage = $2/L 
OC = operating cost / min 
       =  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 3
2
3
3
3 2
2
2
3
2 1
2
1
3
1 cm bm am cm bm am cm bm am + + + + + + + + a   (7.5) 
a = Cost of steam = $10/kg 
m1 = Valve opening FCV-622 (%OP) 
m2 = Valve opening FCV-642 (%OP) 
m3 = Valve opening FCV-662 (%OP) 
a =  min / 10 54 . 8
7 kg
- ´ -  
b =  min / 10 15 . 1
4kg
- ´  
c =  min / 10 69 . 2
3kg
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Values for the output flow rate, input flow rate, leaking flow rate, m1, m2 and m3 are 
average values over one minute. 
 
The above profit model has been confined to the variables that influence the intelligent 
system.  In order to develop a more realistic profit equation for a processing plant, several 
other factors must be taken into consideration, some of which would include: 
 
￿￿ Probability estimations of event occurrences such as pump fault, disturbances, and 
sensor drift.  This would indicate the frequency of a particular fault occurring in the 
plant. 
￿￿ Accurate economic data on production revenue for event occurrences. 
￿￿ Specific data on operator response to event occurrences.  The longer the operator 
takes to respond to an event, the greater the loss in profit. 
 
7.2.2  Results 
Table  7.2  presents  the  operator’s  response  to  event  occurrences  in  the  plant  with  and 
without the intelligent system (IS).  This includes the duration of the event until the event is 
repaired, and the length of time the plant needs to reach its new steady state in minutes and 
seconds. 
 
Result descriptions are grouped according to the modules tested.  Cases 1 and 5, testing the 
data reconciliation module, are described first.  Note that sensor bias, such as that covered 
in  case  1  also  can  be classified  as a  fault and so  can also  be considered  part  of  fault 
detection and diagnosis.  Cases 2 and 7 relate to sensor error and are used to test the fault 
detection and diagnosis module.  Cases 3 and 8 relate to the supervisory control module.  
Cases 4 and 6 involve faults occurring in both the Separation and Heating sections of the 
Pilot  plant,  used  to  test  the  fault  detection  and  diagnosis  module and  so  are  described 
together.  Finally, some general comments regarding the operation of the plant with the 
intelligent system are made. An Integrated Run, Conclusions and Future Work                                               Chapter 7 
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Table 7.2. Event detection and duration times with and without intelligent system (IS) 
No.  Description  Without IS  With IS 
    Duration 
min:sec 
New SS 
min:sec 
Duration 
min:sec 
New SS 
min:sec 
1.  FT-523 / FT-569 sensor 
drift. 
30:30  31:30  4:30  7:05 
2.  Heating fault: LT-667 
sensor error. 
10:05  15:45  4:00  6:55 
3.  Product set point 
temperature specification 
changed. 
NA  4:45  NA  5:55 
4.  Separation fault: NUFP-
561 leak. 
27:05  31:05  2:45  5:00 
5.  TT-623 / FCV-622 sensor 
drift. 
7:10  7:45  7:15  7:50 
6.  Heating fault: PP-681 
leak. 
12:00  14:35  4:10  5:35 
7.  Separation fault: LT-542 
sensor error. 
3:25  14:30  1:15  9:15 
8.  Temperature disturbance.  NA  17:35  NA  12:00 
 
 
The plots use the profit equation consisting of profit values versus time with and without 
the intelligent system.  Plots are used to illustrate the degradation that occurs due to event 
occurrences  with  and  without  the  intelligent  system.    In  each  case,  the  vertical  axis 
represents the profit ($/min) and the horizontal axis represents time (min).  Events such as 
the fault  occurrence  time, fault  repair  time  and  time  to  reach  the  new  steady  state are 
indicated on each plot.   
 
7.3.1.1  Data reconciliation 
Cases 1 (FT-523 / FT-569 sensor error) and 5 (TT-623 / TT-643) were used to test the data 
reconciliation module.  Case 1 is sensor drift of FT-523, however, this kind of sensor drift 
could occur as described in the following.  The sensor labeled FT-Drift in Fig. 7.1 reads 
zero even though it actually has a flow through it.  This could result in lost production, as An Integrated Run, Conclusions and Future Work                                               Chapter 7 
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the production stream, which is measured by FT-569, will have less throughput flow and 
final product should not be flowing to the Supply tanks.  It could also lead to contamination 
of a stream. 
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Fig. 7.1. Sensor drift example 
 
For  case  1,  without  the  intelligent  system,  the  operator  repaired  the  sensor  drift  in  30 
minutes and 30 seconds.  With the intelligent system in operation, sensor drift was detected 
and repaired after 4 minutes and 30 seconds.  Although this case was fairly easy to assess 
without  the intelligent  system  (by  performing  a  quick  mental  mass  balance  around  the 
plant) this would not be the case for a larger plant. 
 
A graph of profit value versus time with and without the intelligent system, for the case of 
sensor drift, is shown in Fig. 7.2.  In terms of the profit model, without the intelligent 
system the plant was making lower profit for around 32 minutes while the sensor was in 
error, before the new steady state was reached.  With the intelligent system in operation, the 
plant was making a lower profit for the 7 minutes that the effect of sensor drift remained in 
the system and normal profit once the plant had reached its new steady state.  So the use of 
the intelligent system in this case, would lead to an increase in profit of around 4% for 32 
minutes of operation. An Integrated Run, Conclusions and Future Work                                               Chapter 7 
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Fig. 7.2. Profit graph for FT-523 / FT-599 sensor drift 
 
The results for case 5, TT-568 / FCV-622 are not as dramatic according to the profit values.  
Large steam usage / variation does not significantly affect the net profit as steam costs are 
relatively low.  However, sensor drift in TT-568 causes FCV-622 to fluctuate (open and 
close) rapidly, thus causing premature valve wear.  This would result in early maintenance 
and replacement of the valve, which is an unwanted expense.  This has not been considered 
in the profit equation. 
 
7.3.1.2  Fault detection and diagnosis I – sensor error 
For case 2, Heating fault (LT-667 sensor error), the operator took 10 minutes and 5 seconds 
to have the fault fixed without the intelligent system.  This fault was detected only because 
the operator was constantly monitoring all schematics when the fault occurred, which is a 
rare situation in a larger plant.  Moreover, even when the operator did notice this fault, 
diagnosis was difficult.  The operator initially diagnosed the fault as FT-687 and then as 
PP-681.  Only after all possibilities were exhausted was the correct fault diagnosed and An Integrated Run, Conclusions and Future Work                                               Chapter 7 
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repaired.    The  intelligent  system  on  the  other  hand,  provided  detection  and  correct 
diagnosis allowing for repair of the fault 4 minutes into the fault occurrence. 
 
The effect of case 2 has been calculated in the profit equation and the graph is shown in 
Fig. 7.3.  From the graph we can see that for the case where the operator was not using the 
intelligent system, the plant is operating at a loss for a period of around 11 minutes.  With 
the intelligent system, the plant is operating at a loss for approximately 5 minutes.  Once 
the fault had been repaired and the plant had reached its new steady state the plant was 
operating at its normal net profit.  Therefore, over 16 minutes, the net profit difference 
between the plant operating with and without the intelligent system is given by the area 
between these two curves. 
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Fig. 7.3. Profit graph for Heating fault (LT-667 sensor error) 
 
Case  7,  Separation  fault  (LT-542  sensor  error)  had  similar  results  but  smaller  fault 
detection and diagnosis times both with and without the intelligent system.  In this case, the An Integrated Run, Conclusions and Future Work                                               Chapter 7 
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operator was familiar with this type of fault occurring in the plant (level sensor errors) and 
so operator diagnosis time without the intelligent system was significantly reduced. 
 
Sensor errors such as the ones described above can have other serious consequences.  If the 
sensor  is  reading  lower  than  actual  tank  levels,  tanks  may  overflow  leading  to 
contamination and environmental impacts.  If level sensor readings are too high, pumps 
may  run  dry  thus  needing  replacement  seals,  which  are  costly.    Personal  injuries,  if 
dangerous materials leak from tanks are another consequence. 
 
7.3.1.3  Supervisory control 
Cases 3 (product set point change) and 8 (temperature disturbance) were used to test the 
supervisory control module and did not make a large amount of difference in the profit 
value.  In case 8, the intelligent system automatically re-calculated the optimal temperature 
set  points  in  the  plant  once  the  input  water  temperature  had  increased  by  5°C  which 
resulted in a marginally better profit with around 2% increase in profit.  When operating a 
processing  plant  without  automatic  supervisory  control  in  place,  the  engineer  must 
manually run the supervisory control program to calculate the set point otherwise set point 
selection is based on extensive experience.  The main comment from the operator was that 
it made set point selection easier and allowed automatic calculation of set points in the 
presence of a temperature disturbance. 
 
7.3.1.4  Fault detection and diagnosis II – pump faults 
In case 4, Separation fault (NUFP-561 leaking), the operator took 27 minutes and 5 seconds 
to respond to this event when only the Honeywell Scan3000 system was running.  This 
fault was very hard to detect.  A small leak from the NUFP-561 results in the pump speed 
increasing in order for the PI controller to maintain the flow of FT-569 at its specified set 
point.  This speed variation is only slight and so many minutes of trend information were 
needed  in  order  to  detect  the  shift  in  pump  speed  (OP).    The  fault  was  detected  only 
because  the  operator  was  constantly  monitoring  all  trends.    Moreover,  even  when  the 
operator did notice this fault, diagnosis was difficult.  The operator initially diagnosed the An Integrated Run, Conclusions and Future Work                                               Chapter 7 
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fault as FT-523 and FDP-521.  Only after all possibilities were exhausted and a suggestion 
made by maintenance as to the cause of the fault, was the fault repaired.  The intelligent 
system on the other hand, provided detection and correct diagnosis of the fault 2 minutes 
and 45 seconds into the fault occurrence. 
 
The graph of the profit value in this case is shown in Fig. 7.4.  The net profit, over 27 
minutes with the intelligent system, is 2% greater than the net profit of the plant without the 
intelligent system.  This scenario was similar to case 6, Heating fault (PP-681 leak).  
 
Although this case scenario does not have an immediate significant effect on the profit 
equation, the longer the fault remains in the system the more profit is lost.  Even a small 
leakage  can  result  in  serious  disturbances  in  processing  plant  including  contamination, 
product specification degradation and have an environmental and / or safety impact.  When 
a certain capacity of production is lost due to leakage, it must be reported to head office 
with an explanatory report.  Thus, there is a premium on early detection on these types of 
faults.  It is very difficult to manually detect and diagnose such small faults, which are 
often masked by controllers.  The fault in this case scenario was a relatively small process 
leakage, however, the intelligent system was able to detect the fault quickly. An Integrated Run, Conclusions and Future Work                                               Chapter 7 
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Fig. 7.4. Profit graph for Separation fault (NUFP-561 leak) 
 
7.2.3  Operator comments 
The operator’s main comments were: 
 
￿￿ The fault detection and diagnosis module was very useful in detecting faults very 
early  on  and  diagnosing  the  exact  location  of  the  fault,  which  was  otherwise 
difficult.  Also, it was useful to have a fault diagnosis module, which could be run 
manually, independent of the detection of faults. 
￿￿ The process monitors were useful in determining when the process was at steady 
state and the fault detection boundary graphs were also very useful for this purpose. 
￿￿ Supervisory control was useful in automatically calculating new set points in the 
presence of a product specification change and disturbances. 
￿￿ Data reconciliation was also useful in detecting sensor drift. 
￿￿ Overall, the intelligent system made the plant easier to monitor. 
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One comment made by the operator was that too many options were presented on the 
operator  screens,  which  were  not  used.    A  method  to  overcome  this  is  to  prevent  the 
operator from accessing the integration Petri nets for day-to-day plant operation. 
 
7.4  Potential Future Work 
Future work is divided into three sections (i) integration of tasks, (ii) the development of a 
large-scale fault detection and diagnosis technique, and (iii) the challenge of integrating the 
intelligent system into a processing plant. 
 
7.4.1  Integration of tasks 
This project focussed on developing a fully integrated system allowing for information 
flow between modules in a continuously changing environment.  Petri nets were developed 
to integrate tasks such as data acquisition, regulatory control, data reconciliation, process 
monitoring, supervisory control, fault detection and diagnosis.  The project also included 
the development of individual modules to be used as part of the integration framework.  
The developed framework has so far been applied to the Separation and Heating sections of 
the  Pilot  plant.    Results  from  this  thesis  indicate  that  the  use  of  an  intelligent  system 
comprising  of  Petri  nets  for  integration  of  tasks  would  result  in  improved  plant 
performance. 
 
Module interaction, organized through the structure of the hierarchical timed place Petri net 
(low-level net), is adequate for a small plant.  For example, a fault in one section of the 
plant affects all other plant sections, and so total plant data reconciliation or supervisory 
control  is  sufficient.    However,  as  plant  size  increases,  not  only  do  we  have  module 
interaction  but  also  plant  section  interaction,  and  so  the  integration  Petri  nets  must  be 
extended to coordinate both module and section interactions.  It is recommended that a 
colored Petri net (high-level net) be used to represent the entire processing plant. 
 
Original module interactions are based on the structure of the low-level Petri net however, 
extending  a  low-level  net  to  cover  all  plant  sections  would  result  in  a  very  large An Integrated Run, Conclusions and Future Work                                               Chapter 7 
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cumbersome  net.    Using  a  high-level  net  where  tokens  of  different  colors  represent 
different plant sections would result in the “folding” of this complex low-level net into a 
simpler and more efficient high-level net.  By using a high-level colored Petri net, all plant 
sections are included in the one Petri net.  If a fault is detected in one section of the plant, 
supervisory control and data reconciliation will not run for those plant sections affected by 
the fault but will continue to run plant sections which are not affected. 
 
Initial application would be on the entire Pilot plant including (i) the Supply Tanks, (ii) Ball 
Mill, (iii) Separation and (iv) Heating sections which will be used as a test bed for the final 
Petri  net  to  be  used  in industry.    The  final  industry  application could also  include  the 
integration of planning and scheduling, which is plant specific. 
 
When developing a new application based on this research, modules have been organized 
in  such  a  way,  so  that  when  a  new  application  needs  to  be  developed  for  a  different 
processing plant, the main components that need to be changed would include schematics 
and variable names.  Equipment definitions, variable definitions, the Petri net module and 
integration Petri nets can be re-used for new applications.  Existing supervisory control and 
data reconciliation programs can be interfaced into G2 though a variety of available G2 
bridges (Gensym, 1997).  Minor modifications may be made to the existing integration 
Petri nets and rules to include additional functionality.  Some suggestions include: 
 
￿￿ When a fault is detected, an email can be sent to the plant engineer informing him / 
her of the fault or event occurrence. 
￿￿ When a fault is detected, the operator could enter a time when the fault must be 
repaired.  This would be linked to the time delay on a place.  The Petri net would 
then wait for this interval and repeat the question or take other measures. 
￿￿ The integration Petri nets could be extended to include plant startup and shutdown 
procedures. An Integrated Run, Conclusions and Future Work                                               Chapter 7 
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7.4.2  Fault detection and diagnosis 
This  thesis  has  presented  a  two-step  supervisory  framework  for  fault  detection  and 
diagnosis based on dynamic fault data in large-scale systems.  A Petri net fault detection 
module detects faults in real time.  Once a fault is detected, the Petri net then directs the 
diagnosis to the neural network for the particular section where the fault originates.  The 
neural networks have been trained based on dynamic fault data, so that the faults can be 
detected while they are occurring, rather than when they have been in existence in the 
system for a long time.  The use of Petri nets for fault detection reduces neural network 
training  times,  as  smaller  networks  are  required  to  diagnose  faults  in  particular  plant 
sections.  This two-step detection and diagnosis methodology allows the isolation of the 
root cause and quick diagnosis of the fault. 
 
The two-step fault detection and diagnosis module has been developed and tested for faults 
that affect the mass balance of the plant including pump faults, tanks leaking and sensor 
errors in the Separation and Heating sections of the plant.  Results so far look promising.  
Diagnosis was accurate in the majority of cases, however, when there were similar faults, 
diagnosis sometimes fluctuated between the similar faults with a low probability of the 
fault occurrence.  Fault diagnosis could be improved by installing additional sensors in the 
Pilot plant, so that more sensor readings are available to be used as inputs to the neural 
network.    Further  data  conditioning  techniques  on  network  input  data  could  also  be 
investigated in order to achieve better fault classification. 
 
A natural extension of this work would include extending the fault detection and diagnosis 
to cover the Supply tanks and Ball mill section of the Pilot plant.  Also, the fault diagnosis 
module should be extended to include faults that affect the energy balances around the 
plant.  Similarly, fault detection for different operating conditions should be covered.  For 
example, if the supervisory control module introduces new set points in the plant, the fault 
detection and diagnosis module should still work for this new set of operating conditions.   
 
Further improvements would involve the implementation of self-training neural networks, 
which learn on-line as new faults occur in the plant.  The existing RBFN’s could indicate An Integrated Run, Conclusions and Future Work                                               Chapter 7 
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when an unknown fault classification occurs.  Historical data of this new fault could then 
be logged  (including the plant section in which this fault originates).  The developer would 
then have to classify this new fault and this classification could be added to the previously 
trained  RBFN.    Alternatively,  an  unsupervised  learning  neural  network,  such  as  the 
Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) network could be used to identify new fault categories 
as they occur in the system.  This type of network has a self-organizing mechanism, which 
allows it to learn from input data without supervised training (Zaknich, 2003).  When set up 
correctly, the ART network could identify new fault categories on-line and continue to 
adapt on line as examples of previously trained faults occur in the system however, the 
designer, at some point must be able to classify these new “fault” categories. 
 
One  of  the  challenges  encountered  when  developing  any  fault  detection  and  diagnosis 
method is being able to distinguish between faults and process disturbances.  This problem 
could  also  be  investigated  as  part  of  future  work  on  fault  detection  and  diagnosis.  
Similarly, an investigation could be conducted into the applicability of the technique for 
multiple  faults  including  interacting  and  overlapping  faults  and  faults  in  non-linear 
processes.    Further  investigations  could also  be  conducted  into  dividing  the  process  in 
different ways so that fault conditions are less correlated to each other leading to “logic” 
sections, which contains multiple physical units or multiple sections in one physical unit. 
 
7.4.3  Industrial implementation: opportunities and challenges 
This  project  has  a  lot  of  opportunities  for  industrial  implementation  of  the  integrated 
framework.    One  of  the  challenges  for  industrial  implementation  involves  operator 
integration.    The  success  or  failure  of  such  a  system  would  depend  on  the  operator’s 
acceptance and willingness to use such a system. Several decisions must be made when 
implementing an on-line intelligent system.  Some of these are listed below (Kramer and 
Fjellheim, 1996): An Integrated Run, Conclusions and Future Work                                               Chapter 7 
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￿￿ What  information  should  the  system  display  on  a  continuous  basis  and  what 
information should be accessed on demand? 
￿￿ How should status information be presented to the user so that the user always 
knows the status of the system at a glance?  How should the system focus user 
attention? 
￿￿ How should the system alert the operators when a deviation is detected, such as 
text, color-coding, sound, animation or a combination of techniques? 
￿￿ What  should  the end-user  screens  look  like  including  color,  layout,  information 
density, etc…?  How should the user navigate between screens?  What measures 
should be taken to ensure that important information is not missed if the user is “on 
the wrong page”? 
 
The technology can be easily developed however, the operator must be willing to use the 
system.    This  would  involve  discussions  with  the  operator  on  user  interfaces  and 
functionality and also adequate operator training.  One would also have to classify the exact 
role of the operator and intelligent system. 
 
Further developments could also be made with respect to the process-monitoring module.  
Data compression algorithms could be incorporated into this module, to allow historical 
data to be quickly retrieved and analyzed (Vedam and Venkatasubramanian, 1998).  An 
easily accessible historical database of important events should also be incorporated into 
this  module.    It  is  recommended  that  a  standard  data  reconciliation  module  such  as 
Sigmafine (OSI Software, Inc., 2003a) or PI (OSI Software, Inc., 2003b) be used as part of 
the data reconciliation module.  This way, reconciled values can be sent directly to the 
distributed control system (DCS) to be used as part of regulatory control.  Currently, the 
supervisory control module automatically sends new set points to the DCS.  In future, the 
operator or area manager should verify these new set points before they are sent to the 
DCS. An Integrated Run, Conclusions and Future Work                                               Chapter 7 
Page 7.18 
7.5  References 
Gensym Corporation (1997). G2 Gateway Bridge Developers Guide, Cambridge, MA. 
Kramer, M.A. and Fjellheim, R. (1996). “Fault Diagnosis and Computer-Aided Diagnostic 
Advisors”, proceedings of the International Conference on Intelligent Systems in 
Process Engineering, Snowmass, Colorado, pp. 12–24. 
OSI Software, Inc. (2003a). PI, [Online] Available: http://www.osisoft.com/PIsystem.htm 
OSI  Software,  Inc.  (2003b).  Sigmafine,  [Online]  Available: 
http://www.osisoft.com/290.htm 
Vedam,  H.  and  Venkatasubramanian,  V.  (1998).  A  B-Spline  based  Method  for  Data 
Compression,  Process  Monitoring  and  Diagnosis,  Computers  in  Chemical 
Engineering, 22 (Suppl), pp. S827 – S830. 
Zaknich, A. (2003). Neural Networks for Intelligent Signal Processing, World Scientific, 
Singapore.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix I:   FCV-541 OP Versus Flow Characteristic 
Appendix II:   Petri Net Boundary Conditions 
Appendix III:   Operators Users Manual - Honeywell 
Scan3000 System 
Appendix IV:  Operators Users Manual - Intelligent System 
  
 
 
 
 
  Appendix I 
FCV-541 OP Versus Flow Characteristic 
 
 
AI.1  Description 
This appendix contains the relationship between the opening of FCV-541 (%) and the flow 
through the valve (L/min).  The relationship is obtained by opening FCV-541 at increments 
of 5 – 10%, waiting for the process to be at steady state and then reading the flow of FT-
523.  This would be the same value of the flow going through FCV-541.  An external valve 
was included on the pipe leading to FCV-541 so that any pressure variations did not affect 
the inflow rate of the plant. 
 
From the graph in Fig. AI.1, the relationship between the flow of FCV-541 and the opening 
of the valve can be found as follows: 
 
862 . 0 * 1147 . 0 + = OP Flow               (I.1) 
 
Where:   Flow is the flow rate through the valve (L/min) 
    OP  is the opening of the valve (%) 
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The R-squared value indicated on the chart was obtained through a regression analysis.  
This  value  indicates  what  percentage  of  variability  in  the  graph  is  explainable  by  the 
obtained relationship.  
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Fig. AI.1. Relationship between the flow of FT-523 and the opening of FCV-541  
 
 
 
  Appendix II 
Petri Net Boundary Conditions 
 
 
AII.1  Description 
This  appendix  presents  the  graphs  of  569 569 - - - FT average FT
1,  Separation_Diff  and 
Heating_Diff versus time for: 
 
1.  Normal operation. 
2.  Fault originating in the Separation section: 
￿￿ NUFP-561 pump fault. 
￿￿ LT-542 sensor error. 
￿￿ LT-501 sensor error. 
3.  Fault originating in the Heating section: 
￿￿ Tank 3 leak. 
￿￿ PP-681 pump fault. 
￿￿ LT-667 sensor error. 
 
On each of the graphs, the selected bounds are plotted with which the mass balance and 
boundary sensor value must remain for normal plant operation.  These bounds are slightly 
                                                 
1 Because FT-569 was part of a control loop, the set point of FT-569 was used as the average value of FT-
569, ie. averageFT-569 = FT-569SP. Petri Net Boundary Conditions                                                                           Appendix II 
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higher than the actual bounds, which would be found from examining Fig. AII.3 to Fig. 
AII.5.  This is because numerous sets of data specifying normal operation (not included in 
this appendix) were plotted in order to find these bounds.  Using all this data the greatest 
upper bound and smallest lower bounds were then chosen as the selected upper and lower 
bounds. 
 
AII.2  Units Analysis for Graphs 
AII.2.1  Separation section 
 
Water
FCV-541
LT-542
Non-
Linear
Tank
FDP-521 FT-523
N
e
e
d
l
e
 
T
a
n
k
LT-501
NUFP-561 TT-568 FT-569
To Heating
Section
Separation Section
LC
LC
FC
 
Fig. AII.1. Separation section of the Pilot plant 
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Mass Balance 
The mass balance around the Separation section of the Pilot plant is as follows: 
569 541 - -
-
- - = + FT FCV
nt
nt
lin non
lin non F F
dt
dh
A
dt
dh
A         (II.1) 
Integrating this expression over the interval of  0 t  to t and re-arranging: 
( ) ￿ ￿ ￿ - -
-
- - = + ￿
t
t FT FCV
t
t
nt
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t
t
lin non
lin non dt F F dt
dt
dh
A dt
dt
dh
A
0 0 0
569 541     (II.2) 
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0
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0 0
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- - + ￿
￿ - -
- - - -
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t FT FCV
nt nt lin non lin non nt nt lin non lin non
dt F F
t h A t h A t h A t h A
   (II.3) 
Separation_Diff can then be defined as follows: 
 
( ) ￿ - -
- -
- -
- -
- -
+ =
t
t FT FCV
nt nt lin non lin non
nt nt lin non lin non
dt F F
t h A t h A
t h A t h A Diff Separation
0
569 541
0 0 ) ( ) (
) ( ) ( _
  (II.4) 
 
Where:   Anon-lin  is the surface area of the non-linear tank (m
2) 
Ant is the surface area of the needle tank (m
2) 
lin non h -  is the level of LT-542 (m) 
nt h  is the level of LT-501 (m) 
541 - FCV F  is the flow rate of FCV-541 (inflow rate of the Separation section) 
( min /
3 m ) (Appendix I) 
569 - FT F   is  the  flow  rate  of  FT-569  (the  outflow  rate  of  the  Separation 
section) ( min /
3 m ) 
 
From these calculations, the units for the graphs of Separation_Diff is meters (m
3).  Since 
the values were small, Separation_Diff was multiplied by 1000 for the G2 calculation. Petri Net Boundary Conditions                                                                           Appendix II 
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AII.2.2  Heating section 
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Fig. AII.2. Heating section of the Pilot plant 
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Mass Balance 
The mass balance around the Heating section of the Pilot plant is as follows: 
687 569
3
3 - - - = FT FT
T
T F F
dt
dh
A               (II.5) 
Integrating this expression over the interval of  0 t  to t and re-arranging: 
( ) ￿ ￿ - - - = ￿
t
t FT FT
t
t
T
T dt F F dt
dt
dh
A
0 0
687 569
3
3          (II.6) 
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t h t h       (II.8) 
Heating_Diff can then be defined as follows: 
 
( ) ￿ - - - - - =
t
t FT FT
T
T T dt F F
A
t h t h Diff Heating
0
687 569
3
0 3 3
1
) ( ) ( _     (II.9) 
 
Where:   AT3 is the surface area of Tank 3 (m
2) 
3 T h  is the level of LT-667 (m) 
569 - FT F   is  the  flow  rate  of  FT-569  (inflow  rate  of  the  Heating  section) 
( min /
3 m ) 
687 - FT F   is  the  flow  rate  of  FT-687  (outflow  rate  of  the  Heating  section) 
( min /
3 m ) 
 
Therefore, the units for the graphs of Heating_Diff is meters (m).  Since the values were 
small, Heating_Diff was multiplied by 1000 for the G2 calculation. Petri Net Boundary Conditions                                                                           Appendix II 
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AII.3  Graphs 
AII.3.1  Normal operation 
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Fig. AII.3. Graph of  569 569 - - - FT average FT  versus time for normal operation 
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Fig. AII.4. Graph of the Separation_Diff versus time for normal operation 
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AII.3.2  Faults originating from Separation section 
AII.1.3.2.1  Fault 1: NUFP-561 pump fault 
Fault 1: NUFP-561 Pump Fault
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Fig. AII.6. Graph of  569 569 - - - FT average FT  versus time for fault 1 
Fault 1: NUFP-561 Pump Fault
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Fig. AII.7. Graph of Separation_Diff versus time for fault 1 
Fault 1: NUFP-561 Pump Fault
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AII.1.3.2.2  Fault 2: LT-542 sensor error 
Fault 2: LT-542 Sensor Error
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Fig. AII.9. Graph of  569 569 - - - FT average FT  versus time for fault 2 
Fault 2: LT-542 Sensor Error
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Fig. AII.10. Graph of Separation_Diff versus time for fault 2 
Fault 2: LT-542 Sensor Error
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Fig. AII.11. Graph of Heating_Diff versus time for fault 2 Petri Net Boundary Conditions                                                                           Appendix II 
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AII.1.3.2.3  Fault 3: LT-501 sensor error 
Fault 3: LT-501 Sensor Error
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Fig. AII.12. Graph of  569 569 - - - FT average FT  versus time for fault 3 
Fault 3: LT-501 Sensor Error
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
0 200 400
Time (sec)
S
e
p
a
r
a
t
i
o
n
_
D
i
f
f
 
x
1
0
3
 
(
m
3
)
Actual values
Selected lower
bound
Selected upper
bound
 
Fig. AII.13. Graph of Separation_Diff versus time for fault 3 
Fault 3: LT-501 Sensor Error
-2
-1
0
1
2
0 200 400
Time (sec)
H
e
a
t
i
n
g
_
D
i
f
f
 
x
 
1
0
3
 
(
m
)
Actual  values
Selected lower
bound
Selected upper
bound
 
Fig. AII.14. Graph of Heating_Diff versus time for fault 3 Petri Net Boundary Conditions                                                                           Appendix II 
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AII.3.3  Faults originating from Heating section 
Faults  originating  in  the  Heating  section  would  not  affect  any  of  the  upstream 
measurements.  Hence for faults 4 to 6, only the graphs showing the Heating-difference 
have  been  included.    The  graphs  of  569 569 - - - FT average FT   and  Separation_Diff  are 
shown in Fig. AII.3 and Fig. AII.4 respectively. 
AII.1.3.3.1  Fault 4: tank 3 leaking 
Fault 4: Tank 3 Leaking
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Fig. AII.15. Graph of Heating_Diff versus time for fault 4 
AII.1.3.3.2  Fault 5: PP-681 pump fault 
Fault 5: PP-681 Pump Fault
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AII.1.3.3.3  Fault 6: LT-667 sensor error 
Fault 6: LT-667 Sensor Error
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Fig. AII.17. Graph of Heating_Diff versus time for fault 6 
 
AII.4  Comments on Fault Graphs 
In  all  fault  cases  plotted  in  the  previous  section,  it  was  not  necessary  to  violate  all 
conditions in order for a fault to be detected.  The following paragraphs outline the specific 
boundary conditions, which were violated, resulting in the detection of each fault. 
 
Fault 1:  NUFP-561 pump fault –  The detection of this fault is based  on the boundary 
conditions  relating  to  the  boundary  sensor  569 569 - - - FT average FT   becoming  violated 
(less than its lower bound).  This is covered by condition 1 (Table 5.7, Chapter 5, section 
5.5.4).  Depending on the fault severity, boundary conditions for the Separation_Diff and 
Heating_Diff may also become violated. 
 
Fault  2:  LT-542  sensor  error  –  The  detection  of  this  fault  is  based  on  the  boundary 
condition relating to the Separation_Diff becoming violated (less than its lower bound).  
This is covered by condition 2 (Table 5.7, Chapter 5, section 5.5.4).  Depending on the fault 
severity, other boundary conditions may become violated. 
 
Fault  3:  LT-501  sensor  error  –  The  detection  of  this  fault  is  based  on  the  boundary 
condition  relating  to  569 569 - - - FT average FT   (greater  than  its  upper  bound)  and Petri Net Boundary Conditions                                                                           Appendix II 
Page AII.12 
Separation_Diff  (less  than  its  lower  bound)  becoming  violated.    This  is  covered  by 
condition  3  (Table  5.7,  Chapter  5,  section  5.5.4).    Depending  on  the  fault  severity, 
boundary conditions relating to the Heating_Diff may also become violated. 
 
Fault 4: tank 3 leaking – The detection of this fault is based on the boundary condition 
relating to Heating_Diff becoming violated (less than its lower bound).  This is covered by 
condition 4 (Table 5.7, Chapter 5, section 5.5.4). 
 
Fault 5: PP-681 pump fault – The detection of this fault is based on the boundary condition 
relating to Heating_Diff becoming violated (less than its lower bound). This is covered by 
condition 4 (Table 5.7, Chapter 5, section 5.5.4).  The case shown in the graph of Fig. 
AII.16 does not show a fault severity capable of violating the boundary condition. 
 
Fault  6:  LT-667  sensor  error  –  The  detection  of  this  fault  is  based  on  the  boundary 
condition relating to Heating_Diff becoming violated (less than its lower bound).  This is 
covered by condition 4 (Table 5.7, Chapter 5, section 5.5.4) 
  
 
 
 
 
  Appendix III 
Operators Users Manual 
Honeywell Scan3000 System 
 
 
AIII.1  Description 
This  manual  was  provided  to  the  operator  in  order  to  run  the  Honeywell  Scan3000 
system.  It provided an introduction to: 
 
￿￿ Plant schematic. 
￿￿ Honeywell Scan3000 schematics. 
￿￿ Initial process set points. 
￿￿ Controller settings. 
￿￿ Plant control modes: 
®  Manual control. 
®  Automatic control. 
￿￿ Initial plant configuration (Honeywell Scan3000 system). 
￿￿ Chart listings. 
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AIII.2  Manual: Honeywell Scan3000 System 
AIII.2.1  Process schematic 
 
Water
FCV-541
LT-542
Non-
Linear
Tank
FDP-521 FT-523
N
e
e
d
l
e
 
T
a
n
k
LT-501
NUFP-561 TT-568 FT-569
FCV-622
TT-623
FCV-642
TT-643
FCV-662
TT-663
Steam
PT-669
PP-681
FT-687
LT-667
Tank 1
Tank 2
Tank 3
Heating Section
Separation Section
LC
LC
LC
TC
TC
TC
FC
 
Fig. AIII.1. Schematic for Separation and Heating section of Pilot plant Operators Users Manual Honeywell Scan3000 System                                    Appendix III 
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AIII.2.2  Honeywell Scan3000 schematics 
 
 
Fig. AIII.2. Honeywell Scan3000 schematic Separation section Operators Users Manual Honeywell Scan3000 System                                    Appendix III 
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Fig. AIII.3. Honeywell Scan 3000 schematic Heating section Operators Users Manual Honeywell Scan3000 System                                    Appendix III 
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AIII.2.3  Initial process set points 
 
Note: All variables below require automatic (Auto) operation of the PI controllers. 
 
No.  Manipulated Variable  Controlled Variable  SP of Controlled Variable 
Separation section 
1.  FCV-541  LT-542  60% 
2.  FDP-521  LT-501  60% 
3.  NUFP-561  FT-569  50% (production rate) 
Heating section 
4.  FCV-622  TT-623  50°C 
5.  FCV-642  TT-643  60°C 
6.  FCV-662  TT-663  75°C 
8.  PP-681  LT-667  90% 
 
 
AIII.2.4  Controller settings 
 
Table AIII.1. Settings for PI controllers 
Control Loop 
c K   I t  
FCV-541 / LT642  5  6 
FDP-523 / LT-501  4  1.2 
NUFP-561 / FT-569  2  3 
PP-681 / LT667  3  3 
FCV-622 / TT-623  26  10 
FCV-642 / TT-643  26  10 
FCV-662 / TT-663  26  10 
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AIII.2.5  Plant control mode 
 
Fig. AIII.4. Mode of controller operation 
 
AIII.2.5.1  Manual control 
Mode: Man 
It is now possible to change the OP of the selected variable.  Note that SP is no longer 
valid. 
 
AIII.2.5.2  Automatic control 
Mode: Auto 
It is now possible to change the SP of the variable.  Note that the OP can no longer be 
changed. 
Controller Mode: 
‘Man’ or ‘Auto’ Operators Users Manual Honeywell Scan3000 System                                    Appendix III 
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AIII.2.6  Initial plant configurations (Honeywell Scan 3000 system) 
General settings: 
·  FCV-541 should never be set to manual with an OP of 0%. 
·  FCV-570 should always be set to manual with an OP of 100%. 
·  FCV-688 should always be set to manual with an OP of 100%. 
 
Recycles: 
·  FCV-690 should always be set to manual with an OP of 0%. 
·  SV-691, SV-692, SV-693, SV-614, SV-615 and SV-616 should always be closed. 
·  DP-611 should always remain off (manual with an OP of 0%). 
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AIII.2.7  Charts 
In order to display the process trends select the trend icon and type in the trend number. 
 
Sensor  Parameter  Trend 
FCV-541  PV  55 
  SP  55 
  OP  55 
LT-542  PV  55 
FDP-521  PV  55 
  SP  55 
  OP  55 
FT-523  PV  55 
LT-501  PV  56 
NUFP-561  PV  56 
  SP  56 
  OP  56 
TT-568  PV  56 
FT-569  PV  56 
FCV-622  PV  56 
  SP  56 
  OP  57 
FCV-642  PV  57 
  SP  57 
  OP  57 
FCV-662  PV  57 
  SP  57 
  OP  57 
TT-623  PV  57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sensor  Parameter  Trend 
TT-643  PV  58 
TT-663  PV  58 
LT-667  PV  58 
PP-681  PV  58 
  SP  58 
  OP  58 
PT-669  PV  58 
FT-687  PV  58 
FCV-690  PV  59 
  SP  59 
  OP  59 
FT-689  PV  59 
SV-691  PV  59 
SV-692  PV  59 
SV-693  PV  59 
DP-611  PV  59 
  SP  60 
  OP  60 
FT-613  PV  60 
SV-614  PV  60 
SV-615  PV  60 
SV-616  PV  60 
  
 
 
 
 
  Appendix IV 
Operators Users Manual  
Intelligent System 
 
 
AIV.1  Description 
This manual was provided to the operator in order to navigate through the intelligent 
system which was developed in G2 as part of this project.  The manual is divided into 
sections as follows: 
 
￿￿ Module overview. 
￿￿ Process schematics. 
®  Equipment and tables. 
￿￿ Integration Petri nets. 
￿￿ Process monitoring (PM). 
￿￿ Data reconciliation (DR). 
®  DR operator input. 
®  Raw and reconciled values. 
®  Sensors in error. 
®  Sensor drift detected. 
®  Sensor drift list. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
  AII.2
®  Errors in the DR module. 
￿￿ Supervisory control (SC). 
®  SC operator input. 
®  SC new set points. 
®  Error in SC module. 
￿￿ Fault detection and diagnosis (FDD). 
®  FDD operator input. 
®  Fault detection Petri net. 
®  Boundary graphs. 
®  Fault detected. 
®  Fault diagnosed. 
®  Fault cannot be fixed immediately. 
￿￿ Alarms list. 
￿￿ Other useful G2 commands. 
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AIV.2  Manual: Navigation Throughout the Intelligent System 
AIV.2.1  Module overview 
Every module can be accessed from Module Overview workspace shown in Fig. AIV.1.  If 
the module overview is not automatically displayed in the center of the screen or has been 
closed,  then  it  can  be  accessed  via  the  toolbar  at  the  top  of  the  screen  by  selecting 
Integration Petri Nets ® ® ® ® Module Overview. 
 
 
Fig. AIV.1. Module Overview workspace 
 
Individual module can also be accessed from the modules toolbar at the top of the screen as 
shown in Fig. AIV.2. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
  Page AIV.4
 
 
Fig. AIV.2. Modules toolbar 
 
AIV.2.2  Process schematics 
The  Separation  and  Heating  Overview  (process  schematics)  can  be  accessed  from  the  
Process Schematics section of the Module Overview.  They can also be accessed from 
Schematics Toolbar.  Diagrams of the Separation and Heating overview are presented in 
Fig. AIV.3 and Fig. AIV.4 respectively. 
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Fig. AIV.3. Separation section schematic 
 
Fig. AIV.4. Heating section schematic Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
  Page AIV.6 
AIV.2.2.1  Equipment and tables 
From the process schematics workspaces, tables for sensors for particular pieces of process 
equipment can be accessed by selecting the equipment icon.  To obtain further details on 
sensor select the variable of interest go to its sub-table.  The table of FT-523 is shown in 
Fig. AIV.5. 
 
 
Fig. AIV.5. Sample table FT-523 
 
AIV.2.3  Integration Petri nets 
Selecting the Task Coordination Integration Petri Nets icon on the  Module Overview 
workspace  (Fig.  AIV.1)  provides  access  to  the  integration  Petri  nets  as  shown  in  Fig. 
AIV.6.  Specific integration Petri net can also be accessed via the toolbar at the top of the 
screen. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
  Page AIV.7 
 
 
Fig. AIV.6. Task coordination integration Petri nets workspace 
 
The integration Petri nets can be disabled or reset from the Task Coordination Integration 
Petri Nets workspace.  The Petri nets have been organized according to modules.  All Petri 
nets can be viewed from this workspace. 
 
When  viewing  the  integration  Petri  nets,  selection  of  the  appropriate  place  provides  a 
description of the place.  An example of these place descriptions is shown in Fig. AIV.7.  
To hide the place description, select the description. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
  Page AIV.8
 
 
Fig. AIV.7. Place descriptions on integration Petri net 
 
AIV.2.4  Process monitoring 
Process Monitors: Indicate if the process is at steady state (ss) or unsteady state (uss). 
 
The  process  monitors  for  the  Separation  section,  Heating  section  and  total  plant  (both 
sections combined) are displayed in Fig. AIV.8.  These indicate whether the plant section 
or total plant is at steady (SS) or unsteady state (USS). Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
  Page AIV.9
 
 
Fig. AIV.8. Process monitors for the Separation and Heating section of the Pilot plant 
 
Sensor Monitors: Indicate if a particular sensor is reading a steady state (ss) or unsteady 
state (uss) value or is in error (err). 
 
Selecting a particular process monitor in Fig. AIV.8, displays the collection of sensors that 
make  up  the  process  monitor.    Each  sensor  monitor  has  an  indicator,  which  turns  red 
indicating if the sensor is at steady state (SS), unsteady state (USS) or in error (Error). 
 
The  sensor  monitors  making  up  the  Heating  section  (Precipitation-Section-Process-
Monitors in Fig. AIV.8) of the Pilot plant is shown in Fig. AIV.9. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
  Page AIV.10
 
 
Fig. AIV.9. Heating section sensor monitors 
 
Selecting each individual sensor monitor displays a workspace of the particular sensor.  
This workspace also includes an action button, which displays the particular sensor on the 
process schematics.  Details of the sensor includes: 
 
￿￿ Steady state: A value of “1” indicates that the sensor is at steady state and a value of 
“0” indicates the sensor is not at steady state. 
￿￿ Ss-start-time: The time that the sensor started being at steady state. 
￿￿ Ss-end-time: The time that the sensor finished being at steady state. 
￿￿ Ss-duration: The duration of the sensor being at steady state. 
￿￿ Sensor-reading: The current value of the sensor. 
￿￿ Nss-start-time: The time that the sensor departed steady state. 
￿￿ Nss-end-time: The time the sensor returned to steady state. 
￿￿ Nss-duration: The duration of the sensor being at unsteady state. 
￿￿ Error: Indicates if the sensor is in error.  A value of “1” indicates that the sensor is 
in error and a value of “0” indicates that the sensor is ok. 
￿￿ Error-end-time: The time that the sensor error was repaired. 
￿￿ Error-duration: The duration of the sensor being in error. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
  Page AIV.11
AIV.2.5  Data reconciliation 
The data reconciliation module is used to detect sensor drift and sensor mis-calibration. 
 
The  data  reconciliation  module  automatically  runs  at  the  frequency  entered  on  the  DR 
Operator Input workspace (Fig. AIV.10).  Data reconciliation can also be run manually by 
pressing the Request Running Data Reconciliation Module action button which can be 
found on the following workspaces: 
 
￿￿ Module Overview (data reconciliation section). 
￿￿ Operator Input Workspace. 
￿￿ Data  reconciliation  integration  Petri  nets  workspaces  (Starting  DR  Petri  net  and 
Main DR Petri net). 
 
AIV.2.5.1  DR operator input 
The DR Operator Input workspace is shown in Fig. AIV.10. 
 
 
Fig. AIV.10. DR user input screen Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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From this workspace, it is possible to enter: 
 
￿￿ The rate at which the data reconciliation module should be run (default value 900 
seconds or 15 minutes).  This value should be between 300 seconds (5 minutes) and 
3600 seconds (6 hours).  A recommended value for the Pilot plant is 900 seconds 
(15 minutes). 
￿￿ The Plant section to be reconciled, where: 
 
®  Section “1” represents the total plant (Separation and Heating section). 
®  Section “2” represents the Separation section. 
®  Section “3” represents the Heating section. 
 
The following indicators are also provided: 
 
￿￿ “DR-Running” to indicate the status of the DR module.  Where, a value of: 
 
®  “1” indicates that the DR module is running. 
®  “0” indicates that the DR module is not running. 
®   “-1” indicates that there is an error in the DR module. 
 
￿￿ The number of seconds ago that DR was last performed. 
￿￿ The number of seconds before the DR module will automatically re-run. 
 
AIV.2.5.2  Raw and reconciled values 
The  Raw  and  Reconciled  Values  workspace  is  shown  in  Fig.  AIV.11.    This  provides 
access to: Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
  Page AIV.13
 
￿￿ The current time. 
￿￿ The number of seconds ago that DR was last performed (that is when the raw and 
reconciled values on the workspace were updated). 
￿￿ The plant section, which was reconciled. 
￿￿ The raw and reconciled value of each variable in which DR was performed. 
 
 
Fig. AIV.11. Raw and reconciled sensor values 
 
AIV.2.5.3  Sensors in error 
The DR Sensor Error Operator Screen (Fig. AIV.12) is used to indicate the sensors in 
errors. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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Fig. AIV.12. DR sensor error operator screen 
 
When a sensor is in error, the component of the sensor icon labeled “Error” turns red.  This 
indicates that the sensor should be fixed before the DR module is re-run.  Two action 
buttons are presented for each sensor, which are to be used when the sensor is in error:  
 
(i)  The action button labeled “Use Nominal Value” repeats the data reconciliation 
calculation using a nominal (either calculated or set point) value for the sensor 
in error. 
(ii)  The action button labeled “Use Raw Value” uses the raw sensor value of the 
corresponding sensor in the data reconciliation calculation.   
 
When either of these options is chosen the icon color of the option chosen turns red and the 
“Error”  icon  color  changes  to  orange  indicating  that  the  sensor  error  repair  has  been 
confirmed. 
 
The action button located next to each sensor icon labeled “Go to {Sensor Name}” displays 
the particular process schematic where the sensor is located.   
 
The action button labeled “Raw and Reconciled Values” displays the workspace shown in 
Fig. AIV.11. 
 Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
  Page AIV.15
Selecting a particular sensor icon in Fig. AIV.12 the specific DR Sensor Details Screen is 
displayed.    An  example  of  the  DR  sensor  details  screen  for  TT-623  is  shown  in  Fig. 
AIV.13.  The screen provides details of: 
 
￿￿ The reconciled value of the sensor: This is the reconciled value of the sensor after 
the data reconciliation calculation. 
￿￿ The value to reconcile of the reconciled value of the sensor: This is the sensor 
value, which was used in data reconciliation calculation. 
￿￿ The nominal value of the reconciled value of the sensor: If the option “use nominal 
value” is chosen when running the data reconciliation module (Fig. AIV.12), then 
the value shown on this display is the data value, which will be used in place of the 
raw sensor value (the value to reconcile of the reconciled value of the sensor). 
￿￿ The sensor-drift of the reconciled-value of the sensor: This indicates that sensor 
drift has been detected, where a value of “1” indicates sensor drift and a value of 
“0” indicates no sensor drift or normal operation. 
￿￿ The use-nominal-value of the reconciled-value of the sensor: This indicates if the 
raw or nominal value of the sensor is used in the data reconciliation calculation 
(Fig. AIV.12).  A value of “1” indicates that the nominal value of the sensor is 
being used and a value of “0” indicates that the raw sensor value is being used. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
  Page AIV.16 
 
 
Fig. AIV.13. DR sensor details screen 
 
AIV.2.5.4  Sensor drift detected 
When  the  data  reconciliation  module  has  run  and  sensor  drift  is  detected,  the  pop-up 
workspace  shown  in  Fig.  AIV.14  is  automatically  displayed  which  provides  options 
relating to the repair of sensor drift as follows. 
 
￿￿ Manually fix the sensors in error: To manually fix the sensors in error, select the 
action  button  labeled  “Take  me  to  the  sensor-error  screen”.    This  displays  the 
workspace shown in Fig. AIV.12.  When all of the sensors have been repaired, the 
action button labeled “DR Module Error Fixed” in Fig. AIV.14 should be selected 
to indicate that the sensors have been repaired and to allow data reconciliation to 
continue. 
￿￿ Use nominal values: The action button labeled “Let the Computer Fix It!” can be 
selected if it is chosen for the computer to re-run the data reconciliation module 
using nominal values for the sensor in errors. 
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If there is no response to the sensors in error pop-up workspace within 5 minutes, then the 
data reconciliation module is automatically re-run using nominal sensor value for sensors in 
error. 
 
 
Fig. AIV.14. Data Reconciliation dynamically created workspace indicating  
sensors in error 
 
AIV.2.5.5  Sensor drift list 
The Sensor Drift List workspace is shown in Fig. AIV.15.  It provides a list of the sensors 
in which drift has been detected and the time when this occurred. 
 
 
Fig. AIV.15. Sensor drift list workspace Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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AIV.2.5.6  Error in the DR module 
The  workspace  presented  in  Fig.  AIV.16  is  displayed  if  there  is  an  error  in  the  data 
reconciliation module.  Generally this error occurs if: 
 
(i)  The data reconciliation input CSV file (DR_Raw.csv) is opened or being 
used by another program. 
(ii)  The data reconciliation output CSV file (OutputDR.csv) is opened or being 
used by another program.   
 
Either closing the input or output file repairs this error.  Once the error has been repaired, 
select the action button labeled “DR Module Error Fixed” so that the data reconciliation 
module can be automatically re-run. 
 
 
Fig. AIV.16. Data reconciliation module error screen 
 
AIV.2.6  Supervisory control 
The supervisory control module is used to find optimum set points of TT-623, TT-643 and 
TT-663 for product temperature specification changes or large temperature disturbances.  
The new set points are automatically sent to the Honeywell Scan3000 system. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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￿￿ The SC module is set to run periodically every hour.  It is also automatically run if there 
is a large water or air temperature disturbance or can be manually run following an 
operator request after a product specification change. 
￿￿ The supervisory control module uses the reconciled values from the data reconciliation 
calculation and so data reconciliation is automatically performed when a request to run 
supervisory control occurs. 
￿￿ If the supervisory control module is run, and no process set points are changed, then the 
plant operation continues using current set points. 
￿￿ If the supervisory control module is run and there are set point changes, then the new 
set  points  are  automatically  sent  to  the  Honeywell  Scan3000  system  and  the  fault 
detection and diagnosis module is stopped until the plant reaches its new steady state. 
 
AIV.2.6.1  SC operator input 
The Supervisory Control Operator Input Workspace is shown in Fig. AIV.17. 
 
￿￿ When starting the plant for the first time, make sure that the average temperature for 
TT-568 (input water temperature of the tanks) is entered into the type in box labeled 
“Enter the average water temperature (TT-568): (deg C):”.  A suggested value is to the 
current value read from the Honeywell Scan3000 system. 
￿￿ The workspace also allows input of the frequency according to which the supervisory 
control module is to be run (default value 3600 seconds or 1 hour).  This value should 
be between 900 seconds (15 minutes) and 21600 seconds (6 hours).  A recommended 
value for the Pilot plant is 3500 seconds (1 hour). 
￿￿ Current air temperature and the product specification bounds can be entered on this 
screen.    If  any  of  these  variables  are  change,  then  the  supervisory  control  module 
should be run again by selecting the “Request Running Supervisory Control” action 
button. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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Fig. AIV.17. SC user input workspace 
 
AIV.2.6.2  SC new set points 
The New Set Points workspace (Fig. AIV.18) indicates the time supervisory control was 
last performed and the current process set points. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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Fig. AIV.18. Supervisory control new set points screen 
 
AIV.2.6.3  Error in SC module 
The workspace shown in Fig. AIV.19 is displayed if there is an error in the supervisory 
control module.  Generally this error occurs if: 
 
(i)  The supervisory control input CSV file (SC_Input.csv) is opened or being 
used by another program. 
(ii)  The  supervisory  control  output  CSV  file  (SC_output.CSV)  is  opened  or 
being used by another program.   
 
Generally these errors can be repaired by closing either the input or output file.  Once the 
error has been repaired, select the button labeled “SC Module Error Fixed” so that the 
supervisory control module can automatically be re-run. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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Fig. AIV.19. Error in SC module 
AIV.2.7  Fault detection and diagnosis 
The fault detection and diagnosis module detects and diagnoses faults in the Separation 
and Heating section of the Pilot plant. 
 
AIV.2.7.1  FDD operator input  
The Fault Detection and Diagnosis User Input Screen is presented in Fig. AIV.20. 
 
Fig. AIV.20. Fault detection and diagnosis user input screen Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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￿￿ “FDD-Running” indicates the status of the fault detection and diagnose module, where: 
 
®  “1” indicates that the FDD module is running. 
®  “0” indicates the FDD module is not running. 
®  “-1” indicates that there is an error in the FDD module. 
 
￿￿ The action button labeled “Request Running Fault Detection and Diagnosis” can be 
pressed  if  “FDD-Running  =  0”  and  it  is  required  to  have  the  fault  detection  and 
diagnosis module running. 
￿￿ The action button labeled “Request Stop Running Fault Detection and Diagnosis” can 
be  pressed  if  “FDD-Running  =  1”  and  it  is  required  for  the  fault  detection  and 
diagnosis module to stop running. 
￿￿ If a fault is manually diagnosed before the fault detection and diagnosis module offers a 
diagnosis or if the fault detection and diagnosis module has missed detecting a fault in 
the plant then the action button labeled “Operator Diagnoses Fault” can be selected.  
This action button can also be found on the Module Overview and Fault Detection and 
Diagnosis Integration Petri Net workspaces. 
￿￿ The  action  buttons  “Start  fault-diagnosis-separation-nn”  and  “Start  fault-diagnosis-
heating-nn” can be pressed if the fault detection module has not detected a fault and the 
a  fault  is  suspected  in  the  plant.    This  manually  starts  the  fault  diagnosis  neural 
networks for the particular plant section. 
￿￿ The displays labeled “Separation-fault-detected” and “Heating-fault-detected” indicates 
if a fault is detected in the Separation or Heating section of the Pilot plant.  A value of  
“1” indicates that a fault has been detected and “0” indicates normal operation. 
￿￿ The displays labeled “Separation-fault-number” and “Heating-fault-number” indicates 
the fault number detected in the Separation and the Heating section of the Pilot plant.  
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AIV.2.7.2  Fault detection Petri net 
The workspace shown in Fig. AIV.21 is the fault detection Petri net.  Descriptions of each 
place consisting of the boundary condition, which the place represents, are displayed when 
the input places (B0 to B9) are selected.  When a fault is detected the fault number is 
indicated  in  the  displays  labeled  “Separation-fault-number”  or  “Heating-fault-number” 
depending on the plant section in which the fault originated.  
 
 
Fig. AIV.21. Fault detection Petri net 
 
AIV.2.7.3  Boundary graphs 
The workspace shown in Fig. AIV.22 is used to indicate boundary conditions for normal 
plant operation.  Three graphs are provided including: Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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(i)  FT-569 boundary conditions and actual values. 
(ii)  Heating difference boundary conditions and actual values 
(iii)  Separation difference boundary conditions and actual values. 
 
For normal operation, current values should remain between the upper and lower bounds on 
each graph.  When the values no longer remain within these limits, this indicates that there 
is a fault in that particular sensor or section of the Pilot plant. 
 
Individual fault diagnosis neural networks can be run form these screen by selecting the 
appropriate action button. 
 
Selecting the action button labeled “Record this Data” creates a data file containing upper 
and lower limits and current values for each of these graphs for the past five minutes of 
data collection. 
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AIV.2.7.4  Fault detected 
When a fault is detected the background color of the following workspaces changes from 
pink to salmon: 
 
￿￿ Fault Detection and Diagnosis Integration Petri Net. 
￿￿ Module Overview. 
￿￿ Inputs to DR Integration PN. 
￿￿ Data Reconciliation Integration Petri Net. 
￿￿ Inputs to SC Integration PN. 
￿￿ Supervisory Control Integration Petri Net. 
￿￿ Stopping Fault Detection and Diagnosis. 
￿￿ Starting Fault Detection and Diagnosis. 
￿￿ Fault Detected Cross Connections I. 
￿￿ Fault Detected Cross Connections II. 
￿￿ Fault Repair Integration Petri Net. 
 
An example of this is illustrated in Fig. AIV.23 for the Fault Detection and Diagnosis 
Integration Petri Net. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
  Page AIV.27 
Normal plant operation
Fault detected in plant
 
Fig. AIV.23. Fault detection and diagnosis integration Petri net fault detected Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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Once a fault is detected in the plant, if the fault is not diagnosed within two minutes by 
either the fault detection and diagnosis module or the operator, a pop-up workspace appears 
asking for indication that: 
 
(i)  The  fault  has  been  diagnosed.    If  this  is  the  case,  the  action  button  labeled 
“Fault has been diagnosed” must be selected. 
(ii)  The fault cannot be diagnosed, in which case a confirmation of this event is 
made via the action button labeled “Fault cannot be diagnosed”. 
 
 
Fig. AIV.24. Fault diagnosed operator input workspace 
 
AIV.2.7.5  Fault diagnosed 
When a fault is diagnosed in the plant a pop-up workspace (Fig. AIV.25) is displayed 
asking for input as to whether the: 
 
(i)  Fault has been fixed.  This choice is made through the action button labeled 
“Fault Fixed”. 
(ii)  Fault cannot be  fixed immediately.   This choice is made through the action 
button labeled “Fault cannot be fixed immediately”. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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Fig. AIV.25. Fault diagnosed workspace 
 
￿￿ If there is no response to either the workspace shown in Fig. AIV.24 or Fig. AIV.25 
within 5 minutes, then the plant remains in ‘faulty auto operation’ and the workspace 
shown in Fig. AIV.26 is displayed which is covered in the next section. 
 
AIV.2.7.6  Fault cannot be fixed immediately 
When a fault is diagnosed in the plant or the fault, which has been detected and diagnosed, 
cannot be fixed immediately, a pop up workspace is displayed as shown in Fig. AIV.1. 
 
 
Fig. AIV.26. Fault diagnosed or fault cannot be fixed immediately workspace Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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This workspace provides options relating to plant operation following the diagnosis of the  
fault: 
 
(i)  Remain in Faulty ‘Auto’ Operation is the best option to choose if the fault is 
not too large and plant operation can continue as is.  For less serious faults, 
PI controllers are able to adapt to accommodate the faults.  If this option is 
chosen, a time interval should be entered to display a reminder that the plant 
is in ‘faulty auto mode’.  This time interval can be entered in the “type in 
box” above the action button.  The default time is set to 5 minutes. 
(ii)  Change the plant section to ‘manual’ control is chosen if the fault is larger 
and the plant controllers cannot continue using ‘auto’ control.  When the 
controllers are operating in this mode, repairs must be scheduled or the plant 
shutdown,  which  is  indicated  through  action  buttons  on  the  workspace 
shown in Fig. AIV.27. 
 
 
Fig. AIV.27. Pop-up workspace for input when plant section is operating in manual mode 
 
If  the  Schedule  Repairs  option  is  chosen  in  Fig.  AIV.27,  the  pop-up 
workspace shown in Fig. AIV.28 is displayed asking for an indication on 
when the repairs have been finished. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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Fig. AIV.28. Pop-up workspace to indicate when plant repairs have been made 
 
Once repairs have been made the pop up workspace shown in Fig. AIV.29 is 
displayed  as  a  reminder  to  change  the  plant  controllers  back  to  ‘auto’ 
operation.  
 
 
Fig. AIV.29. Pop-up workspace to indicate when plant section has been returned to ‘auto’ 
operation 
 
(iii)  Schedule Repairs.  If the operator chooses this option, once the repairs are 
made, the operator must confirm that he/she has completed repairs so the 
plant can return to normal operation.  This is done through the workspace 
shown in Fig. AIV.28. 
(iv)  Shutdown the Plant.  This option is chosen as a last resort in the case of 
severe faults.  Shutting down the plant can result in lost production. Operators Users Manual Intelligent System   Appendix IV 
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AIV.2.8  Alarms List 
An alarms list for fault occurring in the Pilot plant can be accessed via the Alarms section 
of the Module Overview or from the toolbar at the top of the screen by selecting Alarms  ® ® ® ® 
Pilot Plant Alarms Summary.  When viewing the alarm list it is sometimes necessary to 
scroll up and down before alarms are visible. 
 
AIV.2.9  Other useful G2 commands 
￿￿ To  center  a  G2  screen  hold-down  Ctrl  and  press  the  full  stop  over  the  selected 
workspace. 
￿￿ To  make  a  G2  screen  larger  hold-down  Ctrl  and  press  the  b  over  the  selected 
workspace. 
￿￿ To  make  a  G2  screen  smaller  hold-down  Ctrl  and  press  the  s  over  the  selected 
workspace. 